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Introduction	  
	  	   This	  project	  was	  inspired	  by	  my	  long-­‐standing,	  but	  partially	  examined,	  view	  that	  it	  is	  morally	  wrong	  to	  eat	  animals	  or	  their	  secretions,	  or	  otherwise	  use	  their	  bodies	  to	  suit	  our	  ends.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  I	  believe	  that	  we	  all	  ought	  to	  be	  vegans	  for	  moral	  reasons.	  This	  thesis	  represents	  the	  beginning	  of	  my	  philosophical	  thinking	  about	  this	  issue.	  	  	   I	  have	  come	  to	  think	  about	  my	  opposition	  to	  animal	  exploitation	  in	  terms	  of	  speciesism,	  which	  can	  be	  understood,	  for	  now,	  as	  an	  unjust	  prejudice	  that	  wrongly	  justifies	  ignoring	  or	  overriding	  the	  interests	  of	  other	  animals.	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  project	  is	  to	  identify	  what	  we	  ought	  to	  do	  about	  speciesism,	  on	  the	  individual	  level.	  I	  will	  identify	  our	  minimal	  moral	  obligation	  to	  other	  animals,	  and	  I	  will	  consider	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  we	  might	  undermine	  speciesism.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  this	  well,	  we	  must	  first	  have	  a	  good	  understanding	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  speciesism	  (what	  is	  it?)	  and	  we	  must	  have	  a	  strong	  account	  of	  why	  other	  animals	  matter	  morally	  and	  what	  obligations	  we	  have	  to	  them.	  	  	   This	  thesis	  will	  proceed	  as	  follows.	  There	  will	  be	  three	  chapters.	  In	  the	  first	  chapter,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  dominant	  conception	  of	  speciesism,	  which	  is	  understood	  as	  a	  form	  of	  prejudice	  that	  wrongly	  justifies	  ignoring	  or	  overriding	  the	  interests	  of	  animals,	  fails	  to	  adequately	  capture	  the	  complex	  nature	  of	  speciesism.	  I	  argue	  that	  speciesism	  is	  better	  understood	  as	  a	  pernicious	  ideology	  that	  consists	  in	  widespread	  illusory	  beliefs	  about	  nonhuman	  animals.	  These	  have	  a	  profound	  impact	  on	  behavior,	  are	  often	  held	  for	  non-­‐cognitive	  reasons,	  and	  serve	  to	  establish	  and	  stabilize	  the	  oppression	  of	  nonhuman	  animals.	  This	  conception	  is	  stronger	  than	  the	  dominant	  account	  because	  it	  not	  only	  identifies	  the	  problematic	  phenomenon	  (widespread	  speciesist	  beliefs),	  it	  also	  explains	  why	  these	  beliefs	  persist	  in	  the	  face	  of	  reason,	  and	  it	  provides	  us	  with	  reasons	  to	  reject	  it.	  In	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the	  second	  chapter,	  I	  present	  three	  competing	  theories	  of	  animal	  “rights”—Peter	  Singer’s	  utilitarian	  theory	  of	  animal	  rights,	  Tom	  Regan’s	  deontological	  theory	  of	  animal	  rights,	  and	  Gary	  Francione’s	  abolitionist	  theory	  of	  animal	  rights.	  I	  conclude	  that	  Francione’s	  account	  is	  the	  strongest,	  and	  therefore	  it	  ought	  to	  be	  adopted,	  clarified	  and	  further	  developed.	  In	  the	  third	  chapter,	  I	  discuss	  our	  minimal	  obligations	  to	  other	  animals.	  Specifically,	  I	  conclude	  that	  we	  are	  morally	  obligated	  to	  opt	  out	  of	  animal	  exploitation	  to	  the	  greatest	  extent	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  do	  so.	  That	  is,	  we	  ought	  to	  be	  vegans.	  I	  then	  briefly	  consider	  how	  we	  might	  reconceptualize	  our	  relationships	  with	  other	  animals.	  Finally,	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  ideological	  nature	  of	  speciesism,	  I	  explore	  strategies	  for	  combating	  it.	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Chapter	  1:	  Speciesm	  is	  an	  Ideology	  
	  1.1	  Introduction	  
	  	   The	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  explain	  what	  speciesism	  is	  and	  to	  establish	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  reject	  it.	  Here	  is	  a	  preliminary	  and	  commonly	  accepted	  definition:	  Speciesism	  is	  an	  unjust	  prejudice	  akin	  to	  racism	  and	  sexism	  insofar	  as	  the	  interests	  of	  nonhuman	  animals	  are	  ignored	  or	  overridden	  based	  on	  their	  species	  membership	  alone.	  Speciesism	  is	  distinct	  from	  mere	  differential	  treatment	  between	  humans	  and	  nonhumans.	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  differences	  between	  humans	  and	  other	  animals	  sometimes	  justify	  differential	  treatment.	  	  	   Suppose	  we	  want	  to	  decide	  to	  whom	  we	  ought	  to	  grant	  a	  college	  scholarship:	  a	  dog	  or	  a	  human.	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  we	  would	  be	  morally	  justified	  in	  refusing	  to	  consider	  the	  dog	  for	  the	  scholarship,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  dogs	  lack	  the	  kind	  of	  cognitive	  abilities	  necessary	  to	  benefit	  from	  higher	  education.	  Since	  dogs	  are	  not	  the	  kinds	  of	  beings	  that	  desire	  to	  go	  to	  college	  or	  that	  could	  benefit	  intellectually	  from	  doing	  so,	  we	  are	  morally	  justified	  in	  categorically	  excluding	  the	  species	  Canis	  lupus	  familiaris	  from	  considerations	  about	  higher	  education	  admissions.	  Notice,	  however,	  that	  we	  are	  justified	  in	  excluding	  all	  dogs	  from	  being	  considered	  for	  higher	  education	  not	  merely	  because	  they	  belong	  to	  the	  species	  Canis	  
lupus	  familiaris.	  Rather,	  in	  this	  case,	  species	  membership	  serves	  as	  proxy	  for	  other	  cognitive	  abilities.	  Now	  suppose,	  in	  a	  non-­‐emergency	  situation,	  we	  want	  to	  decide	  whether	  to	  perform	  painful	  experiments	  on	  a	  dog	  or	  a	  human.	  Both	  dogs	  and	  humans	  have	  lives	  that	  matter	  to	  them,	  and	  each	  of	  their	  lives	  would	  be	  devastated	  as	  a	  result	  of	  being	  subjected	  to	  such	  experiments.	  That	  is,	  they	  both	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  not	  suffering	  as	  a	  result	  of	  being	  subjected	  to	  painful	  medical	  experiments.	  In	  this	  case,	  species	  membership	  is	  not	  a	  morally	  relevant	  factor	  and	  we	  would	  not	  be	  justified	  in	  refusing	  to	  consider	  the	  interests	  of	  the	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dog.	  In	  this	  case,	  to	  override	  the	  dog’s	  interests	  on	  the	  sole	  basis	  that	  the	  dog	  is	  a	  dog	  would	  amount	  to	  speciesism.	  We	  should	  experiment	  neither	  on	  the	  dog	  nor	  the	  human.	  	  	   The	  above	  two	  hypothetical	  scenarios	  are	  meant	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  sometimes	  the	  species	  to	  which	  an	  individual	  belongs	  is	  relevant	  to	  our	  moral	  thinking	  insofar	  as	  it	  serves	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  other	  characteristics	  or	  abilities,	  but	  species	  membership	  itself	  is	  not	  typically	  relevant	  to	  our	  moral	  considerations.	  Just	  as	  an	  individual’s	  race	  ought	  not	  to	  factor	  into	  our	  moral	  thinking	  when	  race	  is	  a	  morally	  arbitrary	  factor,	  we	  ought	  not	  to	  factor	  in	  an	  individual’s	  species	  when	  species	  membership	  is	  morally	  arbitrary	  to	  whatever	  decision	  we	  are	  making.	  This	  claim—that	  we	  should	  not	  ignore	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  nonhuman	  animals	  just	  because	  they	  are	  nonhuman	  animals—is	  noncontroversial	  to	  most	  people.	  In	  fact,	  most	  people	  think	  we	  should	  never	  cause	  unnecessary	  harm	  to	  nonhuman	  animals.	  But	  as	  we	  shall	  now	  see,	  our	  actions	  do	  not	  match	  our	  attitudes.	  	   Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  not	  nutritionally	  necessary	  for	  humans	  to	  consume	  the	  meats	  or	  secretions	  of	  nonhuman	  animals,	  The	  Humane	  Society	  of	  The	  United	  States	  reports	  that	  more	  than	  9	  billion	  nonhuman	  animals	  per	  year	  are	  killed	  for	  food	  in	  the	  United	  States	  alone.1	  This	  number	  includes	  cows,	  calves,	  hogs,	  sheep,	  lambs,	  chickens,	  turkeys	  and	  ducks.	  The	  vast	  majority	  of	  these	  animals	  are	  subject	  to	  horrendous	  conditions	  that	  cause	  extreme	  suffering.	  For	  example,	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  cannibalism	  induced	  by	  close	  confinement,	  piglets	  have	  their	  tails	  cut	  off,	  or	  “docked,”	  and	  their	  teeth	  cut	  without	  anesthetic.	  Nonhuman	  animals	  used	  for	  dairy	  suffer	  just	  as	  much	  or	  more	  as	  animals	  used	  for	  meat.	  For	  instance,	  dairy	  cows	  are	  forcibly	  impregnated	  repeatedly	  over	  their	  lifetimes	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  see	  Humane	  Society	  of	  The	  United	  States,	  Farm	  Animals	  Statistics:	  Slaughter	  Totals	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so	  that	  they	  will	  continue	  to	  produce	  milk.2	  This	  entails	  taking	  the	  cow’s	  calves	  away	  shortly	  after	  birth,	  which	  causes	  extreme	  and	  vocal	  anguish	  on	  the	  part	  of	  both	  the	  mother	  and	  her	  calves.	  Since	  male	  calves	  will	  never	  produce	  milk,	  they	  are	  sent	  to	  veal	  facilities	  where	  they	  are	  slaughtered	  after	  a	  period	  of	  confinement	  and	  starvation.3	  Some	  females	  are	  also	  sent	  to	  veal	  facilities.	  After	  several	  rounds	  of	  forcible	  insemination,	  pregnancy,	  birth,	  and	  separation	  form	  her	  children,	  dairy	  cows	  are	  slaughtered	  at	  a	  fraction	  of	  their	  typical	  lifespans.	  Painful	  use	  of	  other	  animals	  extends	  beyond	  the	  realm	  of	  “animal	  agriculture.”	  Hunting	  animals,	  using	  them	  as	  sources	  of	  entertainment	  or	  fashion,	  or	  using	  them	  for	  products	  testing	  and	  medical	  experimentation	  all	  represent	  unnecessary	  harms	  to	  the	  other	  animals.	  Hunters	  kill	  over	  200	  million	  animals	  annually	  in	  the	  United	  States	  alone.	  Hunted	  animals	  are	  often	  not	  collected.	  If	  they	  have	  not	  been	  fatally	  wounded,	  they	  are	  left	  to	  languish.	  We	  use	  millions	  more	  for	  the	  sole	  purpose	  of	  entertainment,	  in	  zoos	  and	  circuses,	  for	  example.	  We	  kill	  millions	  more	  for	  fashion.	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  we	  use	  millions	  of	  animals	  for	  biomedical	  experiments,	  product	  testing	  and	  education.	  We	  do	  this	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  experiments	  cause	  intense	  suffering	  to	  nonhuman	  animals	  and	  do	  not	  render	  valuable	  information.	  This	  should	  not	  imply	  that	  these	  tests	  would	  be	  morally	  permissible	  were	  it	  the	  case	  that	  they	  did	  provide	  valuable	  information	  or	  that	  any	  of	  these	  activities	  would	  be	  permissible	  if	  the	  suffering	  of	  nonhuman	  animals	  was	  reduced	  or	  even	  eliminated.	  My	  intent	  at	  this	  point	  is	  only	  to	  illustrate	  the	  gulf	  between	  our	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  see	  Animals	  Australia,	  Dairy	  Cows	  Fact	  Sheet.	  see	  also	  Humane	  Society	  of	  the	  United	  States:	  An	  HSUS	  Report:	  
The	  Welfare	  of	  Cows	  in	  the	  Dairy	  Industry.	  	  3	  See	  Humane	  Society	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  An	  HSUS	  Report:	  The	  Welfare	  of	  in	  the	  Veal	  Industry.	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purported	  moral	  concern	  for	  nonhuman	  animals	  and	  how	  we	  actually	  behave	  in	  our	  everyday	  lives.	  	  	   	  1.2	  The	  Theory	  of	  Ideology	  	   While	  the	  initial	  definition	  of	  speciesism	  I	  put	  forth	  is	  correct,	  it	  describes	  only	  one	  aspect	  of	  what	  it	  is,	  namely	  a	  problematic	  attitude	  among	  individuals.	  The	  conception	  I	  now	  wish	  to	  defend	  better	  captures	  the	  complexity	  of	  speciesism.	  Speciesism,	  on	  my	  view,	  is	  a	  pernicious	  ideology	  that	  consists	  in	  widespread	  illusory	  beliefs	  pertaining	  to	  nonhuman	  animals,	  which	  are	  often	  held	  irrationally,	  and	  which	  serve	  to	  establish	  and	  stabilize	  the	  oppression	  of	  nonhuman	  animals.	  This	  conception	  of	  speciesism	  is	  stronger	  because	  not	  only	  does	  it	  capture	  the	  fact	  that	  speciesism	  involves	  problematic	  attitudes,	  but	  it	  also	  helps	  to	  explain	  the	  gulf	  between	  our	  attitudes	  and	  our	  actions:	  it	  captures	  the	  reason	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  reject	  speciesism,	  namely,	  because	  the	  beliefs	  in	  question	  are	  illusory	  and	  harmful.	  This	  view	  of	  speciesism	  is	  aligned	  with	  Tommie	  Shelby’s	  conception	  of	  an	  ideology.	  In	  “Ideology,	  Racism	  and	  Critical	  Theory,”	  Shelby	  rehabilitates	  the	  Marxist	  theory	  of	  ideology,	  which	  has	  been	  widely	  criticized	  for	  being	  opaque.	  In	  order	  to	  both	  illustrate	  his	  conception	  of	  an	  ideology	  and	  to	  demonstrate	  its	  practical	  import,	  Shelby	  focuses	  on	  the	  ideological	  dimension	  of	  racism,	  particularly	  anti-­‐black	  racism.	  In	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  present	  Shelby’s	  theory,	  including	  some	  of	  the	  examples	  of	  racism	  he	  uses	  to	  illustrate	  it.	  Since,	  for	  most	  of	  us,	  racism	  is	  a	  more	  familiar	  form	  of	  oppression	  than	  speciesism,	  it	  might	  be	  helpful	  to	  first	  establish	  that	  racism	  is	  an	  ideology	  before	  I	  argue	  in	  the	  following	  section	  that	  speciesism	  is	  an	  ideology	  as	  well.	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   Shelby’s	  central	  task	  is	  to	  clarify	  what	  it	  means	  to	  say	  that	  a	  belief	  system	  is	  ideological.	  While	  the	  term	  “ideology”	  tends	  to	  have	  negative	  connotations,	  not	  all	  ideologies	  are	  pernicious.	  Feminism	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  positive	  ideology.	  According	  to	  Shelby,	  the	  term	  “ideology”	  has	  an	  evaluative	  sense	  and	  a	  non-­‐evaluative	  sense.	  The	  non-­‐evaluative	  sense	  is	  epistemically	  and	  morally	  neutral;	  it	  takes	  no	  stance	  on	  whether	  the	  ideology	  ought	  to	  be	  accepted	  or	  rejected.	  By	  contrast,	  the	  evaluative	  sense	  of	  an	  ideology	  imputes	  some	  reason	  to	  reject	  it.	  Shelby	  refers	  to	  the	  evaluative	  sense	  of	  an	  ideology	  as	  the	  
critical	  conception	  of	  ideology.	  The	  critical	  conception	  has	  a	  weak	  sense	  and	  a	  strong	  sense.	  The	  weak	  critical	  conception	  implies	  that	  there	  is	  some	  unfortunate	  aspect	  about	  the	  belief	  system,	  but	  that	  that	  unfortunate	  aspect	  does	  not	  afford	  sufficient	  reason	  to	  reject	  it.	  For	  instance,	  arguably,	  supernatural	  ideologies,	  which	  contain	  beliefs	  in	  ghosts	  and	  the	  like,	  are	  ideologies	  in	  the	  weak	  critical	  conception.	  One	  might	  think	  supernatural	  ideology	  is	  unfortunate	  insofar	  as	  it	  premised	  on	  false	  beliefs,	  but	  nevertheless	  not	  oppose	  the	  ideology	  because	  it	  is	  not	  harmful.	  However,	  on	  the	  strong	  critical	  conception,	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  belief	  system	  is	  ideological	  is	  sufficient	  to	  reject	  it.	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  Shelby	  thinks	  racism	  is	  an	  ideology	  in	  the	  strong	  critical	  sense.	  Shelby’s	  task	  is	  to	  develop	  a	  strong	  critical	  conception	  of	  ideology.	  	  	   The	  object	  of	  Shelby’s	  analysis	  is	  belief	  systems.	  The	  charge	  of	  ideology,	  like	  racism,	  Shelby	  explains,	  is	  usually	  lodged	  against	  widely	  held	  beliefs,	  social	  practices	  or	  institutions	  (e.g.	  Jim	  Crow	  Ordinances	  and	  Ku	  Klux	  Klan	  demonstrations),	  and	  symbolic	  representation	  (slogans,	  jokes,	  speech	  acts	  and	  films).	  Shelby	  notes	  that	  it	  is	  not	  inaccurate	  to	  view	  social	  practices,	  social	  institutions	  and	  symbolic	  representations	  as	  ideological.	  However,	  because	  social	  practices,	  institutions	  and	  symbols	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  reflecting	  beliefs,	  Shelby	  thinks	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that	  beliefs	  are	  analytically	  fundamental	  to	  ideologies.	  Shelby	  understands	  beliefs	  “as	  mental	  representations	  within	  the	  consciousness	  of	  individual	  social	  actors”	  and	  “these	  mental	  representations	  imply	  validity	  claims,	  that	  is,	  knowledge	  claims	  about	  the	  way	  the	  world	  is	  or	  about	  what	  has	  value.”4	  More	  specifically,	  the	  beliefs	  Shelby	  is	  concerned	  with	  “can	  be	  understood	  as	  any	  subset	  of	  the	  beliefs	  of	  members	  of	  a	  historical	  era,	  geographical	  region,	  society,	  social	  strata	  or	  social	  group	  that	  has	  the	  following	  features:	  a.	  	  The	  beliefs	  in	  the	  subset	  are	  widely	  shared	  by	  members	  in	  the	  relevant	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  group;	  and	  within	  the	  group,	  and	  sometimes	  outside	  it,	  the	  beliefs	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  generally	  known	  to	  be	  widely	  held.	  	  	  b.	  	  The	  beliefs	  form,	  or	  are	  derived	  from	  a	  prima	  facie	  coherent	  system	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  of	  thought,	  which	  can	  be	  descriptive	  and/or	  normative.	  	  c.	  	  	  The	  beliefs	  are	  part	  of,	  or	  shape,	  the	  general	  outlook	  and	  self-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  conception	  of	  many	  in	  the	  relevant	  group.	  	  	  d.	  	  	  The	  beliefs	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  social	  action	  and	  social	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Institutions.”5	  	  	   Feature	  (a)	  is	  meant	  to	  emphasize	  that	  ideologies	  are	  forms	  of	  social	  thought.	  The	  theory	  of	  ideology	  is	  not	  concerned	  with	  the	  mental	  lives	  of	  individuals,	  but	  with	  beliefs	  that	  are	  widely	  shared	  and	  known	  to	  be	  so.	  For	  example,	  “if	  there	  were	  only	  two	  white	  Americans	  who	  believed	  that	  blacks	  are	  an	  inferior	  race,	  their	  common	  belief	  would	  be	  
racist	  but	  it	  would	  not	  constitute	  an	  ideology.”6	  Feature	  (b)	  emphasizes	  two	  things.	  First,	  an	  ideology	  is	  never	  an	  isolated	  belief	  but	  a	  network	  of	  beliefs.	  Single	  ideological	  beliefs	  are	  always	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  worldview.	  	  The	  view	  that	  blacks	  are	  inherently	  of	  low	  intelligence	  is	  part	  of	  a	  wide-­‐ranging	  and	  interconnected	  set	  of	  beliefs	  that	  includes,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  beliefs	  about	  the	  laziness,	  aggressiveness,	  and	  unreliability	  of	  black	  people,	  and	  on	  the	  other,	  beliefs	  about	  their	  natural	  musicality,	  athletic	  talent,	  and	  sexual	  prowess.	  Such	  beliefs	  are	  in	  turn	  based	  on	  the	  view	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Shelby,	  Tommie.	  Racism	  and	  Critical	  Social	  Theory.	  pp.	  157	  5	  ibid	  158	  6	  ibid	  157	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that	  these	  and	  other	  such	  socially	  significant	  characteristics	  are	  transmitted	  through	  biological	  reproduction.	  This	  black	  essentialism	  is	  related	  to	  the	  assumption	  about	  the	  continental	  origins	  and	  physical	  characteristics	  of	  various	  subpopulations	  of	  humanity,	  which	  are	  often	  treated	  as	  hierarchically	  ordered	  (according	  to	  some	  criteria	  or	  other)	  with	  blacks	  invariably	  on	  the	  bottom.7	  	  	  	   	  	   Feature	  (b)	  also	  emphasizes	  that	  ideological	  beliefs	  have	  compelling	  explanatory	  and	  justificatory	  power	  for	  those	  who	  hold	  them.	  Scrutiny	  of	  such	  beliefs	  may	  reveal	  them	  to	  be	  ungrounded	  or	  unsound,	  as	  has	  been	  the	  case	  with	  proposed	  theories	  of	  racial	  inferiority,	  but	  the	  beliefs	  are	  are	  held	  nonetheless.	  Feature	  (c),	  Shelby	  says,	  captures	  the	  fact	  that	  ideological	  beliefs	  are	  so	  deeply	  entrenched	  that	  they	  appear	  commonsensical	  and	  “natural”	  to	  those	  who	  hold	  them,	  as	  Shelby	  describes:	  within	  a	  society	  where	  racist	  ideology	  holds	  sway,	  nothing	  could	  be	  more	  ‘obvious’	  than	  that	  there	  are	  different	  races	  with	  corresponding	  mental	  traits	  and	  behavioral	  tendencies	  …	  and	  these	  beliefs	  are	  so	  ‘obvious’	  and	  firmly	  held	  that	  they	  often	  fail	  to	  yield	  to	  criticism	  and	  counter	  evidence.8	  	  	  	  Given	  the	  entrenched	  nature	  of	  ideological	  beliefs,	  specifically	  racist	  beliefs,	  black	  people	  may	  struggle	  with	  feelings	  of	  inadequacy	  despite	  their	  awareness	  of	  the	  injustice	  of	  racism.	  Similarly,	  white	  people	  who	  are	  ostensibly	  anti-­‐racist	  may	  nevertheless	  have	  implicit	  biases	  against	  black	  people.	  	  	   Feature	  (d)	  is	  meant	  to	  highlight	  that	  ideological	  beliefs	  are	  closely	  tied	  to	  action	  and	  social	  practice.	  This	  is	  unsurprising	  given	  ideological	  beliefs	  shape	  the	  self-­‐conceptions	  and	  general	  outlook	  of	  those	  who	  hold	  them.	  Ideological	  belief	  systems	  impact	  the	  actions	  of	  individuals	  by	  mediating	  social	  interactions.	  Ideological	  beliefs	  are	  part	  of	  “common	  meanings,”	  through	  which	  social	  actors	  live	  their	  lives	  and	  coordinate	  their	  actions.	  Shelby	  notes	  that,	  racist	  beliefs	  “have	  engendered	  a	  complex	  and	  sometimes	  subtle	  ensemble	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	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social	  symbols,	  codes,	  norms,	  and	  expectations;	  and	  these	  structure	  social	  conduct	  between	  and	  within	  the	  so-­‐called	  races.”9	  One	  way	  this	  phenomenon	  finds	  material	  expression	  is	  through	  implicit	  bias.	  For	  instance,	  it	  is	  well	  known	  now	  that	  implicit	  racial	  biases	  influence	  hiring	  practices.10	  Furthermore,	  ideological	  beliefs	  contribute	  to	  social	  problems	  such	  as	  substance	  abuse.	  It	  is	  not	  very	  surprising	  that	  racism	  or	  other	  forms	  of	  oppression	  perpetuate	  drug	  abuse,	  given	  oppressed	  individuals’	  systematically	  limited	  life	  opportunities	  and	  given	  that	  their	  self-­‐conceptions	  have	  likely	  been	  fractured	  as	  a	  result	  of	  being	  viewed	  as	  inferior.	  	  	   Shelby	  notes	  that	  not	  every	  belief	  system	  engendering	  these	  four	  features	  is	  an	  ideology	  in	  the	  strong	  critical	  sense,	  since	  such	  belief	  systems	  are	  not	  necessarily	  epistemically	  and	  morally	  unsound.	  For	  instance,	  Shelby	  notes,	  the	  contemporary	  doctrine	  of	  Liberalism	  in	  the	  United	  States	  satisfies	  these	  four	  criteria	  but	  this	  does	  not	  constitute	  a	  reason	  to	  reject	  it.	  The	  strong	  critical	  conception	  of	  ideology	  must	  have	  some	  additional	  negative	  characteristic	  or	  characteristics	  that	  distinguishes	  it	  from	  mere	  ideology.	  Shelby	  refers	  to	  the	  non-­‐evaluative	  sense	  of	  ideology	  as	  “forms	  of	  social	  consciousness”	  and	  he	  refers	  to	  the	  strong	  critical	  conception	  simply	  as	  “ideology.”11	  Before	  we	  specify	  the	  characteristics	  that	  make	  a	  form	  of	  social	  consciousness	  ideological	  in	  the	  strong	  critical	  sense,	  Shelby	  asks	  us	  to	  note	  several	  crucial	  things	  about	  forms	  of	  social	  consciousness.	  	  	   First,	  Shelby	  says,	  the	  representational	  content	  of	  forms	  of	  social	  consciousness	  can	  be	  almost	  anything.12	  He	  notes,	  that	  while	  it	  might	  be	  helpful	  to	  specify	  kinds	  of	  forms	  of	  social	  consciousness,	  such	  as	  racial	  forms,	  there	  are	  challenges	  to	  doing	  so.	  First,	  forms	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  ibid	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social	  consciousness	  might	  intersect	  and	  shade	  into	  each	  other	  to	  form	  a	  broader	  worldview.	  In	  fact,	  Shelby	  says,	  some	  ideologies	  are	  better	  able	  to	  perform	  their	  social	  functions	  when	  they	  mutually	  reinforce	  each	  other	  by	  forming	  a	  broader	  worldview.	  Second,	  forms	  of	  social	  consciousness	  are	  “dynamic	  systems”	  insofar	  as	  their	  representational	  content	  changes	  as	  social	  circumstances	  do.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  specific	  beliefs	  that	  comprise	  forms	  of	  social	  consciousness	  change.	  For	  example,	  “under	  conditions	  of	  plantation	  slavery,	  black	  slaves	  were	  thought	  to	  be	  docile,	  superstitious,	  easily	  satisfied	  and	  servile,	  while	  during	  the	  present	  postindustrial	  phase	  of	  capitalist	  development,	  blacks	  are	  more	  often	  viewed	  as	  parasitic,	  angry,	  ungrateful	  and	  dangerous.”13	  	   The	  second	  crucial	  feature	  of	  forms	  of	  social	  consciousness	  is	  that	  they	  may	  be	  held	  unconsciously.	  An	  individual	  might	  know	  whether	  she	  accepts	  a	  particular	  proposition,	  Shelby	  explains,	  but	  she	  may	  nevertheless	  be	  unaware	  that	  she	  is	  in	  the	  grip	  of	  a	  particular	  picture	  of	  the	  worldview.14	  That	  she	  is	  in	  the	  grip	  of	  some	  worldview	  may	  only	  be	  implicit	  in	  her	  actions.	  Such	  belief	  systems	  may	  be	  “coherently	  articulable,”	  but	  they	  are	  usually	  “confused	  and	  may	  be	  expressed	  only	  in	  the	  form	  of	  stereotypes,	  clichés,	  and	  fragmented	  narratives.”15	  Following	  Marx	  and	  Engels,	  Shelby	  says	  that	  the	  systematization	  of	  these	  “half-­‐baked,	  diffuse,	  and	  crude	  ideas	  is	  typically	  performed,	  sometimes	  unwittingly,	  by	  professional	  ideologists,”	  such	  as	  politicians,	  theologians,	  philosophers,	  scientists,	  journalists,	  teachers	  and	  other	  individuals	  in	  positions	  of	  power.16	  	  	   Third,	  Shelby	  asks	  us	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  the	  distinction	  between	  forms	  of	  consciousness	  and	  “phenomenal	  forms.”	  Forms	  of	  social	  thought,	  he	  says,	  “are	  based	  on	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ideas	  and	  theories	  that	  people	  actively	  construct	  and	  develop.	  As	  such,	  they	  are	  different	  from,	  though	  often	  related	  to,	  the	  misleading	  surface	  appearances,”	  such	  as	  racist	  institutions	  or	  commodity	  fetishism.	  Unlike	  ideological	  beliefs,	  phenomenal	  forms	  are	  not	  to	  be	  critiqued,	  but	  only	  explained.17	  	  	   With	  these	  general	  features	  of	  forms	  of	  social	  thought	  in	  mind,	  we	  are	  now	  a	  position	  to	  discuss	  the	  negative	  properties	  that	  make	  a	  form	  of	  social	  thought	  ideological	  in	  the	  strong	  critical	  sense.	  According	  to	  Shelby,	  ideologies	  have	  three	  kinds	  of	  properties:	  epistemic,	  functional	  and	  genetic.18	  These	  properties	  capture	  the	  idea	  that	  ideologies	  are	  epistemically	  unsound,	  irrationally	  held	  and	  serve	  to	  justify	  the	  oppression	  of	  some	  group.	  I	  will	  now	  discuss	  each	  of	  these	  properties.	  	  	  The	  epistemic	  component	  of	  ideology	  emphasizes	  that	  ideologies	  are	  epistemically	  unsound;	  they	  make	  claims	  about	  the	  world	  that	  are	  cognitively	  defective.	  Shelby	  uses	  the	  term	  “cognitive	  defect”	  to	  highlight	  the	  fact	  that	  ideological	  beliefs	  are	  not	  usually	  straightforwardly	  false.	  Rather,	  they	  involve	  cognitive	  errors	  such	  as	  inconsistency,	  oversimplification,	  exaggeration,	  circularity,	  false	  dichotomy,	  neglect	  of	  pertinent	  facts,	  hasty	  generalizations	  or	  misuse	  of	  “authoritative”	  sources.	  Ideologies	  work,	  Shelby	  says,	  “by	  presenting	  and	  inculcating	  a	  false	  or	  slanted	  perspective	  that	  arranges	  the	  facts	  in	  a	  misleading	  way	  or	  fails	  to	  mention	  certain	  facts	  or	  places	  them	  in	  an	  inconspicuous	  context.”19	  Part	  of	  the	  reason	  these	  defective	  beliefs	  go	  unnoticed	  is	  that	  everyday	  experiences	  seem	  to	  confirm	  them.	  The	  following	  example	  illustrates	  this	  point.	  Racist	  ideology	  underwrites	  the	  widely	  held	  view	  that	  most	  black	  women	  who	  receive	  welfare	  support	  are	  poor	  because	  they	  are	  lazy,	  irresponsible	  and	  promiscuous	  and	  that	  they	  pass	  on—through	  example	  and	  maybe	  genes—such	  tendencies	  to	  their	  children.	  Accordingly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	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black	  woman	  are	  not	  seen	  as	  deserving	  of	  public	  support	  but	  contempt.	  But	  many	  of	  the	  behaviors	  associated	  with	  inner	  city	  poverty	  are	  consequences	  of	  historical	  effects	  of	  racism	  ...	  but	  if	  one	  ignores	  these	  structural	  factors	  some	  of	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  black	  ghetto	  poor	  can	  seem	  to	  conform	  to	  the	  stereotype	  of	  racist	  ideology	  and	  thus	  justify	  resentment	  toward	  welfare	  recipients.20	  	  To	  highlight	  the	  cognitively	  defective	  aspect	  of	  ideological	  beliefs,	  Shelby	  refers	  to	  them	  as	  ideological	  illusions.	  While	  most	  ideological	  beliefs	  are	  not	  straightforwardly	  false,	  some	  of	  them	  are.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  belief	  that	  there	  are	  races	  that	  can	  be	  distinguished	  by	  significant	  genetic	  differences	  persists,	  despite	  extensive	  evidence	  to	  the	  contrary.21	  According	  to	  Shelby	  the	  ideological	  illusion	  of	  “races”	  is	  the	  linchpin	  of	  racism.	  	  	   The	  epistemic	  component	  of	  the	  ideology	  is	  imperative	  to	  forming	  a	  comprehensive	  theory	  of	  ideology.	  While	  the	  functional	  and	  genetic	  properties	  of	  a	  form	  of	  social	  consciousness	  might	  warrant	  suspicion,	  one	  cannot	  rationally	  reject	  it	  if	  it	  is	  not	  cognitively	  defective.	  Since	  forms	  of	  social	  thought	  purport	  to	  be	  forms	  of	  knowledge,	  we	  must	  have	  some	  compelling	  reason	  to	  reject	  that	  claim	  to	  knowledge.	  	  The	  second	  property	  of	  ideologies	  is	  genetic.	  As	  the	  term	  suggests,	  this	  feature	  pertains	  to	  the	  origin	  of	  ideological	  beliefs.	  That	  is,	  this	  feature	  of	  ideology	  captures	  that	  people,	  for	  various	  reasons,	  fail	  to	  perceive	  their	  true	  motives	  for	  accepting	  ideological	  beliefs.	  This	  component	  refers	  not	  to	  the	  beliefs	  themselves	  but	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  beliefs	  are	  held:	  irrationally.	  Shelby	  explains	  this	  phenomenon	  in	  terms	  of	  false	  
consciousness:	  “An	  individual	  who	  suffers	  from	  false	  consciousness	  would	  likely	  believe	  she	  accepts	  a	  given	  belief	  system	  solely	  because	  of	  epistemic	  considerations	  in	  favor	  of	  it	  but	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact	  she	  accepts	  it	  because	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  noncognitive,	  motives	  that	  operate	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behind	  her	  back,	  without	  awareness.”22	  Beliefs	  held	  with	  false	  consciousness	  need	  not	  be	  straightforwardly	  false.	  For	  instance,	  I	  might	  rightly	  believe	  that	  standardized	  testing	  does	  not	  accurately	  and	  consistently	  measure	  intelligence.	  But	  if	  the	  reason	  I	  believe	  this	  is	  because	  I	  want	  to	  avoid	  the	  implication	  that	  my	  bad	  test	  scores	  reflect	  my	  low	  intelligence,	  and	  not	  because	  I	  have	  any	  sound	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  thinking	  such,	  then	  I	  hold	  a	  true	  (or	  at	  least	  not	  straightforwardly	  false)	  belief	  with	  false	  consciousness.	  Because	  ideological	  beliefs	  can	  be	  true,	  a	  strong	  critical	  conception	  of	  ideology	  cannot	  be	  adequately	  captured	  and	  rejected	  purely	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  beliefs	  are	  held	  with	  false	  consciousness.	  The	  relevant	  beliefs	  must	  also	  be	  cognitively	  defective	  in	  some	  way.	  Shelby	  notes	  that	  false	  consciousness	  helps	  to	  explain	  two	  puzzling	  aspects	  of	  ideology.	  	  First,	  recognizing	  the	  role	  of	  false	  consciousness	  in	  ideology	  avoids	  the	  unflattering	  view	  that	  many	  people	  are	  just	  stupid.	  	  Given	  that	  ideologies	  suffer	  from	  fundamental	  cognitive	  defects	  and	  yet	  are	  widely	  held,	  it	  might	  seem	  that	  Ideology	  Critique	  assumes	  that	  most	  humans	  are	  quite	  credulous	  ...	  But	  if	  ideologies	  are	  held	  with	  false	  consciousness	  then	  this	  unflattering	  and	  elitist	  view	  of	  ordinary	  people	  need	  not	  be	  assumed.23	  	  	  It	  is	  a	  simple	  fact	  about	  humans,	  Shelby	  says,	  that	  we	  sometimes	  hold	  beliefs	  for	  reasons	  that	  have	  little	  or	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  concern	  for	  truth	  or	  justification.	  Such	  reasons	  include	  unconscious	  interests,	  such	  as	  consolation,	  anxiety	  reduction,	  reduction	  of	  cognitive	  dissonance,	  confidence-­‐boosting,	  cathartic	  relief,	  need	  for	  hope,	  or	  silencing	  a	  guilty	  conscience.	  For	  instance,	  Shelby	  notes	  that	  some	  white	  workers	  have	  embraced	  racist	  beliefs	  to	  cope	  with	  anxiety	  about	  the	  entrance	  of	  lower	  paid	  blacks	  into	  the	  labor	  market.	  Shelby	  describes	  this	  kind	  of	  scapegoating:	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The	  white	  working-­‐class	  racist	  attacks	  blacks	  in	  a	  similar	  subordinate	  economic	  position	  and	  blames	  them	  for	  problems	  whose	  real	  causes	  lie	  elsewhere.	  But	  he	  blames	  blacks,	  not	  because	  he	  has	  good	  evidence	  for	  thinking	  that	  they	  are	  the	  source	  of	  his	  difficulties,	  but	  because,	  for	  example,	  he	  cannot	  bear	  to	  face	  the	  real	  causes	  of	  his	  misery,	  for	  this	  might,	  given	  his	  powerlessness,	  undermine	  his	  hope	  of	  overcoming	  it,	  or	  it	  might	  threaten	  his	  self-­‐conception	  or	  his	  most	  cherished	  ideals.24	  	  When	  such	  psychological	  factors	  are	  operative,	  Shelby	  says,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  fall	  into	  epistemic	  error.	  Shelby	  suggests	  this	  may	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  kind	  of	  feedback	  loop	  problem:	  people	  may	  fail	  to	  recognize	  that	  their	  beliefs	  have	  social	  currency	  because	  they	  are	  widely	  held	  with	  false	  consciousness.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  beliefs	  are	  prevalent	  then	  gives	  the	  mistaken	  impression	  that	  they	  are	  justified.	  	  	   Second,	  recognizing	  false	  consciousness	  as	  a	  key	  feature	  of	  ideological	  beliefs	  helps	  to	  explain	  the	  fact	  that	  people	  express	  a	  strong	  reluctance	  to	  give	  up	  ideological	  beliefs.	  Even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  extremely	  strong	  reasons	  to	  relinquish	  ideological	  beliefs,	  some	  people	  refuse	  to	  do	  so.	  For	  example,	  some	  people	  believe	  in	  racial	  inferiority	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  theories	  aimed	  at	  showing	  intellectual	  differences	  between	  races	  are	  largely	  meritless.	  This	  feature	  of	  ideology	  yields	  a	  crucial	  insight	  for	  those	  who	  oppose	  racism	  and	  oppression	  in	  general:	  because	  people	  are	  often	  motivated	  by	  noncognitive	  forces,	  we	  should	  not	  expect	  that	  evidence	  or	  logic-­‐based	  criticism	  alone	  would	  dislodge	  ideological	  beliefs.	  	  	   The	  third	  defining	  feature	  of	  ideologies	  (and	  the	  feature	  that	  is	  distinctly	  Marxist)	  is	  functional;	  it	  serves	  to	  establish	  or	  reinforce	  relations	  of	  oppression,	  such	  as	  labor	  exploitation,	  land	  and	  resource	  expropriation,	  political	  disenfranchisement	  and	  marginalization,	  social	  repression	  and	  exclusion,	  expulsion	  and	  genocide.	  The	  function	  of	  ideology	  is	  to	  justify	  the	  subordinate	  status	  of	  a	  certain	  group.	  For	  instance,	  Lawrence	  Blum	  argues	  that	  racist	  beliefs	  in	  the	  U.S.	  were	  adopted	  to	  justify	  slavery	  when	  religious	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considerations	  could	  no	  longer	  adequately	  justify	  slavery.	  This	  is	  a	  remarkable	  feature	  of	  ideologies	  because	  it	  reveals	  that	  ideologies	  are	  not	  really	  about	  what	  they	  appear	  to	  be	  about.	  At	  the	  fundamental	  level,	  racism	  is	  not	  about	  race	  or	  genuine	  concern	  for	  the	  facts	  about	  race.	  Rather,	  racism	  is	  primarily	  a	  tool	  for	  concealing	  injustice,	  a	  cover	  story.	  This	  reinforces	  Shelby’s	  point	  that	  arguments	  that	  focus	  on	  race	  will	  not	  be	  sufficient	  to	  dislodge	  racism,	  or	  any	  other	  ideological	  belief	  system,	  from	  the	  social	  psyche,	  so	  to	  speak.	  	  	   Shelby	  notes	  that	  a	  purely	  functional	  account	  of	  ideology	  is	  necessary	  but	  not	  sufficient	  to	  constitute	  a	  strong	  critical	  conception	  of	  ideology.	  On	  the	  purely	  functional	  account,	  we	  could	  not	  rationally	  reject	  even	  an	  oppressive	  social	  system	  unless	  something	  were	  epistemically	  awry.	  A	  functional	  component	  is	  nevertheless	  necessary	  because	  it	  “emphasizes	  something	  crucial:	  we	  should	  oppose	  and	  seek	  to	  subvert	  ideologies	  not	  just	  because	  they	  are	  rooted	  in	  illusion	  and	  irrationally	  held,	  but	  because	  of	  the	  oppressive	  social	  consequences	  of	  their	  widespread	  acceptance.”25	  Shelby	  further	  emphasizes	  that	  	  the	  illusory	  character	  and	  oppressive	  function	  of	  ideology	  are	  related:	  it	  is	  the	  former	  that	  makes	  the	  later	  possible.	  Ideology	  contributes	  to	  establishing	  and	  stabilizing	  relations	  of	  oppression	  in	  virtue	  of	  its	  cognitive	  defects.	  Ideologies	  perform	  their	  social	  operations	  by	  way	  of	  illusion	  and	  misrepresentation.26	  	  	  	   Moreover,	  Shelby	  stresses	  that	  there	  are	  many	  different	  kinds	  of	  ideological	  illusions	  that	  are	  capable	  of	  performing	  their	  oppressive	  social	  function	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways.	  Shelby	  gives	  us	  three	  such	  examples.	  First,	  	  Moral	  ideologies	  usually	  perform	  through	  legitimation.	  They	  lead	  people	  to	  accept	  that	  relations	  of	  power	  that	  enable	  some	  to	  dominate	  and	  exploit	  others	  are	  not	  unjust	  and	  thus	  that	  the	  prevailing	  distribution	  of	  power	  should	  be	  respected	  or	  at	  least	  not	  interfered	  with.27	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For	  example	  media	  portrayals	  of	  blacks	  as	  morally	  and	  intellectually	  inferior	  gives	  the	  impression	  that	  blacks	  do	  not	  deserve	  the	  kind	  of	  opportunities	  and	  treatment	  afforded	  to	  nonblacks.	  While	  legitimation	  is	  the	  prevailing	  ideological	  illusion,	  Shelby	  stresses	  that	  it	  is	  a	  mistake	  to	  think	  that	  the	  only	  way	  an	  ideology	  can	  create	  or	  stabilize	  oppressive	  social	  relations	  is	  by	  making	  relations	  appear	  legitimate.	  For	  instance,	  	  Reifying	  ideologies	  stabilize	  oppressive	  relations	  by	  creating	  the	  illusion	  that	  relations	  (or	  their	  causes),	  which	  are	  actually	  a	  product	  of	  historically	  contingent	  human	  actions	  or	  convention,	  are	  ‘natural’	  and	  thus	  ineradicable,	  unavoidable	  and	  unalterable.	  Once	  reification	  occurs,	  it	  is	  easy	  for	  those	  in	  better	  circumstances	  to	  ignore	  their	  plight,	  for	  ameliorating	  their	  condition	  will	  be	  practically	  impossible.28	  	  	  Finally	  some	  ideologies	  function	  primarily	  though	  metaphysical	  mystification	  whereby	  	  the	  subordinate	  position	  of	  the	  oppressed	  or	  the	  dominance	  of	  oppressors	  is	  taken	  to	  have	  supernatural	  explanation.	  Relations	  of	  dominance	  are	  seen	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  some	  mysterious	  act	  of	  fate,	  God’s	  will	  or	  forces	  of	  the	  underworld.	  Those	  who	  embrace	  such	  ideologies	  insist	  their	  beliefs	  cannot	  be	  refuted	  by	  ordinary	  empirical	  evidence	  or	  reasoned	  argument.29	  	  	  The	  ideological	  component	  is	  crucial	  for	  sustaining	  oppressive	  social	  relations.	  However	  it	  is	  that	  ideologies	  perform	  “their	  dirty	  work,”	  Shelby	  says,	  all	  ideologies	  are	  alike	  insofar	  as	  they	  lead	  people,	  through	  illusions,	  to	  fail	  to	  recognize	  or	  properly	  appreciate	  that	  they	  are	  implicated	  in	  social	  relations	  of	  oppression.	  People	  fail	  to	  recognize	  oppressive	  systems	  for	  what	  they	  are	  and	  thus	  fail	  to	  work	  towards	  changing	  them.	  	  	   This	  account	  of	  ideology	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  method,	  namely	  ideology	  critique,	  for	  establishing	  whether	  a	  form	  of	  social	  thought	  constitutes	  an	  ideology	  in	  the	  strong	  critical	  sense:	  a	  form	  of	  social	  thought	  is	  ideological	  if	  it	  satisfies	  the	  three	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  conditions—epistemic,	  genetic	  and	  functional—of	  an	  ideology.	  This	  account	  of	  ideology	  has	  profound	  and	  daunting	  implications	  for	  advocacy.	  It	  promises	  to	  serve	  an	  emancipatory	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function,	  and,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  also	  suggests	  that	  reform	  will	  be	  extremely	  difficult,	  if	  not	  impossible.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  implies	  that	  exposing	  the	  cognitively	  defective	  beliefs	  of	  an	  ideology	  would	  render	  relations	  of	  oppression	  less	  stable,	  and	  thusly	  amenable	  to	  change.	  Exactly	  how	  much	  less	  stable,	  Shelby	  points	  out,	  will	  depend	  on	  many	  factors,	  such	  as	  the	  prevailing	  economic	  conditions,	  whether	  there	  are	  other	  structures	  that	  could	  be	  mobilized	  to	  reinforce	  the	  oppressive	  relations,	  whether	  there	  are	  functionally	  equivalent	  ideologies	  that	  could	  quickly	  fill	  the	  void,	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  material	  and	  social	  incentives	  present	  insuperable	  obstacles	  to	  collective	  action	  for	  social	  change.30	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  there	  are	  formidable	  obstacles	  to	  dislodging	  ideological	  beliefs.	  In	  any	  case,	  understanding	  the	  nature	  of	  ideology	  gives	  us	  the	  leverage	  necessary	  to	  potentially	  subvert	  ideologies	  such	  as	  racism	  and	  speciesism.	  	   I	  have	  implied	  that	  I	  endorse	  Shelby’s	  theory	  of	  ideology,	  but	  I	  want	  to	  make	  a	  couple	  of	  remarks	  now	  that	  make	  my	  endorsement	  explicit.	  Ideology	  Critique	  not	  only	  offers	  a	  clear	  account	  of	  what	  it	  is	  that	  makes	  a	  form	  of	  social	  consciousness	  ideological,	  but	  it	  also	  accounts	  for	  and	  explains	  many	  complex	  social	  phenomena,	  such	  as	  race	  relations,	  and	  it	  provides	  us	  with	  both	  reasons	  and	  tools	  to	  reject	  it.	  Ideology	  Critique	  comports	  with	  and	  explains	  why	  it	  is	  that	  racism	  persists	  in	  the	  U.S.	  The	  prevalence	  of	  racism	  in	  the	  U.S.	  indicates	  that	  the	  facts	  about	  so-­‐called	  races	  alone	  are	  insufficient	  to	  abolish	  it.	  By	  “facts”	  I	  do	  not	  only	  mean	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  no	  compelling	  evidence	  that	  there	  are	  any	  meaningful	  differences	  among	  peoples	  with	  different	  skin	  colors;	  I	  am	  also	  referring,	  in	  a	  loose	  way,	  to	  moral	  facts.	  For	  instance	  the	  notion	  that	  beings	  of	  higher	  intelligence	  are	  entitled	  to	  exploit	  beings	  of	  lower	  intelligence	  is	  widely	  rejected.	  Most	  people	  are	  outraged	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when	  they	  hear	  of	  the	  abuse	  of	  a	  mentally	  disabled	  person	  or	  an	  animal.	  So	  when	  I	  say	  that	  the	  facts	  are	  not	  sufficient	  to	  abolish	  racism,	  I	  am	  referring	  to	  both	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  are	  no	  morally	  significant	  differences	  between	  the	  so-­‐called	  races	  and	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  think	  those	  differences	  should	  not	  matter	  anyway,	  at	  least	  with	  respect	  to	  harmful	  treatment.	  	  	   While	  experience	  suggests	  that	  the	  facts	  alone	  cannot	  abolish	  racism,	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  progress	  is	  possible,	  though	  it	  can	  be	  difficult	  to	  discern	  the	  exact	  extent	  of	  that	  progress,	  given	  that	  the	  content	  of	  ideologies	  can	  and	  does	  change	  over	  time.	  For	  instance,	  while	  blacks	  are	  no	  longer	  legal	  property,	  the	  fact	  remains	  that	  many	  remain	  in	  socially	  subordinate	  positions.	  For	  instance,	  many	  remain	  stuck	  in	  extremely	  low	  wage	  jobs	  that	  no	  doubt	  constitute	  another	  form	  of	  oppression.	  It	  has	  also	  been	  argued	  that	  incarceration	  is	  a	  modern	  form	  of	  radicalized	  slavery.31	  Despite	  ongoing	  racial	  injustice,	  the	  fact	  that	  even	  a	  small	  percentage	  of	  blacks	  now	  hold	  positions	  of	  social	  power	  is	  an	  indication	  that	  at	  least	  some	  ideologies	  can	  be	  undermined	  to	  some	  extent.	  Moreover,	  the	  profound	  shift	  in	  social	  thought	  with	  regard	  to	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  suggests	  that	  some	  ideologies	  are	  amenable	  to	  change.	  With	  that	  said,	  there	  is	  no	  doubt,	  as	  Shelby	  acknowledges,	  that	  the	  account	  I	  have	  just	  presented	  is	  not	  a	  complete	  Theory	  of	  Ideology.	  For	  instance,	  as	  Shelby	  notes,	  the	  following	  questions	  must	  be	  answered:	  1)	  what	  makes	  an	  ideology	  specifically	  racist	  or	  otherwise	  in	  character?	  2)	  what	  are	  the	  origins	  of	  specific	  ideologies?	  3)	  what	  is	  the	  current	  context	  and	  function	  of	  an	  ideology?	  4)	  through	  what	  methods	  is	  it	  inculcated	  and	  reproduced?	  5)	  to	  what	  extent	  can	  racism	  or	  other	  forms	  of	  social	  thought	  be	  reduced	  to	  ideology	  and	  its	  effects?	  6)	  to	  what	  extent	  can	  ideology	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  economic	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factors?32	  While	  these	  are	  big	  questions	  that	  I	  will	  set	  aside	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper,	  I	  do	  think	  each	  of	  them	  can	  and	  should	  be	  given	  rigorous	  philosophical	  treatment.	  For	  now,	  we	  have	  a	  cogent	  account	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  call	  a	  form	  of	  social	  thought	  ideological	  and	  that	  provides	  us	  with	  foundation	  for	  considering	  the	  possibility	  that	  speciesism	  is	  also	  an	  ideology.	  	  	  	  1.3	  Speciesism	  as	  an	  Ideology	  	   In	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  ample	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  speciesism	  is	  an	  ideology	  in	  the	  strong	  critical	  sense	  (henceforth	  “ideology”).	  In	  order	  to	  do	  so	  I	  will	  first	  establish	  that	  speciesism	  is	  a	  form	  of	  social	  thought.	  In	  so	  doing,	  I	  will	  swap	  the	  term	  “speciesism”	  for	  “species	  beliefs,”	  since	  “speciesism”	  is	  an	  evaluative	  term	  and	  at	  this	  stage	  my	  task	  is	  only	  to	  establish	  that	  it	  is	  a	  form	  of	  social	  thought.	  Second,	  I	  subject	  species	  beliefs	  to	  Ideology	  Critique,	  and	  I	  conclude	  that	  speciesism	  is	  an	  ideology	  because	  it	  satisfies	  the	  all	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  conditions	  of	  an	  ideology.	  	  	   Recall	  that	  a	  form	  of	  social	  consciousness	  “can	  be	  understood	  as	  any	  subset	  of	  the	  beliefs	  of	  members	  of	  a	  historical	  era,	  geographical	  region,	  society,	  social	  strata	  or	  social	  group	  that	  has	  the	  following	  features:	  a.	  	  The	  beliefs	  in	  the	  subset	  are	  widely	  shared	  by	  members	  in	  the	  relevant	  group;	  and	  within	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  the	  group,	  and	  sometimes	  outside	  it,	  the	  beliefs	  are	  generally	  known	  to	  be	  widely	  held.	  	  	  b.	  	  The	  beliefs	  form,	  or	  are	  derived	  from	  a	  prima	  facie	  coherent	  system	  of	  thought,	  which	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  can	  be	  descriptive	  and/or	  normative.	  	  c.	  	  	  The	  beliefs	  are	  part	  of,	  or	  shape,	  the	  general	  outlook	  and	  self-­‐	  conception	  of	  many	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  relevance	  group.	  	  	  d.	  	  	  The	  beliefs	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  social	  action	  and	  social	  institutions.”33	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  I	  will	  now	  argue	  that	  species	  beliefs	  meet	  each	  of	  these	  criteria	  and	  therefore	  constitute	  a	  form	  of	  social	  thought.	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  beliefs	  of	  those	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  although,	  my	  sense	  is	  that	  species	  beliefs	  are	  not	  significantly	  different	  in	  most	  places	  in	  the	  world.	  In	  order	  to	  establish	  that	  species	  beliefs	  meet	  criterion	  (a),	  that	  is,	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  subset	  of	  species	  beliefs	  of	  the	  group	  are	  widely	  held	  and	  known	  to	  be	  widely	  held,	  we	  need	  to	  have	  an	  idea	  about	  what	  those	  beliefs	  are.	  I	  will	  propose	  a	  cluster	  of	  what	  I	  take	  to	  be	  widely	  held	  species	  beliefs.	  Keep	  in	  mind	  that	  my	  task	  at	  this	  point	  is	  not	  to	  evaluate	  the	  status	  of	  the	  beliefs—that	  is,	  whether	  they	  are	  true,	  or	  false,	  or	  cognitively	  defective—but	  to	  establish	  that	  these	  species	  beliefs	  are	  widely	  held	  and	  recognized	  to	  be	  widely	  held.	  	   	  A	  ubiquitous	  species	  belief	  is	  the	  belief	  that	  humans	  are	  nutritionally	  required	  to	  eat	  animals	  and/or	  their	  bodily	  secretions	  in	  order	  to	  survive	  and/or	  thrive.	  This	  belief	  is	  reflected	  in	  everyday	  conversation	  and	  behaviors	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  prescriptions	  of	  authoritative	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  U.S.D.A.,	  which	  recommends	  eating	  dairy	  and	  seafood	  and	  regards	  meat	  as	  an	  appropriate	  source	  of	  protein.	  It	  is	  from	  this	  belief	  that	  many	  other	  species	  beliefs	  originate.	  For	  instance,	  given	  our	  supposed	  need	  to	  consume	  nonhuman	  animals	  and	  their	  secretions	  it	  is	  widely	  believed	  that	  it	  is	  morally	  permissible	  to	  use	  them	  as	  food	  sources,	  which	  can	  be	  confirmed	  by	  looking	  around	  most	  grocery	  stores.	  Presumably	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  humans	  continue	  to	  eat	  nonhuman	  animal	  “products,”	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  doing	  so	  requires	  the	  suffering	  and	  death	  of	  sentient	  beings	  and	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  “animal	  agriculture”	  is	  responsible	  for	  up	  to	  51%	  of	  greenhouse	  gases34	  is	  because	  they	  believe	  it	  is	  necessary	  or	  “natural.”	  Moreover,	  many	  believe	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  see	  World	  Watch	  Institute,	  Livestock	  and	  Climate	  Change.	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although	  humans	  need	  to	  eat	  nonhuman	  animal	  “products,”	  we	  should	  not	  cause	  nonhuman	  animals	  more	  suffering	  than	  necessary	  in	  the	  process	  of	  obtaining	  those	  products.	  The	  belief	  is	  often	  accompanied	  by	  a	  sense	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  to	  other	  animals,	  which	  yields	  the	  following	  belief:	  it	  is	  permissible	  to	  use	  nonhuman	  animals	  for	  food	  so	  long	  as	  they	  are	  raised	  and	  killed	  humanely.	  This	  sentiment	  is	  evidenced	  by	  the	  prevalence	  of	  humane	  treatment	  campaigns.	  Another	  species	  belief	  is	  that	  humans	  have	  used	  and	  eaten	  animals	  throughout	  history.	  It	  is	  widely	  believed	  that	  the	  domestication	  of	  nonhuman	  animals	  marked	  humankind’s	  ascent	  to	  civilized	  society.	  This	  belief	  is	  a	  part	  of	  common	  knowledge	  and	  it	  is	  reflected	  in	  educational	  resources,	  such	  as	  science	  exhibits	  and	  documentaries.	  This	  belief	  reifies	  the	  belief	  that	  eating	  and	  using	  nonhuman	  animals	  is	  “natural”	  and	  therefore	  acceptable.	  Another	  ubiquitous	  species	  belief	  is	  that	  nonhuman	  animals	  are	  not	  as	  intelligent	  as	  humans.	  Consequently,	  it	  is	  widely	  believed	  that	  they	  are	  not	  harmed	  by	  our	  using	  them	  as	  sources	  of	  entertainment	  and	  tools	  for	  education,	  so	  long	  as	  we	  treat	  them	  well	  in	  the	  process.	  Moreover,	  the	  lower	  intelligence	  of	  nonhuman	  animals	  is	  taken	  to	  justify	  our	  use	  of	  them	  for	  our	  own	  ends,	  as	  subjects	  in	  medical	  experiments	  or	  for	  product	  testing,	  for	  example.	  Remember	  that	  species	  beliefs	  need	  not	  be	  universally	  accepted.	  They	  only	  need	  to	  be	  widely	  accepted	  and	  known	  to	  be	  widely	  accepted.	  One	  need	  not	  endorse	  the	  above	  beliefs,	  but	  only	  to	  recognize	  that	  many	  other	  people	  do.	  	  	  	   The	  above	  illustration	  of	  criterion	  (a)	  also	  illustrates	  criterion	  (b),	  which	  requires	  that	  the	  beliefs	  form,	  or	  are	  derived	  from,	  a	  prima	  facie	  coherent	  system	  of	  thought,	  which	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  also	  see	  Food	  and	  Agriculture	  Organization	  of	  The	  United	  Nation,	  Livestock’s	  Long	  Shadow:	  Environmental	  
Issues	  and	  Options.	  According	  to	  this	  report,	  animal	  agriculture	  is	  responsible	  for	  18%	  of	  the	  global	  warming	  effect,	  which	  is	  a	  larger	  percentage	  than	  the	  transportation	  system,	  worldwide.	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can	  be	  descriptive	  and/or	  normative.	  The	  constellation	  of	  species	  beliefs	  I	  have	  articulated	  form	  an	  outwardly	  coherent	  schema,	  which	  appears	  to	  be	  consistent	  with	  basic	  facts	  about	  the	  world.	  For	  example,	  the	  belief	  that	  humans	  nutritionally	  are	  required	  to	  consume	  nonhuman	  animals	  and/or	  their	  secretions	  seems	  to	  have	  normative	  implications.	  Given	  the	  belief	  that	  human	  health	  and	  survival	  are	  contingent	  upon	  eating	  nonhuman	  animals,	  it	  seems	  uncontroversial	  that	  it	  is	  permissible	  to	  do	  so.	  After	  all,	  as	  philosophers	  sometimes	  point	  out,	  it	  seems	  unreasonable	  to	  ask	  humans	  to	  stop	  consuming	  animals,	  if	  doing	  so	  will	  lead	  to	  death	  or	  illness.	  On	  its	  face,	  then,	  speciesism	  is	  a	  coherent	  system	  of	  thought.	  	  	  	  	   Criterion	  (c)	  requires	  that	  the	  subset	  of	  beliefs	  are	  part	  of,	  or	  shape,	  the	  general	  outlook	  or	  self-­‐conception	  of	  many	  in	  the	  relevant	  group.	  To	  see	  that	  species	  beliefs	  meet	  this	  criterion,	  consider	  that	  humans	  commonly	  invoke	  some	  version	  of	  the	  phrase,	  “I	  am	  not	  an	  animal!”	  in	  protest	  of	  human	  injustice.	  As	  Christine	  Korsgaard	  has	  pointed	  out	  there	  is	  a	  comparative	  thought	  at	  work	  here.	  Humans	  affirm	  their	  own	  value	  by	  appealing	  to	  nonhuman	  animal’s	  lack	  of	  it.	  To	  be	  called	  an	  “animal”	  is	  an	  insult	  to	  human	  dignity.	  Human	  self-­‐conceptions	  are	  shaped	  by	  our	  supposed	  lack	  of	  animality.	  Criterion	  (d)	  requires	  that	  the	  beliefs	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  social	  action	  and	  social	  institutions.	  The	  vastness	  of	  the	  nonhuman	  animal	  industry,	  which	  I	  briefly	  discussed	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  chapter,	  should	  be	  enough	  to	  convince	  anyone	  that	  our	  species	  beliefs	  have	  a	  profound	  impact	  on	  social	  actions	  and	  institutions.	  	  	   	  I	  have	  established	  that	  species	  beliefs	  meet	  all	  the	  criteria	  necessary	  to	  qualify	  it	  as	  a	  form	  of	  social	  thought.	  The	  task	  now	  is	  to	  show	  that	  this	  form	  of	  social	  thought	  is	  an	  ideology	  in	  the	  strong	  critical	  sense	  (henceforth	  simply	  “ideology”).	  I	  will	  now	  return	  to	  using	  the	  term	  “speciesism”	  in	  place	  of	  the	  non-­‐evaluative	  “species	  beliefs.”	  In	  order	  to	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establish	  that	  speciesism	  is	  an	  ideology,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  speciesist	  beliefs	  meet	  all	  the	  criteria	  of	  an	  ideology:	  they	  are	  cognitively	  defective,	  they	  are	  often	  held	  irrationally,	  and	  they	  serve	  to	  justify	  the	  oppression	  of	  nonhuman	  animals.	  	  	   Like	  most	  racist	  beliefs,	  most	  speciesist	  beliefs	  are	  cognitively	  defective,	  or	  illusory	  is	  some	  way.	  However,	  before	  we	  discuss	  these	  kinds	  of	  beliefs,	  there	  is	  one	  speciesist	  belief	  that	  merits	  special	  attention	  because	  it	  is	  straightforwardly	  false	  and	  because	  it	  is	  possibly	  the	  most	  fundamental	  speciesist	  belief	  insofar	  as	  it	  gives	  rise	  to	  other	  many	  other	  defective	  beliefs.	  The	  belief	  I	  have	  in	  mind	  is	  the	  belief	  that	  humans	  are	  nutritionally	  required	  to	  consume	  nonhuman	  animals	  and/or	  their	  secretions	  to	  survive	  and/or	  thrive.	  The	  persistence	  of	  this	  belief	  despite	  extensive	  evidence	  to	  the	  contrary	  is	  indicative	  of	  its	  ideological	  nature.	  Not	  only	  can	  humans	  survive	  and	  flourish	  on	  a	  plant-­‐based	  diet,	  the	  eating	  of	  “meat”	  and	  “dairy”	  is	  a	  relatively	  new	  human	  behavior.	  Modern	  humans	  have	  existed	  for	  around	  200,000	  years	  and	  many	  scientists	  believe	  that	  humans	  were	  vegetarians	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  this	  period,	  with	  the	  possibility	  of	  some	  scavenging	  of	  deceased	  animals	  and	  small	  lizards.	  In	  general,	  sociologist	  David	  Nibert	  explains,	  “food	  and	  other	  material	  resources	  were	  obtained	  by	  searching	  for	  edible	  plants,	  seeds,	  fruits,	  nuts	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  vegetation,	  perhaps	  supplemented	  by	  the	  sporadic	  consumption	  of	  the	  remains	  of	  recently	  deceased	  other	  animals,	  scavenged	  along	  the	  way.”35	  One	  explanation	  for	  this	  behavior,	  Nibert	  suggests,	  is	  that	  foraging	  was	  an	  efficient	  and	  effective	  way	  of	  obtaining	  resources	  and	  hunting	  was	  not.	  Consequently,	  over	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  years,	  humans	  became	  adept	  foragers.	  Nibert	  directs	  our	  attention	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  historical	  practices	  as	  well	  as	  other	  human	  traditions	  of	  food	  gathering	  are	  socially	  constructed:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  ibid	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Human	  experience	  determined	  where	  to	  search,	  what	  to	  look	  for,	  and	  how	  to	  use	  and	  distribute	  foraged	  resources.	  This	  experience-­‐based	  knowledge	  was	  formulated	  into	  custom	  and	  was	  handed	  down	  from	  one	  generation	  to	  the	  next	  as	  learned	  behavior.	  It	  was	  and	  it	  still	  is,	  important	  for	  humans	  to	  teach	  succeeding	  generations	  how	  to	  survive	  in	  any	  given	  time	  because	  humans	  have	  little	  of	  what	  is	  called	  ancestral	  memory	  or	  instinct—that	  is,	  memory	  or	  knowledge	  about	  how	  to	  behave,	  possessed	  at	  birth.	  What	  is	  more,	  human	  animals	  not	  only	  create	  survival	  skills	  but	  also	  construct	  entire	  ways	  of	  thinking	  and	  behaving,	  as	  well	  as	  systems	  of	  social	  organization.	  The	  information	  is	  transmitted	  to	  each	  new	  generation	  in	  the	  form	  of	  culture	  and	  social	  structure.	  Culture	  is	  composed	  of	  common	  beliefs,	  values,	  language,	  customs,	  and	  norms;	  social	  structure	  refers	  to	  the	  ways	  humans	  are	  organized	  to	  coordinate	  actions	  and	  work	  toward	  established	  goals.	  Since	  human	  animals,	  interacting	  with	  one	  another,	  invent	  culture	  and	  social	  structure,	  we	  say	  these	  things	  are	  socially	  created.	  Throughout	  eons	  of	  human	  prehistory,	  the	  foraging	  life,	  with	  its	  rules,	  customs,	  and	  structure,	  was	  regarded	  as	  “natural”	  and	  right.	  Our	  prehistoric	  ancestors	  were	  unaware	  of	  any	  other	  way	  of	  relating	  to	  one	  other	  and	  to	  other	  animals.36	  	  	  	   	  This	  view	  comports	  with	  anthropologist	  Matt	  Cartmill’s	  view	  that	  hunting	  is	  not	  natural	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  instinctual	  for	  humans.	  In	  fact,	  he	  says,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  most	  people	  who	  have	  lived	  never	  hunted.	  Some	  scholars	  think	  organized	  hunting	  began	  about	  20,000	  years	  ago.	  Many	  believe	  that	  this	  shift	  in	  human	  behavior	  was	  made	  possible	  after	  the	  Ice	  Age,	  when	  glacier	  movements	  expanded	  prairies	  and	  grasslands,	  accommodating	  the	  movement	  of	  large	  groups	  of	  nonhuman	  animals.	  This	  allowed	  humans	  to	  efficiently	  capture	  and	  kill	  nonhuman	  animals	  to	  eat	  them.	  When	  this	  practice	  became	  lucrative	  humans	  began	  to	  devote	  time	  to	  it.	  Nibert	  points	  out	  that	  humans	  desiring	  to	  remain	  in	  or	  migrate	  to	  colder	  areas	  became	  particularly	  adept	  at	  using	  the	  bodies	  of	  nonhuman	  animals,	  using	  their	  skin,	  hair,	  bones,	  horns,	  and	  sinews	  for	  food,	  clothing,	  tools	  and	  other	  necessities.	  This	  shift	  in	  human	  behavior,	  Nibert	  rightly	  emphasizes,	  was	  an	  “economically	  motivated	  behavior,	  cultivated	  as	  the	  potential	  for	  effective	  hunts	  grew.	  It	  was	  not	  necessary	  for	  human	  survival,	  as	  hominids	  had	  existed	  for	  the	  better	  part	  of	  five	  million	  years,	  but	  simply	  furthered	  nonessential	  interests.”37	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If	  it	  were	  the	  case	  that	  meat	  eating	  was	  nutritionally	  required,	  we	  would	  have	  seen	  hunting	  behavior	  throughout	  human	  history.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  practice	  of	  eating	  “meat”	  is	  socially	  constructed	  and	  historically	  contingent,	  yet	  “meat”	  eating	  and	  hunting	  are	  nevertheless	  viewed	  as	  a	  “natural”	  and	  necessary	  aspect	  of	  humanity.	  To	  suggest	  otherwise	  is	  often	  viewed	  as	  anti-­‐social	  or	  even	  ignorant.	  This	  narrative,	  or	  ideological	  illusion,	  is	  reified	  through	  both	  intensive	  marketing	  campaigns	  sponsored	  by	  the	  animal	  exploitation	  industry	  and	  educational	  tools	  such	  as	  museum	  exhibits	  and	  depictions	  of	  human	  history	  in	  film.	  These	  depictions	  are	  not	  always	  straightforwardly	  false,	  but	  presented	  in	  a	  context	  that	  implies	  that	  consuming	  nonhuman	  animals	  and	  their	  secretions	  is	  a	  practice	  as	  old	  as	  humanity	  itself,	  and	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  human	  flourishing.	  	  Until	  this	  point	  I	  have	  been	  asserting	  that	  it	  is	  commonly	  wrongly	  believed	  that	  consuming	  nonhuman	  animals	  is	  necessary	  to	  human	  survival	  and/or	  flourishing	  without	  specifying	  the	  meaning	  of	  “and/or.”	  Some	  people	  recognize	  that	  humans	  are	  not	  nutritionally	  required	  to	  use	  and	  consume	  nonhuman	  animals,	  but	  defend	  their	  right	  to	  do	  so	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  the	  domestication	  of	  nonhuman	  animals	  catalyzed	  humankind’s	  ascent	  to	  civility.	  The	  idea	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  humanity	  is	  better	  off	  as	  a	  result	  of	  exploiting	  the	  labor	  and	  bodies	  of	  nonhuman	  animals	  and	  so	  to	  give	  it	  up	  now	  would	  be	  tantamount	  to	  rejecting	  human	  progress.	  Putting	  aside	  any	  problems38	  with	  this	  type	  of	  argument,	  given	  the	  justificatory	  power	  of	  this	  belief,	  it	  will	  be	  a	  helpful	  digression	  to	  briefly	  consider	  the	  history	  of	  domestication.	  It	  will	  also	  help	  to	  show	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  other	  speciesist	  beliefs.	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  The	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  I	  have	  in	  mind	  is	  the	  concept	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  humanity	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  better	  off?	  What	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  Humanity?	  Does	  humanity	  have	  a	  well-­‐being?	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   In	  “Animal	  Oppression	  and	  Human	  Violence:	  Desecration,	  Capitalism	  and	  Global	  Conflict,”	  Nibert	  offers	  a	  compelling	  critique	  of	  the	  hegemonic	  notion	  of	  domestication	  as	  benign	  partnership	  and	  a	  monumental	  step	  forward	  for	  humankind.	  He	  argues	  that	  domestication	  actually	  marked	  the	  beginning	  of	  large-­‐scale	  systematic	  violence	  and	  the	  oppression	  of	  not	  only	  nonhuman	  animals,	  but	  also	  humans,	  particularly	  non-­‐elites	  and	  women.	  He	  argues	  that	  before	  domestication,	  humans	  lived	  relatively	  peacefully	  in	  egalitarian	  societies.	  The	  domestication	  of	  nonhuman	  animals	  both	  spurred	  and	  facilitated	  large-­‐scale	  violence.	  Large-­‐scale	  warfare	  was	  not	  possible	  until	  humans	  began	  to	  use	  animals,	  such	  as	  horses,	  as	  means	  for	  transportation.	  Large-­‐scale	  farming	  was	  and	  remains	  extremely	  resource	  intensive.	  Consequently,	  control	  of	  land	  and	  water	  was	  extremely	  important	  and	  these	  resources	  have	  been	  and	  are	  acquired	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  others,	  as	  Nibert	  explains.	  Use	  of	  domesticated	  animals	  in	  the	  Americas	  both	  enabled	  and	  promoted	  large	  scale	  destruction,	  violence,	  displacement,	  hunger,	  and	  human	  enslavement…	  without	  the	  use	  of	  domesticated	  animals	  first	  as	  essential	  provision	  and	  then	  as	  instruments	  of	  war	  and	  labor,	  the	  European	  conquest	  of	  the	  Americas	  very	  likely	  would	  not	  have	  occurred	  …	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  the	  bloodshed	  in	  the	  Americas	  was	  motivated	  by	  the	  desire	  to	  acquire	  land	  and	  water	  sources	  necessary	  to	  graze	  large	  numbers	  of	  animals	  …	  Entire	  civilizations	  in	  the	  Americas	  were	  invaded	  and	  destroyed,	  and	  much	  expropriated	  land	  was	  converted	  to	  pasture.39	  	  	  From	  this	  historical	  vantage	  point,	  Nibert	  says,	  “the	  idyllic-­‐sounding,	  romanticized	  term	  ‘pastoralism’	  should	  actually	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  “subsistence	  strategy	  often	  associated	  with	  territorial	  expansion,	  social	  stratification,	  and	  military	  aggressiveness.”	  Moreover,	  Nibert	  notes,	  most	  and	  probably	  all	  of	  the	  distinctive	  infectious	  diseases,	  such	  as	  small	  pox,	  TB,	  measles,	  influenza	  and	  malaria,	  transferred	  to	  humans	  from	  animal	  “herds.”40	  In	  light	  of	  this,	  it	  is	  ironic	  that	  people	  often	  cite	  the	  arguably	  crucial	  role	  that	  medical	  experiments	  on	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animals	  have	  played	  in	  combating	  these	  diseases,	  in	  order	  to	  justify	  medical	  experimentation	  on	  animals.	  My	  point	  in	  discussing	  Nibert’s	  view	  is	  not	  to	  offer	  a	  comprehensive	  account	  of	  the	  history	  of	  domestication	  but	  to	  show	  that	  the	  hegemonic	  view	  of	  nonhuman	  animal	  domestication	  as	  symbolic	  of	  human	  flourishing	  is	  controversial	  at	  best.	  Moreover,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  reality	  of	  animal	  exploitation	  is	  masked	  by	  the	  pastoral	  view	  of	  animals	  further	  underscores	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  speciesist	  ideology.	  Furthermore,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that,	  in	  some	  sense,	  humanity	  has	  flourished	  as	  a	  result	  of	  animal	  exploitation,	  the	  fact	  remains	  that	  we	  have	  no	  nutritional	  requirement	  to	  eat	  nonhuman	  animals,	  which	  calls	  into	  question	  the	  moral	  permissibility	  of	  exploiting	  them	  now.	  	  	  	   When	  the	  relationship	  between	  humans	  and	  animals	  is	  more	  accurately	  contextualized,	  it	  becomes	  easier	  to	  identify	  the	  ideological	  illusions	  of	  speciesism	  as	  such.	  For	  instance,	  consider	  the	  belief	  that	  veganism,	  which	  is	  the	  practice	  of	  not	  eating	  any	  nonhuman	  animal	  “meats”	  or	  secretions,	  is	  unrealistic	  or	  unhealthy.	  Given	  the	  prevalence	  of	  nonhuman	  animal	  “products”	  in	  most	  grocery	  stores,	  and	  given	  that	  most	  of	  us	  have	  grown	  up	  eating	  nonhuman	  animals	  “foods”	  this	  is	  somewhat	  unsurprising.	  However,	  our	  social	  practices,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  are	  historically	  contingent	  rather	  than	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  “natural”	  order	  of	  things,	  as	  might	  be	  assumed.	  While	  there	  are	  plenty	  of	  plant-­‐based	  foods	  that	  do	  not	  require	  sacrificing	  palate	  pleasure,	  it	  can	  be	  very	  difficult	  to	  conceptualize	  what	  to	  eat	  or	  how	  or	  where	  to	  get	  it.	  We	  lack	  cultural	  precedent.	  This	  apparent	  difficulty	  is	  taken	  as	  evidence	  that	  veganism	  is	  unrealistic,	  difficult	  or	  even	  unhealthy.	  This	  belief	  explains	  why	  veganism	  is	  viewed	  merely	  as	  a	  lifestyle	  choice	  and	  not	  a	  moral	  issue:	  because	  veganism	  appears	  difficult	  it	  is	  often	  viewed	  as	  a	  supererogatory	  choice,	  rather	  than	  a	  minimal	  moral	  requirement	  of	  justice.	  The	  belief	  that	  veganism	  can	  be	  unhealthy	  is	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compounded	  by	  the	  myth	  that	  plants	  do	  not	  contain	  much	  protein	  and	  that	  “meat”	  and	  “dairy”	  proteins	  are	  superior.	  Moreover,	  nutritional	  issues	  aside,	  becoming	  vegan	  can	  be	  difficult	  for	  some	  people.	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  this	  is	  the	  case	  partially	  depends	  on	  factors	  such	  as	  one’s	  geographical	  location	  and	  socioeconomic	  status.	  The	  point	  here	  is	  to	  emphasize	  that	  the	  belief	  that	  being	  vegan	  is	  difficult	  is	  an	  ideological	  illusion.	  It	  is	  not	  straightforwardly	  false.	  It	  can	  be	  difficult	  for	  some	  people,	  for	  various	  reasons,	  to	  be	  vegan.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  evidence	  that	  there	  is	  something	  amiss	  with	  veganism,	  as	  is	  often	  assumed.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  evidence	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  society	  is	  shaped	  by	  speciesism.	  	  	   Having	  highlighted	  the	  cognitively	  defective	  component	  of	  speciesism,	  I	  will	  now	  argue	  that	  speciesist	  beliefs	  satisfy	  the	  genetic	  component	  of	  an	  ideology.	  Perhaps	  a	  weakness	  of	  Shelby’s	  account	  is	  that	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  he	  thinks	  a	  form	  of	  social	  consciousness	  must	  be	  held	  with	  false	  consciousness	  is	  not	  clear.	  Presumably	  we	  would	  not	  want	  to	  say	  that	  most	  ideological	  beliefs	  are	  held	  with	  false	  consciousness.	  To	  hold	  a	  belief	  in	  false	  consciousness	  implies	  that	  the	  relevant	  beliefs	  have	  been	  considered	  at	  least	  to	  some	  extent.	  And	  since	  a	  hallmark	  of	  ideology	  is	  its	  apparent	  naturalness,	  we	  should	  expect	  it	  to	  be	  the	  case	  that	  many	  people	  will	  never	  have	  occasion	  to	  deliberate	  about	  their	  ideological	  beliefs,	  even	  unconsciously.	  If	  speciesism	  is	  an	  ideology,	  then	  speciesist	  beliefs	  should	  be	  so	  entrenched	  that	  they	  are	  invisible	  to	  some	  people	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  never	  question	  the	  relationships	  between	  humans	  and	  nonhuman	  animals.	  Given	  this,	  Shelby’s	  requirement	  that	  ideological	  beliefs	  often	  be	  held	  with	  false	  consciousness	  must	  pertain	  only	  to	  that	  subset	  of	  people	  who	  have	  had	  occasion	  to	  consider	  their	  beliefs,	  either	  consciously	  or	  unconsciously.	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   With	  this	  consideration	  in	  mind,	  I	  will	  now	  argue	  that	  of	  those	  people	  who	  have	  had	  occasion	  to	  deliberate	  about	  their	  speciesist	  beliefs,	  many	  of	  them	  continue	  to	  hold	  their	  beliefs	  in	  false	  consciousness.	  That	  an	  individual	  is	  in	  the	  grip	  of	  false	  consciousness	  will	  be	  implied	  in	  her	  behavior.	  One	  possible	  indication	  that	  an	  individual	  holds	  his	  beliefs	  in	  false	  consciousness	  is	  inconsistency.	  Suppose	  Jack	  reports	  that	  he	  has	  given	  serious	  thought	  to	  the	  subject	  of	  invasive	  medical	  research	  on	  cats.	  He	  reports	  that	  while	  he	  thinks	  cats	  matter	  morally,	  they	  are	  less	  intelligent	  than	  humans.	  Therefore,	  he	  concludes,	  the	  purported	  benefits	  to	  humans	  that	  would	  result	  from	  the	  testing	  outweigh	  the	  injury	  that	  would	  be	  done	  to	  the	  cats.	  Jack,	  it	  turns	  out,	  would	  not	  endorse	  performing	  the	  same	  experiments	  on	  humans	  of	  the	  same	  intelligence	  level,	  such	  as	  babies	  or	  mentally	  disabled	  people,	  even	  in	  the	  case	  that	  they	  had	  no	  family	  and	  would	  not	  be	  missed.	  If	  this	  discrepancy	  is	  pointed	  out	  to	  Jack,	  he	  might	  abandon	  his	  belief	  and	  attribute	  his	  inconsistency	  to	  his	  speciesist	  upbringing	  and	  his	  subsequent	  desensitization	  to	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  nonhuman	  animals.	  But	  if	  Jack	  fails	  to	  produce	  another	  reason	  to	  justify	  his	  stance,	  and	  he	  refuses	  to	  give	  up	  his	  beliefs,	  then	  this	  is	  a	  strong	  indication	  that	  his	  motives	  for	  believing	  what	  he	  does	  are	  non-­‐cognitive.	  One	  reason	  Jack	  might	  be	  reluctant	  to	  give	  up	  his	  beliefs	  is	  that	  he	  fears	  that	  recognizing	  the	  value	  of	  nonhuman	  animals	  would	  require	  him	  to	  alter	  many	  of	  his	  behaviors,	  which	  would	  compromise	  his	  sense	  of	  identity,	  his	  manhood.	  For	  instance,	  if	  he	  worries	  that	  if	  he	  becomes	  properly	  sensitized	  to	  the	  oppression	  of	  nonhuman	  animals,	  he	  would	  have	  to	  stop	  eating	  them.	  And	  this	  proposition	  terrifies	  Jack,	  for	  his	  manhood	  is	  closely	  tied	  to	  his	  meat	  eating.	  Moreover,	  he	  might	  fear	  that	  making	  a	  drastic	  change	  to	  his	  behaviors	  might	  alienate	  him	  from	  his	  family	  and	  friends.	  For	  instance,	  he	  fears	  that	  his	  fraternity	  brothers	  might	  reject	  him	  and	  that	  he	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  able	  to	  participate	  in	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his	  family’s	  cherished	  Thanksgiving	  tradition.	  	  	   Exaggeration	  might	  also	  be	  an	  indication	  that	  one	  holds	  speciesist	  beliefs	  in	  false	  consciousness.	  For	  instance,	  many	  people	  report	  that	  having	  tried	  to	  be	  vegetarian	  or	  vegan,	  they	  just	  felt	  too	  sick	  or	  they	  were	  always	  hungry.	  Of	  course,	  we	  can	  anticipate	  that	  this	  will	  be	  true	  in	  some	  cases,	  given	  that	  some	  people	  will	  not	  know	  what	  to	  eat	  or	  how	  to	  satisfy	  themselves.	  But	  the	  prevalence	  of	  people	  who	  report	  becoming	  sick,	  combined	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  very	  easy	  to	  get	  all	  the	  nutrients	  one	  needs	  from	  plant	  based	  foods,	  suggests	  that	  noncognitive	  motives	  are	  at	  work.	  Another	  possible	  reason	  one	  might	  be	  reluctant	  to	  give	  up	  speciesist	  beliefs	  is	  because	  doing	  so	  would	  compromise	  one’s	  worldview,	  which	  can	  be	  frightening.	  For	  instance,	  if	  one	  is	  a	  biblical	  literalist	  and	  believes	  that	  God	  gave	  nonhuman	  animals	  to	  humans	  to	  use	  as	  a	  means	  to	  their	  own	  ends,	  then	  the	  implications	  of	  giving	  up	  one’s	  speciesist	  beliefs	  are	  profound.	  It	  may	  call	  in	  to	  question	  the	  authority	  of	  one’s	  role	  models	  or	  involve	  potentially	  abandoning	  one’s	  church	  community.	  One	  need	  not	  be	  a	  biblical	  literalist	  to	  face	  a	  similarly	  frightening	  challenge	  to	  her	  worldview.	  Becoming	  aware	  of	  the	  injustice	  done	  to	  nonhuman	  animals	  can	  and	  should	  be	  a	  highly	  disturbing	  and	  emotional	  process	  that	  might	  shed	  light	  on	  similar	  forms	  of	  oppression	  in	  the	  world.	  This	  in	  turn	  might	  lead	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  hopelessness	  or	  it	  might	  cause	  one	  to	  reflect	  on	  one’s	  oppression	  or	  mistreatment,	  which	  one	  may	  prefer	  to	  avoid.	  	   Yet	  another	  reason	  why	  someone	  might	  want	  to	  avoid	  abandoning	  his	  or	  her	  speciesist	  beliefs	  is	  because	  doing	  so	  might	  force	  us	  to	  confront	  our	  own	  mortality.	  As	  we	  saw	  earlier,	  human	  identity	  is	  often	  defined	  by	  our	  lack	  of	  animality.	  Of	  course,	  it	  is	  true	  that	  humans	  are	  animals.	  But	  we	  often	  distance	  ourselves	  from	  that	  fact	  by	  placing	  our	  lives	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  lives	  of	  animals.	  To	  come	  to	  see	  animals	  as	  sentient	  beings	  who	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ought	  to	  be	  treated	  with	  respect,	  might	  involve	  accepting	  that	  one	  is	  not	  so	  different	  from	  other	  animals.	  It	  might	  involve	  recognizing	  that	  humans	  and	  animals	  are	  equals	  in	  many	  respects.	  The	  implications	  of	  this	  equality	  might	  give	  us	  the	  sense	  that	  our	  lives	  are	  not	  unique	  and	  significant.	  This	  may	  seem	  like	  so	  much	  psychologizing,	  but	  as	  Shelby	  points	  out,	  it	  is	  a	  mundane	  yet	  profound	  fact	  about	  humans	  that	  we	  are	  sometimes	  prompted	  to	  accept	  beliefs	  for	  reasons	  that	  have	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  concern	  for	  truth	  or	  justification.	  	  	  	   I	  have	  argued	  that	  speciesism	  has	  both	  an	  epistemic	  and	  genetic	  component.	  I	  will	  now	  argue	  that	  speciesism	  has	  a	  functional	  component	  and	  therefore	  it	  satisfies	  all	  the	  conditions	  of	  an	  ideology	  in	  the	  strong	  critical	  sense.	  The	  functional	  component	  of	  an	  ideology	  gives	  us	  grounds	  to	  reject	  it.	  We	  ought	  to	  reject	  speciesism	  not	  just	  because	  speciesist	  beliefs	  are	  epistemically	  unsound	  and	  irrationally	  held,	  but	  also	  because	  they	  foster	  the	  oppression	  of	  nonhuman	  animals.	  Whereas	  racism	  is	  a	  moral	  ideology	  because	  it	  performs	  primarily	  by	  legitimizing	  the	  oppression	  of	  blacks	  through	  the	  dissemination	  of	  ideological	  illusions,	  speciesism	  is	  a	  reifying	  ideology	  because	  it	  performs	  primarily	  by	  stabilizing	  “oppressive	  relations	  by	  creating	  the	  illusion	  that	  relations	  (or	  their	  causes),	  which	  are	  actually	  a	  product	  of	  historically	  contingent	  human	  actions	  or	  convention,	  are	  ‘natural’	  and	  thus	  ineradicable,	  unavoidable	  and	  unalterable.”41	  The	  result	  of	  our	  speciesist	  beliefs	  is	  that	  there	  are	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	  nonhuman	  animals	  in	  captivity	  in	  the	  U.S.	  as	  I	  write	  this	  and	  billions	  more	  have	  suffered	  and	  been	  killed,	  for	  no	  reason	  except	  for	  our	  palate	  pleasure,	  convenience	  and	  entertainment.	  While	  some	  people	  are	  repulsed	  by	  the	  thought	  of	  drinking	  human	  breast	  milk	  after	  infancy,	  we	  are	  forcing	  millions	  of	  cows	  to	  endure	  several	  rounds	  of	  forcible	  impregnation	  and	  traumatic	  separation	  from	  their	  babies	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Shelby,	  Tommie.	  Ideology,	  Racism	  and	  Critical	  Social	  Theory.	  pp.	  177	  
	   34	  
so	  that	  we	  can	  drink	  their	  milk.	  We	  are	  doing	  this	  while	  we	  teach	  our	  children	  that	  cows	  need	  to	  be	  milked	  so	  the	  cows’	  utters	  do	  not	  hurt,	  when	  in	  fact	  we	  have	  subjected	  them	  to	  a	  relentless	  cycle	  of	  forcible	  impregnation	  and	  separation	  from	  their	  children,	  who	  will	  be	  killed	  in	  similarly	  despicable	  fashion	  as	  their	  mother,	  so	  that	  we	  can	  have	  their	  milk.	  To	  compound	  this	  tragedy,	  it	  turns	  out,	  that	  human	  consumption	  of	  cow’s	  milk	  is	  not	  only	  wholly	  unnecessary,	  there	  is	  also	  strong	  evidence	  that	  it	  is	  deleterious	  to	  human	  health.42	  We	  are	  teaching	  them	  that	  sheep	  need	  to	  be	  shorn	  so	  that	  the	  sheep	  do	  not	  overheat,	  ignoring	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  have	  genetically	  modified	  them	  to	  produce	  this	  amount	  of	  wool	  for	  us.	  And	  we	  are	  failing	  to	  teach	  them	  that	  many	  sheep	  are	  subjected	  to	  violent	  sheering	  as	  oppressed	  workers,	  who	  are	  paid	  for	  each	  sheep	  that	  they	  sheer	  and	  not	  hourly,	  rush	  to	  get	  the	  job	  done.	  	   I	  have	  argued	  that	  speciesism	  ought	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  ideology	  because	  it	  satisfies	  the	  epistemic,	  genetic	  and	  functional	  criteria	  of	  an	  ideology.	  This	  conception	  of	  speciesism	  is	  stronger	  than	  the	  conventional	  conception	  because	  it	  not	  only	  allows	  us	  to	  pick	  out	  what	  beliefs	  systems	  are	  problematic,	  it	  also	  explains	  why	  they	  are	  problematic,	  and	  it	  provides	  us	  with	  reasons	  to	  reject	  them.	  Moreover,	  it	  helps	  to	  explain	  social	  phenomena,	  such	  as	  how	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  so	  many	  of	  us	  fail	  to	  recognize	  that	  we	  are	  complicit	  in	  oppression	  of	  other	  animals.	  To	  my	  mind,	  the	  most	  profound	  implication	  of	  this	  view	  is	  the	  implication	  that	  reason	  or	  logical	  arguments	  alone	  will	  be	  woefully	  insufficient	  to	  dislodge	  speciesist	  beliefs.	  If	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  people	  hold	  speciesist	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beliefs	  for	  noncognitive,	  or	  affective,	  reasons,	  then	  we	  must	  identify	  what	  those	  affective	  reasons	  are	  if	  there	  is	  to	  be	  any	  hope	  of	  undermining	  speciesist	  ideology.	  Although	  facts	  alone	  will	  not	  be	  sufficient	  to	  undermine	  speciesism,	  having	  access	  to	  the	  facts	  is	  nevertheless	  a	  crucial	  component	  of	  undermining	  speciesism.	  These	  facts	  include	  scientific	  facts	  about	  other	  animals,	  and	  they	  also	  include	  moral	  “facts”	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  our	  obligations	  to	  other	  animals.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  have	  access	  to	  the	  facts	  for	  at	  least	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  not	  all	  people	  hold	  speciesist	  beliefs	  for	  affective	  reasons.	  Rather,	  they	  simply	  lack	  the	  proper	  information	  to	  make	  an	  informed	  decision.	  Second,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  be	  able	  to	  explain	  why	  it	  is	  that	  speciesist	  beliefs	  ought	  to	  be	  abandoned.	  The	  next	  chapter	  is	  devoted	  to	  identifying	  a	  strong	  account	  of	  why	  it	  is	  that	  we	  have	  obligations	  to	  other	  animals.	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Chapter	  2:	  Theories	  of	  Animal	  “Rights”	   	  1.1	  Introduction	  	   One	  may	  have	  found	  the	  characterization	  of	  speciesism	  as	  an	  ideology	  compelling	  but	  nevertheless	  be	  unclear	  about	  exactly	  what	  constitutes	  a	  moral	  relationship	  between	  humans	  and	  other	  animals.	  Rightly	  so.	  The	  argument	  in	  favor	  of	  thinking	  that	  speciesism	  is	  an	  ideology	  does	  not	  yield	  an	  account	  of	  our	  duties	  to	  other	  animals.	  It	  only	  prescribes	  that	  our	  moral	  thinking	  about	  other	  animals	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  distorted	  by	  ideological	  beliefs.	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  provide	  an	  account	  of	  our	  duties	  to	  animals.	  Although	  an	  account	  of	  our	  obligations	  to	  other	  animals	  alone	  will	  not	  be	  sufficient	  to	  undermine	  speciesist	  ideology,	  it	  is	  a	  necessary	  component	  for	  doing	  so.	  We	  must	  be	  able	  to	  counter	  speciesist	  ideology	  with	  considered	  arguments	  and	  scientific	  facts.	  Just	  as	  an	  account	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  access	  to	  the	  scientific	  facts	  about	  race	  is	  vital	  to	  the	  task	  of	  undermining	  racist	  ideology,	  it	  is	  vital	  to	  the	  task	  of	  undermining	  speciesism	  to	  have	  access	  to	  a	  strong	  account	  of	  animal	  rights	  and	  to	  the	  scientific	  facts	  about	  other	  animals.	  	  	   In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  present	  three	  competing	  accounts	  of	  animal	  “rights.”	  I	  put	  “rights”	  in	  quotations	  because	  not	  all	  theorists	  believe	  that	  other	  animals	  have	  rights	  in	  a	  sense	  that	  I	  will	  explain.	  For	  now,	  I	  use	  the	  term	  conventionally,	  as	  shorthand	  for	  views	  that	  maintain	  that	  we	  have	  direct	  obligations	  to	  other	  animals.	  I	  will	  present	  what	  I	  take	  to	  be	  the	  three	  dominant	  theories	  of	  animal	  rights:	  Peter	  Singer’s	  utilitarian	  theory	  of	  animal	  rights,	  Tom	  Regan’s	  deontological	  theory	  of	  animal	  rights,	  and	  Gary	  Francione’s	  abolitionist	  theory	  of	  animal	  rights.	  I	  argue	  that	  Francione’s	  theory	  is	  the	  most	  tenable.	  Consequently,	  I	  think	  we	  ought	  to	  adopt	  it,	  clarify	  it	  and	  further	  develop	  it.	  I	  devote	  considerable	  time	  to	  Singer’s	  theory	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  although	  Singer’s	  view	  is	  not	  conceptually	  complex,	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Singer	  is	  sometimes	  equivocal	  about	  his	  moral	  prescriptions.	  And	  although	  Singer’s	  theory	  has	  strong	  intuitive	  appeal,	  its	  implications	  are	  not	  always	  obvious.	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  requires	  careful	  exposition.	  Second,	  Singer’s	  view	  is	  seminal.	  It	  represents	  the	  dominant	  thinking	  in	  society	  and	  within	  animal	  rights	  movements.	  Both	  Regan’s	  and	  Francione’s	  positions	  are,	  to	  a	  great	  extent,	  direct	  responses	  to	  the	  Singer	  model	  of	  animal	  ethics.	  After	  presenting	  Singer’s	  theory,	  I	  will	  then	  discuss	  Regan’s	  theory	  and	  Francione’s	  theory.	  	  	  	  1.2	  Singer’s	  Utilitarian	  Theory	  of	  Animal	  Rights	  	   The	  cornerstone	  of	  Singer’s	  view	  on	  how	  nonhuman	  animals	  ought	  to	  be	  treated	  is	  the	  assumption	  that	  suffering	  is	  inherently	  bad.	  Since	  suffering	  is	  a	  function	  of	  sentience,	  sentience	  is	  the	  fundamental	  criterion	  for	  moral	  considerability.	  For	  Singer,	  then,	  the	  objective	  of	  morality	  is	  to	  minimize	  suffering	  and	  to	  maximize	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  the	  preferences	  of	  sentient	  beings.43	  Since	  animals	  possess	  the	  capacity	  to	  suffer	  and	  they	  have	  preferences,	  they	  necessarily	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  ethical	  concern.	  To	  ignore	  the	  suffering	  of	  a	  sentient	  being	  based	  on	  its	  species	  membership	  alone	  amounts	  to	  speciesism.	  Singer	  understands	  speciesism	  as	  a	  prejudice	  akin	  to	  racism	  and	  sexism	  in	  that	  it	  appeals	  to	  an	  animal’s	  species	  membership	  to	  justify	  disregarding	  or	  overriding	  his	  or	  her	  preferences,	  in	  situations	  in	  which	  species	  membership	  is	  morally	  arbitrary.	  In	  order	  to	  avoid	  this	  kind	  of	  unjust	  discrimination,	  Singer	  argues	  that	  our	  actions	  ought	  to	  be	  governed	  by	  The	  Equality	  principle,	  which	  stipulates	  that	  we	  take	  into	  account	  every	  sentient	  being	  who	  might	  be	  affected	  by	  our	  actions.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  For	   an	  account	  of	   Singer’s	  utilitarian	  views	  on	   suffering,	   see	   Singer,	  Peter.	  Practical	  Ethics:	  Third	  Edition.	  Chapter	  2.	  Also	  see	  Singer,	  Peter.	  Animal	  Liberation:	  Updated	  Edition.	  Chapter	  1	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1.3	  The	  Case	  for	  Human	  Equality	  and	  The	  Equality	  Principle	  	   In	  order	  to	  elucidate	  the	  case	  for	  animal	  equality,	  Singer	  enjoins	  us	  to	  examine	  the	  basis	  of	  our	  opposition	  to	  discrimination	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  race	  or	  sex	  and	  to	  analyze	  our	  conviction	  that	  all	  humans	  are	  equal	  despite	  our	  differences.	  The	  claim	  that	  all	  humans	  are	  equal	  is	  a	  moral	  prescription	  for	  how	  we	  ought	  to	  treat	  one	  another	  that	  rests	  on	  the	  egalitarian	  idea	  that	  our	  moral	  concern	  for	  each	  other	  should	  not	  be	  based	  on	  what	  one	  is	  like,	  or	  what	  characteristics	  one	  possesses.	  Notice	  that	  the	  notion	  that	  all	  humans	  are	  equal	  is	  not	  an	  assertion	  of	  fact.	  That	  is,	  the	  case	  for	  human	  equality	  is	  not	  a	  claim	  that	  all	  humans	  have	  the	  same	  capacities	  or	  characteristics.	  Human	  characteristics	  and	  capacities	  vary	  widely	  among	  individuals,	  and	  some	  human	  characteristics	  and	  capacities	  warrant	  differences	  in	  treatment.	  For	  instance,	  we	  grant	  voting	  rights	  to	  adults	  but	  not	  to	  infants.	  This	  difference	  in	  treatment	  is	  not	  arbitrary;	  it	  is	  warranted	  because	  infants	  are	  not	  cognitively	  equipped	  to	  make	  political	  decisions.	  Similarly,	  feminists	  advocate	  for	  women’s	  right	  to	  abortion	  services	  but	  they	  do	  not	  maintain	  that	  men	  have	  the	  same	  right.	  This	  difference	  in	  treatment	  is	  also	  warranted;	  given	  that	  it	  is	  physically	  impossible	  for	  men	  to	  have	  abortions,	  they	  do	  not	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  receiving	  an	  abortion.	  	  	   Other	  differences	  in	  treatment	  are	  not	  morally	  justifiable.	  Suppose	  Jack	  and	  Jill	  both	  apply	  to	  graduate	  school	  and	  the	  graduate	  admissions	  committee	  can	  only	  admit	  one	  candidate.	  Jack	  is	  accepted	  and	  Jill	  is	  not.	  A	  morally	  justifiable	  reason	  to	  choose	  Jack	  over	  Jill	  would	  be	  because	  he	  had	  a	  stronger	  academic	  record	  than	  Jill	  and	  he	  was	  a	  more	  promising	  candidate.	  A	  morally	  unjustifiable	  reason	  to	  choose	  Jack	  over	  Jill	  would	  be	  because	  the	  admissions	  committee	  believed	  that	  men	  make	  better	  academics	  than	  women.	  This	  rationale	  is	  morally	  noxious	  because	  sex	  is	  not	  an	  indicator	  of	  intellectual	  competence.	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   We	  have	  seen	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  problematic	  per	  se	  about	  differential	  treatment	  so	  long	  as	  there	  is	  a	  valid	  basis	  for	  it.	  Differential	  treatment	  is	  problematic	  when	  it	  is	  justified	  by	  appeal	  to	  characteristics	  that	  are	  morally	  irrelevant	  to	  a	  particular	  decision.	  Racism	  and	  sexism	  are	  morally	  reprehensible	  because	  race	  and	  sex	  are	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  situations	  in	  which	  those	  characteristics	  are	  morally	  irrelevant.	  Notice	  that	  racism	  and	  sexism	  are	  problematic	  for	  at	  least	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  as	  a	  factual	  matter,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  one	  can	  infer	  morally	  significant	  information	  about	  someone’s	  character	  based	  on	  that	  person’s	  race	  or	  sex	  alone.	  It	  is	  a	  fact	  that	  individuals	  differ	  in	  various	  respects	  at	  the	  individual	  level.	  Some	  men	  have	  more	  expansive	  intellectual	  capacities	  than	  women	  and	  vice	  versa,	  and	  some	  white	  people	  have	  more	  expansive	  intellectual	  capacities	  than	  people	  of	  color	  and	  vice	  versa.	  But	  differences	  on	  the	  individual	  level	  should	  not	  be	  interpreted	  as	  evidence	  for	  inherent	  differences	  between	  the	  races	  and	  sexes	  as	  such.	  	  	   The	  second	  issue	  is	  that	  even	  if	  it	  were	  the	  case	  that	  there	  were	  factual	  differences	  among	  races	  and	  sexes	  as	  such,	  “there	  is	  no	  logically	  compelling	  reason	  for	  assuming	  that	  a	  factual	  difference	  in	  ability	  between	  two	  people	  justifies	  any	  difference	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  consideration	  we	  give	  to	  their	  needs	  and	  interests.”44	  For	  instance,	  there	  is	  no	  objective	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  intelligent	  people,	  muscular	  people	  or	  musically	  talented	  people	  are	  more	  important	  than	  anyone	  else.	  To	  underscore	  this	  point,	  Singer	  quotes	  Sojourner	  Truth,	  a	  black	  feminist	  who	  advocated	  for	  women’s	  rights	  in	  the	  1850s:	  They	  talk	  about	  this	  thing	  in	  the	  head;	  what	  do	  they	  call	  it”	  [“intellect,”	  whispered	  someone	  nearby.]	  That’s	  it.	  What’s	  that	  got	  to	  do	  with	  women’s	  rights	  or	  Negroes’	  right?	  If	  my	  cup	  won’t	  hold	  but	  a	  pint	  and	  yours	  holds	  a	  quart,	  wouldn’t	  you	  be	  mean	  not	  to	  let	  me	  have	  my	  little	  half-­‐measure	  full?45	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Singer,	  Peter.	  Practical	  Ethics:	  Third	  Edition.	  pp.	  20	  45	  Singer,	  Peter.	  Animal	  Liberation:	  Updated	  Edition.	  pp.	  6.	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Because	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  factual	  differences	  among	  humans	  should	  influence	  the	  amount	  of	  consideration	  that	  is	  given	  to	  their	  interests,	  Singer	  says,	  the	  case	  for	  the	  equality	  of	  humans	  should	  not	  rest	  on	  the	  truth-­‐value	  of	  empirical	  facts	  about	  people’s	  capacities	  or	  characteristics.	  	  	  
	   We	  have	  seen	  that	  the	  case	  for	  human	  equality	  is	  not	  based	  on	  factual	  equality.	  And	  this	  is	  as	  it	  should	  be,	  for	  while	  there	  are	  vast	  differences	  among	  humans,	  with	  respect	  to	  phenotypic	  characteristics	  such	  as	  skin	  color,	  or	  differences	  in	  ability	  such	  as	  intellectual	  or	  physical	  strength,	  those	  differences	  do	  not	  matter	  morally.	  Rather,	  the	  case	  for	  human	  equality	  rests	  on	  the	  egalitarian	  idea	  that	  our	  concern	  for	  others	  should	  not	  be	  contingent	  upon	  what	  they	  are	  like	  or	  on	  what	  abilities	  they	  possess.	  The	  Principle	  of	  Equality	  is	  a	  moral	  ideal	  for	  how	  we	  ought	  to	  treat	  one	  another.	  It	  is	  a	  tool	  we	  use	  to	  explain,	  guide	  and	  evaluate	  our	  actions.	  	  	  
	  1.4	  The	  Case	  for	  Animal	  Equality:	  The	  Sentience	  Criterion	  and	  The	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration	  	   Having	  considered	  the	  case	  for	  human	  equality,	  we	  can	  now	  turn	  our	  attention	  to	  the	  case	  for	  the	  equality	  of	  other	  animals.	  The	  case	  for	  animal	  equality	  is	  simple.	  It	  does	  not	  require	  us	  to	  adopt	  any	  new	  principles.	  Rather,	  it	  requires	  that	  we	  extend	  The	  Equality	  Principle,	  a	  principle	  we	  already	  endorse,	  to	  other	  animals.	  It	  requires	  that	  we	  conform	  our	  actions	  to	  our	  own	  moral	  standards	  by	  expanding	  the	  moral	  community	  to	  encompass	  other	  animals.	  On	  Singer’s	  view	  sentience	  alone	  is	  sufficient	  for	  inclusion	  in	  the	  moral	  community.	  The	  ability	  to	  experience	  pleasure	  and	  pain	  is	  not	  special	  to	  any	  species.	  Rather,	  the	  ability	  to	  experience	  pleasure	  and	  pain	  is	  a	  function	  of	  sentience.	  Therefore,	  the	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exclusion	  of	  sentient	  beings	  from	  moral	  consideration	  based	  on	  species	  membership	  alone	  is	  arbitrary.	  In	  order	  to	  avoid	  speciesism	  and	  to	  do	  what	  is	  morally	  right,	  we	  must	  extend	  The	  Principle	  of	  Equality	  to	  other	  animals,	  Singer	  says.	  	   A	  clarification	  regarding	  The	  Equality	  Principle	  is	  now	  in	  order.	  The	  Principle	  of	  Equality	  is	  a	  formal	  principle.	  Formal	  principles	  set	  boundaries	  for	  what	  kinds	  of	  actions	  are	  permissible	  but	  they	  do	  not	  specify	  exactly	  which	  actions	  are	  morally	  permissible.	  For	  example,	  The	  Categorical	  Imperative,	  a	  Kantian	  formal	  principle,	  states	  that	  one	  ought	  to	  never	  act	  except	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  one	  could	  will	  that	  the	  maxim	  of	  one’s	  action	  become	  universal	  law.	  For	  instance,	  suppose	  one	  wants	  to	  consider	  whether	  to	  murder	  one’s	  annoying	  neighbor.	  Unless	  one	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  universalize	  the	  maxim,	  “kill	  people	  one	  finds	  annoying”	  then	  one	  ought	  not	  to	  commit	  the	  murder.	  Since	  the	  maxim,	  “Do	  not	  kill,”	  is	  derived	  from	  a	  formal	  principle	  and	  it	  indicates	  the	  value	  of	  a	  specific	  action,	  namely	  murder,	  it	  is	  a	  substantive	  principle.	  Kant,	  controversially,	  considered	  the	  maxim	  “Don’t	  lie”	  to	  be	  a	  substantive	  principle.	  People	  may	  disagree	  about	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  a	  substantive	  principle	  while	  accepting	  the	  formal	  principle	  from	  which	  it	  is	  derived.	  For	  instance,	  one	  might	  accept	  The	  Categorical	  Imperative	  but	  disagree	  about	  whether	  it	  yields	  the	  substantive	  principle	  that	  there	  is	  an	  absolute	  prohibition	  against	  lying	  when	  the	  principle	  is	  properly	  applied.	  The	  point	  of	  this	  example	  is	  to	  point	  out	  that	  The	  Equality	  Principle	  is	  a	  formal	  Principle	  and	  formal	  principles	  are	  open	  to	  interpretation.	  This	  is	  important,	  because,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  Singer’s	  interpretation	  of	  The	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration	  depends	  on	  the	  moral	  theory	  within	  he	  is	  working,	  namely	  utilitarianism.	  	  	   Since	  The	  Equality	  Principle	  is	  a	  formal	  principle,	  it	  does	  not	  specify	  exactly	  which	  actions	  are	  morally	  permissible.	  It	  merely	  enjoins	  us	  to	  recognize	  that	  all	  sentient	  beings	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have	  equal	  moral	  status	  (each	  counts	  for	  one,	  no	  more	  and	  no	  less),	  but	  it	  does	  not	  specify	  how	  we	  ought	  to	  treat	  sentient	  beings	  once	  we	  have	  recognized	  their	  moral	  status.	  Ought	  we	  treat	  all	  sentient	  beings	  exactly	  the	  same?	  According	  to	  Singer,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  we	  should	  treat	  every	  sentient	  being	  identically.	  Different	  capacities	  give	  rise	  to	  different	  interests	  and	  corresponding	  prescriptions	  for	  treatment.	  Notice	  that	  this	  is	  a	  fact	  we	  already	  acknowledged	  in	  the	  example	  of	  feminists	  who	  do	  not	  advocate	  for	  the	  rights	  of	  men	  to	  access	  abortion	  services.	  As	  I	  noted	  earlier,	  this	  is	  as	  it	  should	  be,	  for	  men	  cannot	  have	  abortions	  and	  therefore	  they	  do	  not	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  having	  abortions.	  Because	  we	  have	  a	  morally	  sound	  reason	  to	  justify	  this	  instance	  of	  differential	  treatment	  of	  the	  sexes,	  this	  difference	  in	  treatment	  is	  not	  sexist.	  Likewise,	  animal	  advocates	  would	  not	  and	  should	  not	  advocate	  that	  other	  animals	  are	  entitled	  to	  access	  to	  higher	  education,	  because	  other	  animals	  do	  not	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  pursuing	  higher	  education	  	  	   As	  we	  have	  seen,	  The	  Equality	  Principle	  requires	  that	  we	  take	  into	  account	  the	  moral	  status	  of	  all	  sentient	  beings,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  require	  that	  we	  treat	  all	  sentient	  beings	  identically.	  Given	  this,	  Singer	  argues	  that	  we	  are	  entitled	  to	  derive	  The	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration	  from	  The	  Equality	  Principle.	  The	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration	  requires	  that	  we	  extend	  equal	  consideration	  to	  equal	  interests.	  To	  put	  it	  slightly	  differently,	  The	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration	  essentially	  “means	  that	  if	  an	  animal	  feels	  pain,	  the	  pain	  matters	  as	  much	  as	  it	  does	  when	  a	  human	  feels	  pain	  -­‐	  if	  the	  pains	  hurt	  just	  as	  much.	  How	  bad	  pain	  and	  suffering	  are	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  the	  species	  of	  being	  that	  experiences	  it."46	  The	  derivation	  of	  the	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration	  from	  the	  Principle	  of	  Equality	  is	  vital,	  because	  it	  specifies	  the	  object	  of	  our	  moral	  concern.	  It	  tells	  us	  not	  just	  we	  ought	  to	  consider	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  This	  quote	  is	  from	  a	  debate	  between	  Singer	  and	  Posner	  in	  Slate	  Magazine	  in	  2001.	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other	  animals	  when	  we	  make	  choices	  that	  might	  affect	  them,	  but	  that	  it	  is	  their	  equal	  interests	  in	  particular	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  take	  into	  account.	  	  	   Although	  The	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration	  is	  more	  precise	  than	  the	  Equality	  Principle,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  notice	  that	  it	  is,	  like	  The	  Equality	  Principle,	  a	  formal	  principle.	  It	  tells	  us	  that	  equal	  interests	  ought	  to	  be	  the	  target	  of	  our	  moral	  concern,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  specify	  exactly	  which	  interests	  are	  equal.	  Singer	  provides	  an	  example	  pertaining	  to	  the	  interest	  in	  avoiding	  pain,	  which	  offers	  some	  limited	  insight	  into	  the	  concept	  of	  equal	  interests:	  If	  I	  give	  a	  horse	  a	  hard	  slap	  across	  its	  rump	  with	  my	  open	  hand,	  the	  horse	  may	  start,	  but	  it	  presumably	  feels	  little	  pain.	  Its	  skin	  is	  thick	  enough	  to	  protect	  it	  against	  a	  mere	  slap.	  If	  I	  slap	  a	  baby	  in	  the	  same	  way,	  however,	  the	  baby	  will	  cry	  and	  presumably	  does	  feel	  the	  pain,	  for	  the	  baby’s	  skin	  is	  more	  sensitive.	  So	  it	  is	  worse	  to	  slap	  a	  baby	  than	  a	  horse,	  if	  both	  slaps	  are	  administered	  with	  equal	  force.	  But	  there	  must	  be	  some	  kind	  of	  blow	  –	  I	  don’t	  know	  exactly	  what	  it	  would	  be,	  but	  perhaps	  a	  blow	  with	  a	  heavy	  stick	  –	  that	  would	  cause	  the	  horse	  as	  much	  pain	  as	  we	  cause	  a	  baby	  by	  a	  simple	  slap.	  If	  we	  consider	  it	  wrong	  to	  inflict	  that	  much	  pain	  on	  a	  baby	  for	  no	  good	  reason	  then	  we	  must,	  unless	  we	  are	  speciesist,	  consider	  it	  equally	  wrong	  to	  inflict	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  pain	  on	  a	  horse	  for	  no	  good	  reason.47	  	  	  Of	  course	  our	  choices	  are	  rarely	  as	  simple	  as	  deciding	  whether	  slapping	  a	  baby	  is	  worse	  than	  slapping	  a	  horse.	  The	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration	  might	  have	  helpful	  action-­‐guiding	  power	  even	  in	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  harms	  are	  obviously	  incomparable.	  For	  example,	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  you	  would	  not	  be	  morally	  justified	  in	  killing	  me	  for	  the	  five	  dollars	  in	  my	  back	  pocket.	  My	  interest	  in	  remaining	  alive,	  ostensibly,	  outweighs	  your	  comparatively	  trivial	  interest	  in	  having	  my	  five	  dollars.	  Singer	  does	  not	  provide	  us	  with	  a	  clear	  guide	  to	  adjudicate	  apparent	  conflicts	  of	  interests.	  What	  is	  important	  to	  take	  away	  from	  this	  discussion	  about	  equal	  interests	  is	  that	  Singer	  thinks	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  treat	  equal	  interests	  equally	  in	  decision-­‐making	  processes.	  But	  deciding	  how	  to	  weigh	  these	  is	  a	  separate	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question,	  and	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  later,	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  are	  ultimately	  adjudicated	  by	  utilitarian	  considerations,	  on	  Singer’s	  view.	  	  	  1.5	  Personhood	  and	  the	  Morality	  of	  Killing	  	   Singer’s	  views	  on	  personhood	  directly	  inform	  his	  views	  on	  the	  interests	  that	  sentient	  beings	  have	  in	  continued	  life,	  or	  to	  put	  it	  in	  negative	  terms,	  their	  interests	  in	  not	  being	  painlessly	  killed.	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  Singer	  thinks	  that	  painlessly	  killing	  persons	  is	  morally	  impermissible,	  but	  painlessly	  killing	  nonpersons	  is	  morally	  permissible,	  at	  least	  in	  theory.	  I	  will	  now	  discuss	  Singer’s	  views	  on	  personhood	  before	  discussing	  their	  moral	  implications	  for	  murder.	  Singer	  does	  not	  use	  the	  term	  “person”	  in	  the	  colloquial	  sense	  as	  referring	  to	  a	  member	  of	  the	  species	  Homo	  sapiens.	  Rather,	  a	  person	  is	  a	  rational	  and	  self-­‐aware	  being.48	  Given	  this	  definition,	  it	  follows	  that	  not	  all	  sentient	  beings	  are	  persons.	  Some	  members	  of	  the	  species	  Homo	  sapiens,	  such	  as	  infants	  or	  the	  severely	  mentally	  disabled,	  are	  not	  persons	  because	  they	  are	  neither	  rational	  nor	  self-­‐aware.	  Likewise,	  some	  nonhuman	  animals,	  such	  as	  dolphins	  and	  chimpanzees,	  are	  persons	  because	  they	  are	  both	  rational	  and	  self-­‐aware.	  I	  will	  now	  discuss	  persons	  and	  nonpersons	  respectively.	  	   Nonpersons	  are	  conscious	  but	  they	  are	  not	  self-­‐conscious.	  They	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  world	  around	  them	  but	  they	  are	  not	  aware	  of	  their	  own	  awareness	  of	  the	  world.	  	  Singer	  describes	  nonpersons	  as	  beings	  who	  live	  in	  a	  sort	  of	  perpetual	  present	  state	  of	  mind.49	  While	  some	  of	  their	  actions,	  such	  as	  searching	  for	  food,	  may	  suggest	  an	  ability	  to	  plan	  for	  the	  future,	  they	  are	  only	  able	  to	  do	  this	  to	  a	  very	  restricted	  extent.	  When	  they	  lose	  consciousness,	  as	  in	  sleep,	  their	  desires	  desist—they	  have	  no	  expectations	  for	  the	  future.	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And	  if	  they	  do	  regain	  consciousness,	  they	  have	  no	  sense	  of	  having	  previously	  existed.	  A	  dog	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  nonperson.50	  Your	  dog	  may	  recognize	  you	  when	  she	  awakens,	  but	  she	  does	  not	  understand	  that	  she	  recognizes	  you	  or	  that	  you	  have	  a	  relationship	  that	  persists	  over	  time.	  When	  she	  awakens	  she	  is	  just	  there.	  For	  nonpersons,	  falling	  asleep	  and	  awakening	  is	  similar	  to	  dying	  and	  being	  born.	  As	  a	  result,	  nonpersons	  lack	  a	  sense	  of	  identity	  over	  time.	  Christine	  Korsgaard	  has	  aptly	  captured	  Singer’s	  conception	  of	  the	  experiences	  of	  nonpersons:	  “Because	  they	  lack	  any	  sense	  of	  their	  experience	  as	  extended	  in	  time,	  all	  their	  consciousness	  can	  be	  is	  a	  series	  of	  discrete,	  disconnected	  experiences,	  which	  can	  be	  painful	  or	  pleasant	  or	  frightening	  but	  only	  in	  a	  local	  way.”51	  	   Unlike	  nonpersons,	  persons	  are	  self-­‐aware	  and	  rational.	  They	  are	  both	  conscious	  of	  the	  world	  around	  them	  and	  aware	  that	  they	  are	  conscious	  of	  the	  world.	  Unlike	  the	  experiences	  of	  nonpersons,	  the	  experiences	  of	  persons	  are	  connected,	  by	  memory	  or	  anticipation,	  to	  long	  term	  hopes	  or	  fears,	  as	  Korsgarrd	  puts	  it.	  The	  hopes,	  expectations	  and	  fears	  of	  persons	  do	  not	  desist	  when	  they	  become	  unconscious,	  as	  in	  sleep.	  The	  significance	  of	  Singer’s	  distinction	  between	  persons	  and	  nonpersons	  is	  salient	  in	  his	  views	  on	  the	  moral	  permissibility	  of	  killing,	  which	  I	  will	  now	  discuss.	  	  	   According	  to	  Singer,	  there	  is	  no	  strong	  theoretical	  basis	  for	  opposing	  the	  painless	  killing	  of	  nonpersons:	  the	  harm	  of	  death	  is	  a	  function	  of	  the	  amount	  of	  opportunities	  for	  future	  satisfaction	  of	  interests	  on	  which	  it	  forecloses.52	  Since,	  on	  Singer’s	  view,	  nonpersons	  cannot	  contemplate	  the	  future,	  they	  are	  incapable	  of	  having	  an	  interest	  in	  continued	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existence.	  Exactly	  because	  nonpersons	  cannot	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  continued	  existence,	  they	  
do	  not	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  continuing	  to	  live	  their	  lives.	  So	  long	  as	  they	  are	  killed	  painlessly,	  being	  killed	  does	  not	  constitute	  a	  harm	  to	  nonpersons;	  it	  is	  tantamount	  to	  falling	  asleep.53	  While	  nonpersons	  do	  not	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  remaining	  alive,	  they	  do	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  avoiding	  pain.	  Nonpersons	  may	  resist	  being	  killed,	  but	  their	  resistance	  signals	  an	  aversion	  to	  suffering	  here	  and	  now	  rather	  than	  an	  interest	  in	  continued	  existence.	  Thus,	  Singer	  stresses	  that	  in	  order	  for	  a	  killing	  of	  a	  nonperson	  to	  be	  morally	  permissible,	  it	  must	  be	  done	  painlessly.	  While	  there	  is	  nothing	  wrong	  with	  painlessly	  killing	  nonpersons	  in	  theory,	  Singer	  notes,	  the	  painless	  killing	  of	  nonpersons	  may	  have	  negative	  indirect	  consequences	  that	  would	  call	  into	  question	  the	  morality	  of	  doing	  so.	  For	  instance,	  if	  the	  nonperson	  in	  question	  were	  a	  human	  infant	  or	  an	  infant	  chimpanzee,	  then	  killing	  that	  infant	  would	  be	  morally	  impermissible	  because	  it	  would	  cause	  intense	  suffering	  to	  the	  infant’s	  family	  and	  to	  other	  members	  of	  the	  moral	  community.	  	  	  	  	   By	  contrast,	  Singer	  says,	  painless	  killing	  directly	  harms	  persons	  because	  it	  forecloses	  on	  the	  future	  opportunities	  to	  satisfy	  their	  interests.	  Because	  persons	  are	  cognitively	  disposed	  such	  that	  they	  have	  a	  sense	  of	  identity	  over	  time,	  which	  corresponds	  to	  an	  interest	  in	  continued	  life,	  painlessly	  killing	  persons	  is	  morally	  impermissible,	  as	  Singer	  explains:	  According	  to	  preference	  utilitarianism,	  an	  action	  contrary	  to	  the	  preference	  of	  any	  being	  is	  wrong,	  unless	  this	  preference	  is	  outweighed	  by	  contrary	  preferences.	  Killing	  a	  person	  who	  wishes	  to	  continue	  living	  is	  therefore	  wrong,	  other	  things	  being	  equal.	  That	  the	  victims	  are	  not	  around	  after	  the	  fact	  to	  lament	  the	  fact	  that	  their	  preferences	  have	  been	  disregarded	  is	  irrelevant.	  The	  wrong	  is	  done	  when	  the	  preference	  is	  thwarted	  …	  Taking	  the	  life	  of	  a	  person	  will	  normally	  be	  worse	  than	  taking	  the	  life	  of	  some	  other	  being,	  because	  persons	  are	  highly	  future-­‐oriented	  in	  their	  preferences.	  	  To	  kill	  a	  person	  is	  therefore,	  normally,	  to	  violate	  not	  just	  one	  but	  also	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  the	  most	  central	  and	  significant	  preferences	  a	  being	  can	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have.	  Very	  often,	  it	  will	  make	  nonsense	  of	  everything	  that	  the	  victim	  has	  been	  trying	  to	  do	  over	  the	  past	  days,	  months	  and	  even	  years54.	  	  On	  Singer’s	  view,	  the	  interests	  of	  persons	  in	  remaining	  alive	  will	  always	  outweigh	  any	  competing	  interest	  to	  end	  that	  person’s	  life.	  Moreover,	  there	  are	  often	  indirect	  harms	  associated	  with	  the	  killing	  of	  persons	  that	  compound	  the	  wrongness	  of	  it.	  For	  instance,	  the	  painless	  killing	  of	  persons	  will	  usually	  cause	  intense	  grief	  to	  the	  person’s	  family	  members.	  On	  Singer’s	  view,	  the	  preferences	  that	  persons	  have	  in	  continued	  life	  are	  sufficiently	  strong	  such	  that	  killing	  them,	  even	  painlessly,	  will	  never	  be	  justifiable.	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  later,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  Singer	  is	  entitled	  to	  this	  conclusion.	  	   At	  this	  juncture,	  one	  might	  wish	  to	  propose	  a	  counter	  example	  to	  Singer’s	  argument	  that	  painlessly	  killing	  persons	  is	  morally	  impermissible.	  Suppose	  that	  painlessly	  killing	  a	  very	  depressed	  man,	  who	  has	  no	  family	  or	  friends	  and	  who	  wishes	  to	  die,	  would	  bring	  about	  good	  consequences.	  Suppose	  there	  has	  been	  a	  series	  of	  brutal	  murders.	  The	  townspeople	  are	  bereft	  and	  they	  want	  revenge.	  You	  and	  only	  you	  know	  that	  the	  murderer	  has	  died	  and	  you	  cannot	  prove	  he	  is	  the	  murderer.	  It	  would	  bring	  great	  solace	  to	  the	  townsfolk	  to	  see	  the	  killer	  publicly	  executed.	  Wanting	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  best	  consequences,	  you	  decide	  to	  frame	  the	  innocent	  depressed	  man.	  In	  doing	  so,	  you	  satisfy	  the	  depressed	  man’s	  preference	  to	  die;	  you	  do	  not	  bring	  about	  any	  indirect	  negative	  consequences,	  since	  the	  depressed	  man	  has	  no	  loved	  ones	  who	  would	  grieve	  his	  death;	  and	  you	  satisfy	  the	  preferences	  of	  the	  townspeople	  to	  see	  the	  murderer	  killed.	  In	  this	  case,	  we	  have	  brought	  about	  no	  suffering	  and	  we	  have	  even	  managed	  to	  satisfy	  many	  preferences.	  Would	  this	  painless	  killing	  be	  wrong?	  According	  to	  Singer,	  it	  would	  be	  wrong.	  Although	  we	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have	  avoided	  suffering	  and	  maximized	  preference	  satisfaction,	  killing	  the	  depressed	  man	  violates	  a	  morally	  salient	  rule,	  as	  we	  shall	  see.	  	  	   In	  order	  to	  understand	  this	  seemingly	  inconsistent	  conclusion	  and	  to	  further	  elucidate	  Singer’s	  position,	  it	  will	  be	  helpful	  to	  briefly	  discuss	  the	  broader	  utilitarian	  theory	  in	  which	  he	  is	  working.	  Singer	  is	  a	  preference	  rule	  utilitarian.55	  Preference	  utilitarianism	  might	  be	  best	  understood	  in	  contrast	  to	  hedonistic	  utilitarianism,	  which	  holds	  that	  the	  right	  action	  is	  the	  action	  that	  creates	  the	  most	  happiness.	  A	  common	  objection	  to	  hedonistic	  utilitarianism	  is	  that	  it	  not	  only	  permits	  but	  it	  requires	  actions	  that	  most	  people	  consider	  morally	  reprehensible.	  For	  instance,	  on	  the	  hedonistic	  utilitarian	  view,	  the	  brutal	  murder	  of	  a	  innocent	  person	  would	  be	  morally	  required	  so	  long	  as	  it	  were	  the	  case	  that	  the	  happiness	  produced	  by	  that	  murder	  outweighed	  the	  pain	  caused	  by	  it.	  Preference	  utilitarianism	  purports	  to	  avoid	  this	  pitfall	  by	  aiming	  not	  to	  maximize	  happiness	  but	  to	  maximize	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  interests,	  or	  preferences.	  The	  thought	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  preference	  utilitarianism	  would	  not	  permit	  the	  murder	  of	  innocents	  so	  long	  as	  it	  brought	  about	  the	  most	  happiness,	  because	  the	  preference	  of	  the	  person	  in	  question	  to	  not	  be	  killed	  would	  outweigh	  the	  happiness	  brought	  to	  a	  sadist.	  	   Singer	  is	  also	  a	  rule	  utilitarian.	  That	  is,	  he	  believes	  that	  the	  best	  way	  to	  maximize	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  interests	  overall	  is	  to	  follow	  rules	  that	  have	  proven	  over	  time	  to	  maximize	  utility.	  This	  position	  contrasts	  with	  act	  utilitarianism,	  which	  states	  that	  the	  right	  action	  is	  the	  action	  that	  maximizes	  good	  consequences	  in	  any	  given	  situation.	  Singer	  thinks	  that	  act	  utilitarianism	  is	  too	  cumbersome	  because	  it	  requires	  that	  we	  perform	  complicated	  utilitarian	  calculations	  for	  every	  one	  of	  our	  actions.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	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anticipate	  the	  consequences	  of	  our	  actions.	  Therefore,	  Singer	  thinks	  that	  consequences	  are	  better	  maximized	  overall	  when	  we	  rely	  on	  rules	  that	  have	  proven	  over	  time	  to	  maximize	  overall	  utility.	  	  	   We	  are	  now	  in	  a	  position	  to	  understand	  Singer’s	  seemingly	  inconsistent	  conclusion	  that	  killing	  the	  depressed	  man	  is	  morally	  wrong,	  even	  though	  doing	  so	  apparently	  satisfies	  the	  most	  preferences.	  Singer	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  interests	  of	  persons	  in	  not	  being	  killed	  are	  so	  strong	  that	  they	  will	  always	  outweigh	  competing	  interests	  in	  killing	  them.	  Since	  the	  depressed	  man	  has	  no	  interest	  in	  remaining	  alive,	  in	  fact	  he	  wants	  to	  die,	  and	  his	  killing	  would	  not	  have	  any	  indirect	  negative	  consequences,	  it	  seems	  like	  Singer	  ought	  not	  to	  oppose	  his	  painless	  killing.	  In	  fact,	  it	  seems	  like	  Singer	  ought	  to	  endorse	  his	  killing,	  given	  that	  doing	  so	  would	  maximize	  preference	  satisfaction.	  It	  seems	  that	  Singer	  would	  agree	  that	  this	  particular	  killing	  would	  not	  be	  morally	  objectionable	  in	  itself.	  But	  since	  we	  can	  safely	  presume	  that	  most	  painless	  killings	  would	  not	  be	  committed	  in	  secrecy	  against	  depressed	  persons	  who	  have	  a	  death	  wish,	  Singer	  would	  maintain	  that	  utility	  is	  maximized	  overall	  when	  we	  follow	  the	  rule	  that	  prohibits	  the	  painless	  killing	  of	  human	  persons,	  who	  normally	  do	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  continued	  life.	  	  	   Having	  presented	  Singer’s	  view	  on	  personhood	  and	  the	  morality	  of	  killing	  persons	  and	  nonpersons,	  I	  will	  now	  discuss	  his	  views	  on	  killing	  humans.	  Singer	  argues	  that	  painlessly	  killing	  any	  human	  being,	  person	  or	  nonperson,	  is	  morally	  wrong	  under	  normal	  circumstances.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  Singer,	  in	  theory,	  opposes	  the	  painless	  killing	  of	  persons	  but	  not	  nonpersons.	  The	  same	  argument	  against	  killing	  persons	  obtains	  in	  the	  case	  of	  humans.	  But	  there	  is	  an	  additional	  reason	  to	  oppose	  painless	  killing	  when	  the	  killed	  person	  is	  a	  human.	  Not	  only	  would	  painlessly	  killing	  a	  person	  harm	  that	  person	  and	  distress	  that	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person’s	  relatives,	  it	  would	  also	  be	  highly	  distressing	  to	  other	  humans	  who	  are	  not	  related	  to	  the	  person.	  Unlike	  nonhuman	  animals,	  humans	  can	  learn	  about	  events	  that	  happen	  all	  over	  the	  world.	  If	  the	  practice	  of	  painless	  killing	  were	  morally	  permissible,	  it	  would	  cause	  extreme	  suffering	  to	  people	  worldwide.	  For	  if	  people	  thought	  they	  might	  be	  killed	  at	  any	  moment,	  painlessly	  or	  not,	  they	  would	  be	  terrified.	  Therefore,	  the	  basis	  for	  Singer’s	  objection	  to	  the	  painless	  killing	  of	  human	  nonpersons	  is	  that	  the	  practice	  of	  doing	  so	  would	  have	  devastating	  indirect	  consequences	  that	  cannot	  be	  successfully	  morally	  justified.	  As	  one	  can	  easily	  imagine,	  the	  practice	  of	  painlessly	  killing	  infants	  or	  even	  the	  senile	  would	  be	  socially	  devastating.	  Given	  this,	  Singer	  thinks	  we	  ought	  to	  heed	  the	  utilitarian	  rule	  prohibiting	  the	  painless	  killing	  of	  all	  humans,	  persons	  or	  nonpersons.	  	  
	  1.6	  The	  Replaceability	  Argument	  	   Singer’s	  views	  on	  personhood	  and	  killing	  have,	  to	  my	  mind,	  shocking	  implications.	  Singer	  maintains	  that	  it	  is	  morally	  permissible	  to	  use	  nonhuman	  animals,	  who	  are	  not	  persons,	  as	  replaceable	  resources,	  so	  long	  as	  they	  are	  treated	  well.56	  Notice	  that	  humans	  and	  persons	  are	  excluded	  from	  the	  category	  of	  beings	  who	  can	  be	  used	  as	  replaceable	  resources.	  This	  is	  because,	  as	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  they	  either	  have	  preferences	  in	  continued	  life	  that	  should	  never	  be	  overridden	  or	  their	  killing	  would	  bring	  about	  negative	  indirect	  consequences	  that	  cannot	  be	  morally	  justified.	  By	  contrast,	  since	  the	  experiential	  lives	  of	  nonhuman	  nonpersons	  are	  confined	  to	  a	  local	  awareness	  of	  the	  world,	  we	  can	  conceptualize	  them	  as	  mere	  receptacles	  of	  experience,	  mere	  locations	  where	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experiences	  occur.	  Consequently,	  they	  are	  interchangeable:	  if	  a	  nonhuman	  nonperson	  dies,	  he	  or	  she	  can	  be	  replaced	  with	  other	  receptacles	  of	  experience.	  	  	   On	  Singer’s	  view,	  it	  is	  not	  permissible	  to	  painlessly	  kill	  nonhuman	  nonpersons	  unless	  that	  nonhuman	  animal	  is	  replaced	  with	  another	  one	  and	  the	  animals	  are	  treated	  well.	  While	  painless	  killing,	  according	  to	  Singer,	  does	  not	  constitute	  a	  harm	  against	  nonhuman	  nonpersons,	  their	  deaths	  would	  nevertheless	  be	  impermissible	  because	  the	  death	  of	  such	  an	  animal	  would	  subtract	  from	  the	  overall	  balance	  of	  good	  experiences	  in	  the	  world.	  In	  order	  to	  successfully	  justify	  the	  practice	  of	  killing	  nonhuman	  nonpersons	  for	  use	  as	  resources,	  we	  must	  avoid	  incurring	  a	  negative	  balance	  in	  the	  utilitarian	  calculus	  by	  ensuring	  that	  the	  animals	  in	  question	  are	  both	  treated	  well	  and	  replaced	  with	  another	  animal	  who	  will	  live	  a	  similarly	  happy	  life.	  	  	   Singer	  notes	  that	  this	  argument,	  the	  replaceability	  argument,	  is	  purely	  theoretical.	  He	  expresses	  doubt	  that,	  in	  practice,	  animals	  could	  be	  killed	  painlessly.	  Moreover,	  he	  thinks	  that	  we	  should	  give	  farm	  animals	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  doubt	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  personhood.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  there	  is	  any	  doubt	  about	  whether	  a	  being	  is	  a	  person,	  we	  should	  assume	  it	  is.	  It	  is	  worth	  mentioning	  that	  while	  Singer	  appears	  to	  be	  extremely	  skeptical	  that	  nonhuman	  animals	  can	  be	  used	  as	  replaceable	  resources	  in	  an	  ethical	  way	  (because	  he	  doubts	  that	  animals	  can	  be	  killed	  “humanely”	  and	  thinks	  we	  should	  assume	  farm	  animals	  are	  persons),	  he	  endorses	  humane	  treatment	  standards,	  as	  opposed	  to	  categorically	  rejecting	  the	  use	  of	  animals	  for	  food.	  One	  explanation	  for	  the	  discrepancy	  between	  Singer’s	  moral	  prescriptions	  and	  his	  actions,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  later,	  is	  that	  the	  structure	  of	  utilitarian	  theory	  is	  such	  that	  it	  can	  always	  justify	  trade-­‐offs	  of	  interests	  so	  long	  as	  doing	  so	  conduces	  to	  the	  best	  overall	  consequences.	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  1.7.	  Some	  Practical	  Implications	  of	  Singer’s	  View	  	   Discerning	  the	  implications	  of	  Singer’s	  view	  is	  challenging	  because	  he	  equivocates	  about	  the	  stringency	  of	  his	  moral	  prescriptions.	  Singer	  sometimes	  appears	  to	  be	  opposed	  to	  using	  other	  animals	  for	  any	  purpose;	  however,	  we	  shall	  see	  that	  he	  is	  and	  can	  only	  be	  committed	  to	  improving	  the	  welfare	  of	  other	  animals.	  That	  is,	  Singer	  is	  not	  concerned	  that	  we	  use	  animals	  as	  means	  to	  our	  ends,	  but	  only	  with	  how	  we	  use	  them.	  	  	   In	  theory,	  Singer	  argues	  that	  we	  are	  morally	  obligated	  to	  become	  vegetarians	  to	  the	  greatest	  extent	  possible,	  to	  end	  factory	  farming,	  to	  stop	  using	  other	  animals	  for	  clothing	  and	  sources	  of	  entertainment,	  to	  stop	  using	  them	  in	  medical	  experiments,	  and	  to	  convince	  others	  to	  do	  the	  same.	  However,	  he	  often	  says	  things	  that	  contradict	  these	  prescriptions.	  For	  instance,	  he	  says	  that	  using	  other	  animals	  for	  food	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  The	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration	  because	  suffering	  is	  inherent	  to	  farming	  practices	  both	  on	  a	  large	  and	  small	  scale.57	  Yet	  he	  says	  that	  veganism	  is	  not	  morally	  required	  because	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  “buy	  animal	  products	  from	  animals	  allowed	  to	  graze	  outside.”58	  Moreover,	  Singer	  acknowledges	  that	  eating	  meat	  is	  not	  morally	  different	  than	  eating	  other	  dairy	  products,	  but	  he	  prescribes	  vegetarianism	  and	  not	  veganism.59	  Singer	  also	  argues	  that	  we	  ought	  not	  to	  use	  other	  animals	  as	  clothing	  or	  forms	  of	  entertainment,	  or	  for	  experimentation	  purposes.	  Yet,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  the	  “objections”	  section,	  Singer	  makes	  exceptions	  to	  these	  rules,	  which	  betrays	  a	  tension	  between	  his	  moral	  prescriptions	  and	  the	  structural	  constraints	  of	  utilitarianism.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  notice	  that,	  although	  Singer	  might	  appear	  to	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be	  categorically	  opposed	  to	  using	  other	  animals,	  in	  fact	  he	  is	  concerned	  only	  with	  how	  we	  use	  animals	  and	  not	  that	  we	  use	  them.	  	  	   Putting	  aside	  concerns	  about	  Singer’s	  inconsistencies	  and	  the	  viability	  of	  Singer’s	  theory	  given	  the	  abovementioned	  tensions,	  I	  will	  now	  discuss	  some	  of	  his	  ostensible	  moral	  prescriptions.	  First,	  Singer	  argues	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  be	  vegetarian	  primarily	  as	  a	  form	  of	  boycott	  against	  cruelty.60	  Although	  the	  goal	  of	  vegetarianism	  is	  to	  reduce	  suffering,	  Singer	  argues,	  vegetarianism	  cannot	  be	  understood	  to	  represent	  a	  claim	  that	  one’s	  actions	  actually	  reduce	  suffering.	  The	  number	  of	  animals	  raised	  for	  slaughter	  depends	  on	  the	  profitability	  of	  the	  process	  and	  the	  anticipated	  profit	  depends	  on	  demand.	  Since	  one	  person’s	  consumer	  habits	  cannot	  by	  itself	  	  influence	  market	  demand,	  our	  obligation	  to	  become	  vegetarian	  cannot	  rest	  on	  the	  claim	  that	  our	  consumer	  choices	  directly	  reduce	  suffering.	  Rather,	  by	  becoming	  vegetarian,	  we	  set	  an	  example	  for	  others	  to	  do	  the	  same.	  Although	  we	  do	  not	  directly	  reduce	  suffering	  by	  becoming	  vegetarian,	  if	  we	  are	  successful	  in	  getting	  others	  to	  become	  vegetarian,	  then	  we	  will	  eventually	  reduce	  the	  suffering	  of	  future	  animals.	  Second,	  Singer	  says,	  we	  are	  obligated	  to	  becoming	  vegetarians	  because	  eating	  and	  using	  animals	  causes	  bias	  in	  our	  evaluations	  of	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  animals	  are	  raised.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  eating	  and	  using	  animals	  hinders	  our	  ability	  to	  accurately	  apply	  The	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration	  because	  it	  makes	  us	  more	  willing	  to	  overlook	  their	  interests.	  	  	   According	  to	  Singer,	  extending	  the	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration	  to	  other	  animals	  also	  would	  involve	  ending	  factory	  farming,	  for	  the	  cruelty	  inherent	  in	  large-­‐scale	  conditions	  of	  confinement	  is	  antithetical	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  other	  animals.61	  Nonhuman	  animals’	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interests	  in	  avoiding	  the	  kind	  of	  intense	  suffering	  brought	  about	  by	  factory	  farm	  practices	  will	  always	  outweigh	  the	  interests	  of	  humans	  in	  consuming	  or	  otherwise	  using	  factory	  farmed	  nonhuman	  animals.	  Again,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  Singer	  equivocates	  about	  the	  stringency	  of	  this	  moral	  prescription.	  	  	   Singer’s	  view	  on	  factory	  farming	  naturally	  gives	  rise	  to	  questions	  about	  smaller	  farms.	  While	  Singer	  (in	  theory)	  thinks	  that	  smaller	  farms	  are	  better	  because	  nonhuman	  animals	  suffer	  less,	  he	  expresses	  serious	  doubt	  that	  animals	  can	  be	  raised	  for	  food	  in	  a	  way	  that	  does	  not	  produce	  significant	  amounts	  of	  suffering.	  For	  instance,	  as	  I	  mentioned	  earlier,	  the	  process	  of	  obtaining	  milk	  necessarily	  involves	  causing	  cows	  significant	  pain.	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  Singer	  says	  that	  it	  makes	  little	  difference	  if	  one	  stops	  eating	  meat	  only	  to	  replace	  that	  meat	  with	  dairy	  products.	  The	  only	  species	  of	  nonhuman	  animal	  Singer	  thinks	  it	  might	  be	  morally	  permissible	  to	  exploit	  is	  free-­‐range	  chickens.	  Singer	  claims	  that	  they	  can	  fare	  well	  in	  free-­‐range	  conditions	  and	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  distressed	  when	  their	  eggs	  are	  taken	  from	  them,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  evidence	  that	  hens	  are	  killed	  when	  they	  are	  no	  longer	  useful	  and	  male	  chicks	  are	  killed	  upon	  birth.	  The	  fact	  that	  some	  of	  the	  chickens	  will	  have	  a	  decent	  life	  appears,	  on	  Singer’s	  view,	  to	  mitigate	  the	  suffering	  caused	  by	  the	  eventual	  slaughter	  of	  the	  hens.	  Recall,	  though,	  that	  in	  order	  for	  the	  killing	  of	  chickens	  to	  be	  morally	  permissible,	  killed	  chickens	  must	  be	  replaced	  with	  similarly	  happy	  chickens.	  	  	   On	  Singer’s	  view,	  hunting	  is	  morally	  impermissible	  under	  normal	  circumstances	  because	  nonhuman	  animals	  who	  are	  hunted	  are	  not	  replaced	  with	  other	  nonhuman	  animals.	  He	  makes	  an	  exception	  for	  cases	  in	  which	  nonhuman	  animals,	  such	  as	  deer,	  are	  killed	  because	  they	  will	  otherwise	  starve	  to	  death	  as	  a	  result	  of	  overpopulation.	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Singer	  is	  also	  opposed	  to	  animal	  experimentation.	  Not	  only	  are	  the	  results	  of	  animal	  experimentation	  generally	  unreliable,	  the	  suffering	  caused	  by	  experimentation	  cannot	  be	  successfully	  morally	  justified.	  The	  fact	  that	  humans	  would	  not	  be	  prepared	  to	  use	  human	  nonpersons	  for	  experimentation	  betrays	  speciesism.	  However,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  the	  following	  section,	  Singer	  equivocates	  on	  his	  views	  about	  nonhuman	  animal	  experimentation.	  	  1.8	  Objections	  to	  Singer	  	   I	  will	  now	  present	  what	  I	  think	  are	  the	  strongest	  objections	  to	  Singer’s	  view.	  On	  the	  surface,	  Singer’s	  theory	  seems	  like	  the	  epitomical	  egalitarian	  theory:	  every	  being’s	  like	  preferences	  count	  for	  exactly	  one,	  no	  more	  and	  no	  less.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  The	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration	  is	  undermined	  by	  the	  utilitarian	  theory	  in	  which	  Singer	  is	  working.	  The	  structure	  of	  utilitarianism	  is	  such	  that	  it	  cannot	  provide	  animals,	  human	  or	  nonhuman,	  with	  the	  kind	  of	  protections	  that	  an	  adequate	  theory	  ought	  to,	  and	  the	  kind	  of	  protections	  that	  even	  Singer	  appears	  to	  want	  to	  offer.	  Recall	  that	  the	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration	  is	  a	  formal	  principle.	  It	  specifies	  conditions	  that	  valid	  substantive	  principles	  must	  satisfy	  but	  it	  is	  silent	  about	  the	  moral	  permissibility	  of	  specific	  actions.	  All	  that	  The	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration	  requires	  is	  that	  we	  register	  the	  equal	  preferences	  or	  interests	  of	  animals;	  it	  does	  not	  specify	  what	  treatment	  they	  are	  due	  once	  we	  have	  registered	  their	  moral	  status.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration	  is	  predistributive;	  it	  does	  not	  specify	  “conditions	  that	  must	  be	  met	  if	  the	  distribution	  of	  benefits	  (goods)	  and	  harms	  (evils)	  arising	  as	  of	  a	  given	  act	  or	  rule	  are	  just	  distributions.”62	  Although	  Singer	  appears	  to	  derive	  substantive	  principles,	  or	  rules,	  from	  the	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration,	  such	  as	  “Do	  not	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factory	  farm	  nonhuman	  animals,”	  his	  utilitarian	  framework	  cannot	  support	  these	  derivations.	  Nor,	  as	  a	  general	  matter,	  does	  his	  utilitarian	  framework	  allow	  for	  an	  interpretation	  of	  The	  Principle	  Equality	  that	  guarantees	  protections	  to	  the	  most	  basic	  interests	  of	  sentient	  beings,	  as	  we	  shall	  now	  see.	  	  	   Singer	  gives	  the	  impression	  that	  he	  categorically	  opposes	  performing	  medical	  experimentation	  on	  nonperson	  nonhuman	  animals	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  the	  preferences	  of	  those	  animals	  outweigh	  the	  preferences	  of	  humans	  to	  experiment	  on	  them.	  Singer	  cites	  our	  unwillingness	  to	  perform	  invasive	  experiments	  on	  infants	  or	  mentally	  disabled	  people	  as	  evidence	  that	  the	  practice	  of	  performing	  experiments	  on	  nonhuman	  animals	  is	  speciesist.	  However,	  when	  enough	  pressure	  is	  put	  on	  Singer’s	  rules	  against	  certain	  activities—that	  is,	  when	  it	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  clear	  that	  the	  overall	  consequences	  of	  overriding	  the	  preferences	  of	  sentient	  beings	  would	  conduce	  to	  the	  greater	  good—he	  concedes	  that	  the	  rule	  ought	  to	  be	  abandoned.	  For	  example,	  in	  a	  2006	  interview,	  Singer	  said	  that	  experimenting	  on	  one	  hundred	  monkeys	  could	  be	  justified	  if	  doing	  so	  would	  help	  thousands	  of	  people	  recover	  from	  Parkinson’s	  disease.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  preferences	  of	  the	  monkeys	  are	  registered,	  but	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  the	  preferences	  of	  the	  many	  outweigh	  the	  preferences	  of	  the	  few.	  Tom	  Regan	  traces	  this	  issue	  to	  a	  problem	  with	  deriving	  the	  Equality	  principle	  from	  the	  Principle	  of	  Utility:	  The	  equality	  or	  inequality	  of	  the	  interests	  of	  two	  individuals,	  A	  and	  B,	  depends	  on	  how	  important	  their	  respective	  interests	  are	  to	  them,	  A’s	  interests	  being	  equal	  to	  B’s	  if	  their	  interests	  have	  like	  importance	  to	  A	  and	  B,	  respectively,	  As	  and	  B’s	  interests	  being	  unequal	  if	  the	  case	  is	  otherwise.	  The	  equality	  or	  inequality	  of	  their	  interests	  cannot	  depend	  on	  how	  the	  interests	  of	  other	  will	  be	  affected	  if	  A’s	  and	  B’s	  interests	  are	  considered	  as	  equal	  or	  unequal.	  If	  this	  were	  so,	  we	  would	  be	  free	  to	  regard	  the	  same	  interests	  of	  A	  and	  B	  as	  equal	  at	  one	  time	  and	  as	  a	  unequal	  at	  another,	  because	  the	  interests	  of	  others	  happened	  to	  be	  affected	  differently	  by	  regarding	  A’s	  and	  B’s	  interest	  differently	  at	  these	  different	  times.	  This	  is	  to	  make	  shambles	  of	  the	  notion	  equality	  as	  it	  applies	  to	  interests.	  And	  yet	  this	  is	  precisely	  where	  we	  are	  led	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  equal	  interests,	  if	  the	  obligation	  to	  respect	  the	  equality	  principle	  is	  derived	  from	  the	  principle	  of	  utility.	  For	  the	  utility	  of	  counting	  A’s	  and	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B’s	  interests	  as	  equal	  can	  vary	  from	  case	  to	  case,	  even	  if	  their	  interest	  do	  not	  …	  This	  is	  to	  distort	  the	  concept	  of	  equal	  interests	  beyond	  recognition.63	  	  	   It	  seems	  that	  the	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration	  might,	  in	  some	  cases,	  be	  able	  to	  protect	  preferences	  on	  the	  individual	  level.	  For	  instance,	  if	  we	  must	  decide	  whether	  we	  can	  perform	  invasive	  tests	  on	  one	  monkey	  in	  order	  to	  save	  a	  human	  from	  suffering	  from	  some	  disease,	  then	  we	  can	  conclude	  that	  we	  ought	  not	  to	  do	  so.	  For	  the	  monkey’s	  preference	  in	  avoiding	  suffering	  is	  just	  as	  important	  as	  a	  human’s.	  However,	  when	  our	  considerations	  involve	  more	  than	  two	  individuals,	  things	  change	  drastically,	  as	  the	  Parkinson’s	  case	  demonstrates.	  It	  turns	  out	  that	  the	  preferences	  of	  the	  very	  same	  monkey	  that	  we	  just	  decided	  could	  not	  be	  subjected	  to	  invasive	  experiments	  can	  be	  overridden	  when	  doing	  so	  conduces	  to	  the	  greater	  good.	  Moreover,	  this	  problem,	  let	  us	  call	  it	  the	  trade-­‐off	  problem,	  is	  not	  special	  to	  considerations	  about	  nonhuman	  animals.	  On	  Singer’s	  utilitarian	  view,	  the	  preferences	  of	  humans	  could	  also	  be	  traded	  away	  in	  cases	  in	  which	  doing	  so	  would	  maximize	  utility.	  The	  trade-­‐off	  problem	  is	  a	  problem	  with	  utilitarianism,	  which	  asserts	  itself	  in	  both	  cases	  involving	  humans	  and	  other	  animals.	  	  	   While	  Singer’s	  theory	  might	  represent	  progress	  in	  our	  thinking	  about	  nonhuman	  animals	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  requires	  that	  we	  recognize	  that	  animals	  have	  preferences	  that	  matter	  morally,	  it	  does	  not	  represent	  progress	  in	  any	  other	  respect.	  It	  does	  not	  guarantee	  that	  equal	  interests	  will	  be	  treated	  equally,	  as	  purported,	  nor	  does	  it	  provide	  any	  protections	  for	  the	  most	  basic	  preferences	  (i.e.	  not	  being	  killed)	  of	  sentient	  beings,	  humans	  or	  nonhumans.	  This	  problem	  is	  further	  compounded	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  not	  obvious	  that	  it	  is	  an	  empirical	  fact	  that	  the	  suffering	  on	  factory	  farms	  outweighs	  the	  interests	  of	  humans	  in	  exploiting	  them.	  Suppose	  it	  could	  be	  established	  that	  humans’	  interests	  in	  eating	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nonhuman	  animals	  or	  their	  secretions,	  or	  humans	  interest	  in	  not	  losing	  factory	  farm	  jobs	  as	  a	  result	  of	  their	  closure,	  outweighed	  the	  interest	  of	  animals	  in	  not	  suffering	  and	  dying	  and	  factory	  farms.	  If	  this	  were	  established,	  then,	  under	  utilitarianism,	  we	  would	  be	  morally	  required	  to	  override	  the	  interests	  of	  nonhuman	  animals	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  best	  outcome.	  	  	  	   Moreover,	  Christine	  Korsgaard	  has	  pointed	  out	  that	  there	  is	  a	  conceptual	  problem	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  “best	  outcome,	  or	  “what	  does	  ‘the	  most	  good.’”	  64	  Korsgaard	  explains	  that	  for	  utilitarians,	  value	  is	  measured	  and	  accumulated	  by	  adding	  up	  pleasures	  or	  pains,	  or	  in	  Singer’s	  case,	  preferences.65	  This	  aggregative	  process	  assumes	  that	  subjects	  of	  experiences	  are	  locations	  where	  pleasure	  and	  pain	  occur	  and	  not	  beings	  for	  whom	  experiences	  are	  good	  or	  bad.	  This	  aggregative	  process	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  accumulate	  value	  by	  adding	  pleasures	  and	  pains	  across	  the	  boundaries	  between	  different	  subjects.66	  The	  value	  of	  experience	  depends	  on	  the	  character	  of	  the	  experience	  and	  not	  the	  way	  the	  experience	  is	  related	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  subject.	  The	  problem	  with	  this	  view,	  as	  Korsgaard	  puts	  it,	  is	  that	  given	  that	  the	  badness	  of	  pain	  or	  the	  goodness	  of	  pleasure	  is	  tethered	  to	  the	  subject	  who	  experiences	  it,	  those	  experiences	  cannot	  coherently	  be	  added	  or	  subtracted	  between	  subjects	  of	  experience.	  To	  put	  it	  differently,	  experiences	  are	  good	  or	  bad	  for	  some	  specific	  subject.	  When	  utilitarians	  aggregate	  the	  value	  of	  experiences,	  they	  cut	  the	  tether	  between	  subject	  and	  experience	  and	  thereby	  render	  the	  notion	  of	  “the	  greater	  good”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  Rawls	  also	  points	  out	  this	  conceptual	  problem	  with	  the	  “most	  good.”	  See	  Rawls,	  John.	  A	  Theory	  of	  Justice.	  pp.	  19-­‐23.	  65	  Korsgaard,	  Christine	  M.	  Interacting	  with	  Other	  Animals:	  A	  Kantian	  Approach.	  pp.	  95.	  66	  ibid	  94-­‐95	  
	   59	  
incomprehensible.67	  For	  example,	  borrowing	  Korsgaard’s	  example,	  it	  is	  unintelligible	  to	  think	  that	  we	  can	  “do	  more	  good”	  by	  balancing	  the	  good	  of	  one	  subject	  against	  the	  good	  of	  another	  by	  taking	  pleasure	  away	  from	  Jack	  in	  order	  to	  give	  greater	  pleasure	  to	  Jill.	  This	  would	  be	  good	  for	  Jill	  and	  bad	  for	  Jack.	  But	  there	  is	  no	  one	  for	  whom	  the	  situation	  is	  better	  overall	  and	  therefore	  no	  sense	  in	  which	  it	  is	  better	  overall.	  This	  view	  of	  subjects	  as	  locations	  of	  experiences	  calls	  into	  question	  the	  soundness	  of	  Singer’s	  claim	  that	  death	  is	  worse	  for	  humans	  than	  nonhumans,	  as	  Korsgaard	  aptly	  explains:	  The	  view	  that	  a	  subject	  relationship	  to	  experience	  is	  one	  of	  location	  is	  quite	  a	  general	  feature	  of	  utilitarianism	  and	  does	  not	  have	  anything	  special	  to	  do	  with	  nonhuman	  consciousness	  …	  And	  this	  makes	  me	  wonder	  why	  Singer	  thinks	  that	  death	  is	  worse	  for	  us—or	  perhaps	  why	  he	  thinks	  it	  matters	  morally	  if	  it	  is	  …	  Singer	  argues	  that	  because	  we	  are	  self-­‐conscious	  and	  aware	  of	  our	  lives	  we	  are	  not	  replaceable	  in	  the	  way	  other	  animals	  are.	  Each	  of	  us	  has	  a	  desire	  to	  live	  that	  will	  not	  be	  fulfilled	  if	  we	  are	  killed.	  But	  self-­‐conscious	  experiences	  of	  memory	  and	  anticipation	  are	  in	  themselves	  just	  more	  experiences.	  If	  a	  person	  is	  just	  a	  place	  where	  these	  experiences	  happen,	  then	  we	  can	  always	  replace	  one	  human	  being	  who	  experiences,	  say	  satisfaction	  at	  the	  thought	  that	  his	  plans	  have	  worked	  out,	  or	  worry	  about	  the	  fate	  of	  a	  loved	  one,	  with	  another	  human	  being	  whose	  experiences	  have	  similar	  content.	  And	  a	  person	  whose	  desire	  is	  not	  fulfilled	  may	  be	  replaced	  with	  a	  person	  who	  will	  develop	  a	  desire	  to	  live	  that	  will	  then	  be	  fulfilled.68	  	  	   To	  make	  the	  disanalogy	  of	  the	  harm	  of	  death	  between	  humans	  and	  nonhumans	  hold,	  Korsgaard	  says,	  Singer	  would	  have	  to	  argue	  that	  death	  is	  bad	  for	  us.	  And	  in	  order	  to	  argue	  that	  death	  is	  bad	  for	  us,	  Singer	  would	  have	  to	  abandon	  utilitarianism.	  	  	   Gary	  Francione	  has	  posed	  another	  apt	  objection	  to	  Singer’s	  view	  on	  using	  nonhuman	  animals	  as	  replaceable	  resources.	  This	  may	  seem	  like	  a	  small	  point	  in	  light	  of	  Korsgaard’s	  more	  fundamentally	  devastating	  argument,	  but	  it	  is	  important	  nonetheless.	  Francione	  says	  that	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  can	  use	  animals	  as	  replaceable	  resources	  is	  “psychologically	  peculiar”	  because	  it	  conflicts	  with	  our	  common	  views	  about	  the	  value	  of	  nonhuman	  animals.	  For	  instance,	  Francione	  mentions	  that	  he	  has	  seven	  canine	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companions.	  When	  one	  of	  them	  dies,	  he	  adopts	  another	  dog.	  However,	  he	  does	  not	  think	  of	  the	  new	  dog	  as	  replacing	  the	  old	  dog.	  When	  a	  nonhuman	  companion	  animal	  dies,	  we	  are	  not	  consoled	  when	  another	  nonhuman	  companion	  enters	  our	  lives.	  We	  grieve	  that	  particular	  companion.	  The	  way	  we	  value	  our	  nonhuman	  companion	  animals	  is	  not	  significantly	  different	  from	  the	  way	  we	  regard	  our	  human	  companions.	  We	  appreciate	  both	  our	  human	  and	  nonhuman	  companions	  because	  of	  who	  they	  are.	  We	  do	  not	  value	  them	  because	  they	  contain	  experiences.	  Rather,	  we	  appreciate	  them	  as	  individuals	  with	  their	  own	  unique	  characteristics	  and	  idiosyncrasies.	  	  	   I	  have	  argued	  that	  Singer’s	  theory	  is	  inadequate.	  Despite	  the	  seeming	  promise	  of	  Singer’s	  view,	  his	  theory	  cannot	  provide	  adequate	  protections	  for	  even	  the	  most	  basic	  interests	  of	  animals,	  human	  or	  nonhuman.	  This	  should	  not	  imply	  a	  theoretical	  problem	  with	  The	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration.	  Rather,	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  The	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration	  is	  largely	  powerless	  when	  it	  is	  beholden	  to	  a	  consequentialist	  structure.	  By	  conceptualizing	  sentient	  beings	  as	  mere	  receptacles	  of	  experience,	  rather	  than	  beings	  for	  whom	  experiences	  matter,	  utilitarianism	  fails	  to	  account	  for	  the	  value	  of	  the	  very	  beings	  who	  are	  the	  subjects	  of	  our	  moral	  deliberations.	  	  
	  2.1	  Regan’s	  Deontological	  Theory	  of	  Animal	  Rights	  	   Tom	  Regan’s	  The	  Case	  for	  Animal	  Rights	  is	  a	  direct	  response	  to	  Singer’s	  view.	  Unlike	  Singer’s	  view,	  which	  emphasizes	  the	  wrongness	  of	  treating	  nonhuman	  animals	  in	  ways	  that	  cause	  them	  to	  suffer,	  Regan	  emphasizes	  the	  wrongness	  of	  using	  animals	  as	  human	  resources.	  On	  Regan’s	  view,	  the	  institution	  of	  animal	  use	  is	  unjust	  and	  ought	  to	  be	  abolished.	  He	  argues	  that	  nonhuman	  animals	  have	  value	  that	  is	  independent	  of	  the	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consequences.	  To	  put	  it	  differently,	  nonhuman	  animals	  have	  moral	  rights	  that	  should	  not	  be	  ignored	  or	  overridden	  when	  doing	  so	  would	  conduce	  to	  the	  best	  aggregate	  outcome.	  	  	   One	  way	  to	  begin	  to	  conceptualize	  Regan’s	  richly	  detailed	  view	  is	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  main	  philosophical	  machinery:	  the	  moral	  community,	  the	  postulate	  of	  inherent	  value,	  the	  subject-­‐of-­‐a-­‐life	  criterion,	  moral	  rights,	  and	  four	  Principles:	  The	  Respect	  Principle,	  The	  Harm	  Principle,	  The	  Miniride	  Principle,	  and	  The	  Worse-­‐Off	  Principle.	  This	  discussion	  will	  be	  divided	  into	  four	  sections.	  In	  the	  first	  section,	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  group	  of	  individuals	  that	  Regan	  believes	  have	  moral	  rights,	  namely	  members	  of	  the	  moral	  community.	  Members	  of	  the	  moral	  community,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  are	  such	  in	  virtue	  of	  having	  inherent	  value,	  which	  in	  turn	  is	  a	  function	  of	  being	  what	  Regan	  calls	  a	  “subject-­‐of-­‐a-­‐life.”	  In	  the	  second	  section,	  I	  will	  discuss	  The	  Respect	  Principle	  and	  moral	  rights.	  According	  to	  Regan,	  members	  of	  the	  moral	  community	  have	  moral	  rights	  that	  command	  respectful	  treatment	  from	  moral	  agents.	  In	  the	  third	  section,	  I	  will	  discuss	  The	  Harm	  Principle,	  The	  Miniride	  Principle	  and	  The	  Worse-­‐Off	  Principle,	  which	  further	  delineate	  the	  exact	  nature	  of	  our	  obligations	  to	  nonhuman	  animals.	  In	  the	  fourth	  section,	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  implications	  of	  Regan’s	  view.	  There	  will	  not	  be	  a	  fifth	  section	  for	  objections	  because	  I	  endorse	  the	  objections	  posed	  by	  Francione,	  which	  I	  will	  discuss	  in	  my	  presentation	  of	  Francione’s	  view.	  	  	  2.2	  The	  Moral	  Community,	  The	  Postulate	  of	  Inherent	  Value,	  The	  Subject-­‐of-­‐a-­‐life	  Criterion	  	   According	  to	  Regan,	  the	  moral	  community	  is	  the	  collection	  of	  individuals	  who	  are	  of	  direct	  moral	  concern,	  or	  who	  have	  moral	  status.	  The	  moral	  community	  is	  comprised	  of	  moral	  agents	  and	  moral	  patients.	  Moral	  agents	  are	  “individuals	  who	  have	  a	  variety	  of	  sophisticated	  abilities,	  including	  in	  particular	  the	  ability	  to	  bring	  impartial	  moral	  principles	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to	  bear	  on	  the	  determination	  of	  what,	  all	  things	  considered,	  morally	  ought	  to	  be	  done,	  and	  having	  made	  this	  determination,	  to	  freely	  choose	  or	  fail	  to	  choose	  to	  act	  as	  morality,	  as	  they	  conceive	  it,	  requires.”69	  Moral	  agents	  are	  those	  individuals	  who	  can	  reasonably	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  their	  actions.	  Normal	  adults	  are	  paradigmatic	  moral	  agents.	  Moral	  agents	  can	  do	  what	  is	  right	  and	  wrong,	  and	  they	  can	  also	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  right	  or	  wrong	  actions	  of	  other	  moral	  agents.	  In	  this	  way,	  moral	  agents	  have	  a	  reciprocal	  relationship	  with	  one	  another.	  	  	   By	  contrast,	  moral	  patients	  cannot	  be	  reasonably	  held	  responsible	  for	  their	  actions,	  because	  “they	  lack	  the	  prerequisites	  that	  would	  enable	  them	  to	  control	  their	  own	  behaviors	  in	  ways	  that	  would	  make	  them	  morally	  accountable	  for	  what	  they	  do.	  A	  moral	  patient	  lacks	  the	  ability	  to	  formulate,	  let	  alone	  bring	  to	  bear,	  moral	  principles	  in	  deliberating	  about	  which	  one	  among	  a	  number	  of	  possible	  acts	  it	  would	  be	  right	  or	  proper	  to	  perform.”70	  While	  the	  actions	  of	  moral	  patients	  can	  positively	  or	  negatively	  affect	  other	  members	  of	  the	  moral	  community,	  they	  cannot	  do	  what	  is	  right	  or	  wrong.	  For	  instance,	  when	  a	  bear	  attacks	  a	  human,	  she	  does	  something	  harmful,	  but	  she	  does	  not	  do	  something	  wrong.	  Young	  children	  and	  the	  “mentally	  enfeebled,”	  as	  Regan	  calls	  them,	  are	  paradigmatic	  moral	  patients.	  	  	   Regan	  distinguishes	  between	  two	  categories	  of	  moral	  patients.	  Category	  (a)	  encompasses	  individuals	  who	  are	  conscious	  and	  sentient	  (i.e.	  they	  can	  experience	  pain	  and	  pleasure)	  but	  who	  lack	  other	  mental	  abilities.	  Category	  (b)	  encompasses	  individuals	  who	  are	  conscious,	  sentient	  and	  possess	  other	  volitional	  abilities	  such	  as	  belief	  and	  memory,	  or	  who	  have	  an	  emotional	  life,	  a	  sense	  of	  psychophysical	  identity	  over	  time,	  or	  who	  have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  see	  Regan,	  Tom.	  The	  Case	  for	  Animal	  Rights.	  pp.	  151	  70	  ibid	  pp.	  152	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desires.	  Regan	  points	  out	  that	  while	  it	  is	  difficult	  or	  even	  impossible	  to	  draw	  a	  hard	  line	  between	  these	  categories,	  it	  is	  nevertheless	  clear	  that	  some	  human	  animals	  and	  some	  nonhuman	  animals	  belong	  to	  each	  of	  these	  categories.71	  According	  to	  Regan,	  only	  individuals	  who	  belong	  to	  category	  (b)	  are	  included	  in	  the	  moral	  community.	  When	  Regan	  refers	  to	  moral	  patients,	  he	  is	  referring	  to	  members	  of	  category	  (b).	  So,	  the	  moral	  community	  is	  comprised	  of	  moral	  agents	  and	  moral	  patients	  from	  class	  (b).	  Members	  of	  the	  moral	  community	  are	  such	  in	  virtue	  of	  being	  individuals	  to	  whom	  moral	  agents	  have	  direct	  duties	  and	  because	  they	  satisfy	  what	  Regan	  calls	  the	  subject-­‐of-­‐a-­‐life	  criterion.72	  I	  will	  discuss	  this	  criterion	  after	  I	  discuss	  the	  postulate	  of	  inherent	  value.	  	  	   On	  Regan’s	  view,	  justice	  involves	  viewing	  certain	  individuals	  as	  having	  inherent	  value.73	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  certain	  individuals	  have	  value	  in	  themselves	  and	  independently	  of	  their	  utility	  to	  anyone	  else.	  Moral	  agents	  have	  inherent	  value,	  which	  is	  distinct	  from	  what	  Regan	  calls	  their	  “intrinsic	  value,”	  which	  “attaches	  to	  the	  experiences	  they	  have	  (e.g.,	  their	  pleasures	  or	  preference	  satisfactions.”74	  Consequently,	  Regan	  says,	  we	  cannot	  determine	  the	  inherent	  value	  of	  an	  individual	  by	  simply	  totaling	  the	  intrinsic	  values	  of	  their	  experiences.	  Regan	  uses	  a	  cup	  analogy	  to	  highlight	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  postulate	  of	  inherent	  value	  and	  to	  highlight	  the	  differences	  between	  his	  view	  and	  Singer’s	  utilitarian	  view:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  Regan’s	  views	  on	  animals	  awareness,	  which	  he	  discusses	  in	  the	  first	  two	  chapters	  informs	  his	  view	  on	  which	  animals	  qualify	  as	  moral	  patients.	  See	  Regan,	  Tom.	  The	  Case	  for	  Animal	  Rights.	  pp.	  153.	  72	  Direct	  duties	  are	  duties	  that	  are	  owed	  directly	  to	  an	  individual,	  as	  opposed	  to	  indirect	  duties,	  which	  pertain	  to	  a	  certain	  individual	  but	  are	  not	  owed	  to	  that	  individual.	  Kant	  thought	  that	  humans	  only	  had	  indirect	  duties	  to	  animals.	  He	  thought	  that	  humans	  had	  a	  duty	  to	  refrain	  from	  torturing	  animals	  not	  because	  torturing	  animals	  is	  bad	  for	  nonhuman	  animals	  but	  because	  torturing	  nonhuman	  animals	  negatively	  affect	  one’s	  moral	  character.	  	  73	  ibid	  235	  74	  ibid	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On	  the	  receptacle	  view	  of	  value,	  it	  is	  what	  goes	  into	  the	  cup	  (the	  pleasures	  of	  preference-­‐satisfactions,	  for	  example)	  that	  has	  value;	  what	  does	  not	  have	  value	  is	  the	  cup	  itself	  (i.e.,	  the	  individual	  himself	  or	  herself).	  The	  postulate	  of	  inherent	  value	  offers	  an	  alternative.	  The	  cup	  (that	  is,	  the	  individual)	  has	  value	  and	  a	  kind	  that	  is	  not	  reducible	  to,	  and	  is	  incommensurate	  with,	  what	  goes	  into	  the	  cup	  (e.g.,	  pleasures),	  but	  the	  value	  of	  the	  cup	  (individual)	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  any	  one	  or	  any	  sum	  of	  the	  valuable	  things	  the	  cup	  contains.	  Individual	  moral	  agents	  
themselves	  have	  a	  distinctive	  kind	  of	  value,	  according	  to	  the	  postulate	  of	  inherent	  value,	  but	  not	  according	  to	  the	  receptacle	  view	  to	  which	  utilitarians	  are	  committed.	  It’s	  the	  cup,	  not	  just	  what	  goes	  into	  it,	  that	  is	  valuable.75	  	  	  	  Inherent	  value	  is	  categorical	  insofar	  as	  it	  does	  not	  admit	  of	  degrees,	  Regan	  explains.	  For	  if	  inherent	  value	  admitted	  of	  degrees,	  there	  would	  have	  to	  be	  some	  basis	  for	  determining	  exactly	  how	  much	  inherent	  value	  one	  has.	  This	  basis	  could	  be	  anything,	  such	  as	  race	  or	  sex.	  Regan	  rightly	  notes	  that	  this	  view	  is	  dangerous,	  because	  it	  makes	  way	  for	  a	  theory	  of	  justice	  that	  would	  allow,	  for	  example,	  for	  those	  with	  less	  inherent	  value	  to	  be	  enslaved	  by	  those	  with	  more	  of	  it.76	  	  	   Regan	  draws	  our	  attention	  to	  three	  features	  of	  the	  inherent	  value	  of	  moral	  agents	  that	  he	  believes	  makes	  it	  decidedly	  egalitarian.	  First,	  it	  cannot	  be	  earned.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  one	  cannot	  acquire	  or	  lose	  inherent	  value	  based	  on	  their	  actions.	  Criminals	  and	  saints	  have	  equal	  inherent	  value,	  Regan	  says.	  Second,	  moral	  agents	  cannot	  acquire	  or	  lose	  inherent	  value	  depending	  upon	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  they	  have	  utility.	  For	  example,	  Regan	  notes,	  beneficent	  philanthropists	  and	  unscrupulous	  used-­‐car	  salesmen	  have	  equal	  inherent	  value.77	  Third,	  “the	  inherent	  value	  of	  moral	  agents	  is	  independent	  of	  their	  being	  the	  object	  of	  anyone	  else’s	  interests.”78	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  inherent	  value	  of	  the	  most	  unloved	  or	  lonely	  people	  is	  not	  less	  than	  the	  value	  of	  the	  most	  personable	  and	  loveable	  individuals.	  According	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to	  Regan,	  the	  postulate	  of	  inherent	  value	  allows	  us	  to	  avoid	  the	  unsavory	  consequences	  of	  utilitarianism,	  such	  as	  secret	  killings	  and	  killing	  innocent	  individuals	  when	  doing	  so	  would	  conduce	  to	  the	  aggregate	  good.	  	  	   Up	  until	  now,	  I	  have	  only	  been	  discussing	  moral	  agents.	  But	  moral	  patients	  also	  have	  inherent	  value.	  On	  Regan’s	  view,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  the-­‐subject-­‐of-­‐a-­‐life	  criterion,	  moral	  agents	  and	  patients	  can	  be	  harmed	  in	  relevantly	  similar	  ways,	  and	  so	  to	  exclude	  moral	  patients	  from	  the	  moral	  community	  would	  be	  arbitrary	  and	  thus	  unjust.	  Both	  moral	  agents	  and	  moral	  patients	  possess	  equal	  inherent	  value,	  then.	  Here	  again	  Regan	  reiterates	  the	  necessity	  of	  postulating	  inherent	  value	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  negative	  implications	  of	  act	  utilitarianism.	  Namely,	  the	  postulate	  of	  inherent	  value	  avoids	  running	  the	  risk	  of	  denying	  the	  harm	  done	  to	  some	  individuals	  when	  doing	  so	  conduces	  to	  the	  aggregate	  good.	  	  	   Before	  I	  discuss	  the	  subject	  of	  life	  criterion,	  two	  remarks	  on	  the	  postulate	  of	  inherent	  value	  are	  due.	  First,	  as	  Regan	  emphasizes,	  the	  postulate	  of	  inherent	  value	  is	  a	  theoretical	  assumption	  that	  competes	  with	  alternative	  theories	  about	  the	  moral	  standing	  of	  individuals.79	  Second,	  the	  postulate	  of	  inherent	  value	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  individuals	  or	  entities	  (such	  as	  trees,	  or	  “natural”	  or	  cultural	  objects)	  do	  not	  have	  inherent	  value.	  There	  may	  be	  other	  beings	  or	  objects	  that	  have	  inherent	  value;	  however,	  the	  grounds	  for	  this	  value	  will	  be	  different	  than	  the	  account	  Regan	  provides	  for	  moral	  agents	  and	  patients.	  	  	   Having	  defined	  the	  moral	  community	  and	  explicated	  the	  postulate	  of	  inherent	  value,	  I	  will	  now	  discuss	  the	  subject-­‐of-­‐a-­‐life	  criterion.	  The	  subject-­‐of-­‐a-­‐life	  criterion	  is	  foundational	  to	  Regan’s	  view	  because	  it	  identifies	  what	  Regan	  considers	  to	  be	  a	  non-­‐	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arbitrary	  criterion	  that	  holds	  between	  moral	  patients	  and	  moral	  agents.	  It	  demarcates	  the	  class	  of	  individuals	  who	  belong	  to	  the	  moral	  community	  and	  to	  whom	  moral	  agents	  have	  direct	  duties.	  To	  be	  a	  subject-­‐of-­‐a-­‐life	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  being	  alive	  or	  merely	  conscious.	  Rather,	  to	  be	  a	  subject-­‐of-­‐life	  is	  to	  be	  an	  individual	  who	  has	  “beliefs	  and	  desires;	  perception,	  memory,	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  future,	  including	  their	  own	  future;	  an	  emotional	  life	  together	  with	  feelings	  of	  pleasure	  and	  pain;	  preference	  and	  welfare	  interests;	  the	  ability	  to	  initiate	  action	  in	  pursuit	  of	  their	  desires	  and	  goals;	  a	  psychophysical	  identity	  over	  time;	  and	  an	  individual	  welfare	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  their	  experiential	  life	  fares	  well	  or	  ill	  for	  them,	  logically	  independently	  of	  their	  utility	  for	  to	  others	  and	  logically	  independently	  of	  their	  being	  the	  object	  of	  anyone	  else’s	  interests.”	  In	  order	  to	  possess	  all	  of	  these	  characteristics,	  Regan	  says,	  the	  agent	  must	  be	  a	  normal	  mammalian	  animal,	  aged	  one	  or	  more.80	  In	  virtue	  of	  these	  characteristics,	  subjects-­‐of-­‐a-­‐life	  have	  lives	  that	  matter	  to	  them.	  Regan	  rightly	  points	  out	  that	  we	  use	  language	  literally	  and	  not	  metaphorically	  when	  we	  speak	  of	  the	  good	  or	  welfare	  of	  subjects-­‐of-­‐a-­‐life.81	  Subjects-­‐of-­‐a-­‐life	  have	  a	  kind	  of	  autonomy	  that	  makes	  it	  the	  case	  that	  they	  not	  only	  have	  interests	  in	  avoiding	  pain,	  but	  interests	  in	  expressing	  their	  autonomy	  by	  satisfying	  their	  preferences,	  as	  Regan	  explains:	  	  Despite	  the	  importance	  of	  reducing	  animal	  suffering,	  it	  is	  essential	  that	  we	  recognize	  that	  not	  all	  harms	  hurt.	  Harms	  understood	  as	  deprivations	  detract	  from	  an	  individual’s	  welfare	  independently	  of	  their	  occasioning	  pain	  or	  suffering.	  As	  deprivation,	  these	  harms	  are	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  losses	  of	  benefits	  (e.g.	  losses	  of	  opportunities	  to	  develop	  or	  exercise	  one’s	  autonomy.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  both	  humans	  and	  animals,	  it	  was	  argued,	  what	  we	  don’t	  know	  can	  harm	  us,	  even	  if	  what	  we	  don’t	  know	  can’t	  hurt	  us.	  It	  is,	  therefore,	  no	  defense	  of	  consigning	  either	  humans	  or	  animals	  to	  environments	  that	  ignore	  their	  biological,	  social,	  or	  psychological	  interests,	  or	  that	  cater	  to	  some	  (e.g.,	  the	  desire	  for	  food)	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  others	  (e.g.,	  the	  interest	  in	  autonomy	  or	  social	  relations	  to	  claim	  that	  these	  individuals	  do	  not	  know	  what	  they	  are	  missing	  and	  so	  cannot	  be	  any	  worse	  off	  for	  not	  having	  it.	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Harms,	  then,	  can	  take	  the	  form	  of	  both	  inflictions	  (of	  suffering)	  and	  deprivations.82	  Regan	  offers	  an	  intuition-­‐pumping	  example	  to	  render	  salient	  the	  harm	  of	  deprivation:	  If	  I	  were	  to	  raise	  my	  son	  in	  a	  comfortable	  cage,	  in	  isolation	  from	  other	  human	  contact,	  and	  if,	  in	  all	  of	  my	  dealing	  with	  him,	  I	  went	  to	  considerable	  trouble	  to	  insure	  that	  he	  experienced	  no	  unnecessary	  pain,	  then	  I	  could	  not	  be	  faulted	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  I	  was	  hurting	  him.	  However,	  I	  would	  have	  quite	  obviously	  harmed	  him	  and	  this	  in	  a	  most	  grievous	  way.	  How	  lame	  would	  be	  my	  retort	  that	  my	  son	  “didn’t	  know	  what	  he	  was	  missing”	  and	  so	  wasn’t	  harmed	  by	  me.83	  	  This	  view	  of	  subjects-­‐of-­‐a-­‐life	  militates	  against	  killing	  them,	  even	  painlessly,	  for	  doing	  so	  forecloses	  on	  their	  opportunities	  to	  satisfy	  their	  interests	  and	  desires.	  Regan’s	  view	  of	  moral	  agents	  and	  patients	  is	  more	  robust	  than	  Singer’s	  insofar	  as	  it	  recognizes	  that	  they	  have	  interests	  that	  extend	  beyond	  their	  interest	  in	  merely	  avoiding	  pain.	  	  	  2.3	  The	  Respect	  Principle	  and	  Moral	  Rights	  	  	   	  Regan	  notes	  that	  the	  notion	  that	  moral	  patients	  and	  agents	  have	  intrinsic	  value	  is	  not	  a	  moral	  principle	  because	  it	  does	  not	  specify	  what	  kind	  of	  treatment	  moral	  agents	  and	  patients	  are	  due.	  What	  kind	  of	  treatment	  subjects-­‐of-­‐a-­‐life	  are	  due	  depends	  on	  how	  one	  interprets	  justice.	  Regan	  interprets	  justice	  as	  requiring	  that	  we	  treat	  individuals	  who	  have	  inherent	  value	  with	  respect.	  The	  Respect	  Principle,	  then,	  encompasses	  the	  notion	  that	  subjects-­‐of-­‐a-­‐life	  are	  due	  respectful	  treatment.	  The	  Respect	  Principle	  is	  a	  formal	  principle;	  it	  is	  predistributive	  because	  it	  does	  not	  specify	  “conditions	  that	  must	  be	  met	  if	  the	  distribution	  of	  benefits	  (goods)	  and	  harms	  (evils)	  arising	  as	  of	  a	  given	  act	  or	  rule	  are	  just	  distributions.”	  Rather,	  The	  Respect	  Principle	  prohibits	  the	  possibility	  of	  arriving	  at	  any	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distribution	  that	  fails	  to	  recognize	  the	  inherent	  value	  of	  subjects-­‐of-­‐a-­‐life.	  Regan	  elucidates	  The	  Respect	  Principle	  in	  negative	  terms:	  	  we	  fail	  to	  treat	  individuals	  who	  have	  inherent	  value	  with	  the	  respect	  they	  are	  due,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  strict	  justice,	  whenever	  we	  treat	  them	  as	  if	  they	  lacked	  inherent	  value,	  and	  we	  treat	  them	  in	  this	  way	  whenever	  we	  treat	  them	  as	  if	  they	  were	  mere	  receptacles	  of	  valuable	  experiences	  …	  or	  as	  if	  their	  value	  depended	  upon	  their	  utility	  relative	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  others.84	  
	  As	  one	  can	  see,	  this	  view	  is	  antithetical	  to	  utilitarian	  views.	  On	  Regan’s	  view,	  is	  it	  unjust	  to	  regard	  subjects-­‐of-­‐a-­‐life	  in	  the	  way	  that	  utilitarianism	  requires,	  namely	  as	  locations	  of	  experiences,	  rather	  than	  beings	  for	  whom	  experiences	  matter.	  	  	   According	  to	  Regan,	  the	  inherent	  value	  of	  subjects-­‐of-­‐a-­‐life,	  along	  with	  the	  obligation	  to	  respect	  beings	  who	  have	  inherent	  value,	  yields	  a	  valid	  claim,	  or	  moral	  right,	  to	  respectful	  treatment.85	  Moral	  rights	  are	  distinct	  from	  legal	  rights.	  Whereas	  legal	  rights	  can	  change	  and	  vary	  depending	  on	  location,	  moral	  rights	  are	  universal.	  The	  universality	  of	  moral	  rights	  implies	  that	  if	  some	  individual	  has	  a	  moral	  right,	  then	  all	  other	  individuals	  that	  are	  like	  it	  in	  relevant	  respects	  also	  have	  moral	  rights.	  As	  Regan	  indicates,	  what	  exactly	  constitutes	  relevant	  respects	  is	  debatable.	  But	  it	  is	  not	  debatable	  that	  morally	  arbitrary	  characteristics,	  such	  as	  race,	  class	  and	  sex,	  do	  not	  constitute	  relevant	  respects.	  Moreover,	  moral	  rights	  are	  equal	  insofar	  as	  they	  do	  not	  admit	  of	  degrees.	  If	  any	  two	  individuals	  have	  a	  moral	  right,	  they	  have	  it	  equally.	  	  	   Regan	  conceives	  of	  moral	  rights	  as	  valid	  claims.	  A	  claim,	  Regan	  explains,	  involves	  a	  
claim-­‐to	  and	  a	  claim-­‐against.	  To	  put	  it	  slightly	  differently,	  a	  claim	  is	  an	  assertion	  that	  one	  is	  owed	  something	  from	  someone.	  In	  this	  case,	  that	  something	  is	  respectful	  treatment	  and	  the	  
someone	  is	  a	  moral	  agent(s).	  In	  order	  for	  a	  claim	  to	  be	  valid,	  that	  is	  to	  establish	  a	  right,	  the	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claim	  must	  be	  validated	  as	  a	  claim-­‐to	  and	  a	  claim-­‐against.86	  In	  order	  to	  validate	  X’s	  claim	  against	  Y	  to	  R,	  it	  must	  be	  the	  case	  that	  Y	  can	  provide	  X	  with	  R.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  a	  claim	  is	  not	  valid	  unless	  it	  can	  be	  satisfied.	  For	  example,	  borrowing	  Regan’s	  example,	  it	  is	  no	  good	  for	  you	  to	  claim	  that	  you	  are	  due	  a	  vacation	  in	  Acapulco	  from	  me	  if	  I	  am	  not	  able	  to	  give	  you	  that	  to	  you.	  Moreover,	  in	  order	  for	  X	  to	  have	  a	  valid	  claim	  against	  Y	  to	  R,	  it	  must	  be	  the	  case	  that	  Y	  has	  a	  duty	  to	  provide	  R	  to	  X.	  For	  instance,	  X	  would	  not	  have	  a	  valid	  claim	  to	  respectful	  treatment	  against	  a	  lion,	  because	  lions	  are	  moral	  patients	  and	  therefore	  cannot	  have	  duties.	  To	  establish	  a	  right	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  establish	  a	  duty.	  Rights	  always	  correspond	  to	  a	  duty.	  	  	   It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  now	  that,	  on	  Regan’s	  view,	  the	  duty	  of	  moral	  agents	  to	  respect	  those	  with	  inherent	  value	  is	  unacquired.	  Regan	  borrows	  John	  Rawl’s	  characterization	  of	  unacquired	  duties	  as	  duties	  that	  “apply	  to	  us	  without	  regard	  to	  our	  voluntary	  acts”	  and	  hold	  “irrespective	  of	  institutional	  arrangements.”87	  For	  instance,	  the	  duty	  not	  to	  kill	  someone	  who	  has	  inherent	  value	  is	  a	  duty	  that	  one	  has	  in	  virtue	  of	  being	  a	  moral	  agent	  and	  not	  because	  one	  implicitly	  or	  explicitly	  promised	  not	  to	  kill	  someone.	  By	  contrast,	  acquired	  duties	  are	  duties	  one	  has	  in	  virtue	  of	  some	  voluntary	  act,	  such	  as	  promising,	  or	  some	  institutional	  arrangement,	  such	  as	  the	  duty	  of	  military	  members	  to	  follow	  certain	  commands.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  Regan	  notes	  that	  the	  validity	  of	  claims-­‐to	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  claims-­‐against	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  depends	  on	  appeals	  to	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  moral	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  if	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  principles	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  a	  right	  be	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2.4	  The	  Harm	  Principle,	  The	  Miniride	  Principle	  and	  the	  Worse-­‐Off-­‐Principle	  	   The	  Harm	  Principle	  sets	  forth	  a	  prima	  facie	  direct	  duty	  not	  to	  harm	  either	  moral	  patients	  or	  moral	  agents.	  The	  Harm	  Principle	  is	  derived	  from	  the	  Respect	  Principle:	  moral	  agents	  and	  patients	  have	  inherent	  value	  in	  virtue	  of	  satisfying	  the	  subject-­‐of-­‐a-­‐life	  criterion.	  Consequently,	  moral	  agents	  and	  patients	  command	  respect,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  justice.	  To	  harm	  a	  moral	  agent	  or	  patient	  is	  to	  fail	  to	  respect	  their	  inherent	  value.	  Recall	  that	  harms	  can	  take	  the	  form	  of	  both	  infliction	  of	  suffering	  or	  deprivations.	  	  	   The	  Harm	  Principle	  is	  prima	  facie.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  it	  admits	  of	  exceptions.	  And	  this	  is	  as	  is	  should	  be,	  according	  to	  Regan,	  for	  there	  are	  some	  situations	  in	  which	  it	  is	  morally	  permissible	  to	  override	  the	  right	  to	  respectful	  treatment,	  that	  is,	  the	  right	  not	  to	  be	  harmed.88	  For	  example,	  Regan	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  permissible	  to	  override	  the	  right	  not	  to	  be	  harmed	  in	  certain	  situations,	  such	  as	  in	  cases	  in	  which	  guilty	  people	  are	  punished	  (i.e.	  when	  an	  individual	  is	  imprisoned	  for	  a	  committing	  a	  crime),	  or	  cases	  in	  which	  an	  innocent	  person	  harms	  someone	  in	  self-­‐defense.	  Regan	  notes	  that	  while	  it	  is	  sometimes	  morally	  permissible	  to	  override	  guilty	  individuals’	  rights	  not	  to	  be	  harmed,	  it	  is	  never	  permissible	  to	  override	  the	  rights	  of	  innocents.89	  Unfortunately,	  Regan	  notes,	  there	  are	  situations	  in	  which	  harming	  innocents	  cannot	  be	  avoided.	  Regan	  derives	  two	  more	  principles	  to	  deal	  with	  such	  cases:	  The	  Miniride	  Principle	  and	  the	  Worse-­‐Off-­‐Principle.	  	  	  	  	   The	  Miniride	  Principle,	  or	  the	  “Minimize	  Override	  Principle,”	  prescribes	  that	  	  Special	  considerations	  aside,	  when	  we	  must	  choose	  between	  overriding	  the	  rights	  of	  many	  who	  are	  innocent	  or	  the	  rights	  of	  few	  who	  are	  innocent,	  and	  when	  each	  affected	  individual	  will	  be	  harmed	  in	  a	  prima	  facie	  comparable	  way,	  then	  we	  ought	  to	  chose	  to	  override	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  few	  in	  preference	  to	  overriding	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  many.90	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  Regan	  emphasizes	  that	  while	  this	  principle	  is	  utilitarian	  insofar	  as	  numbers	  matter,	  it	  is	  grounded	  in	  rights	  considerations	  and	  derived	  from	  The	  Respect	  Principle.	  Exactly	  because	  all	  moral	  agents	  and	  patients	  have	  an	  equal	  prima	  facie	  right	  not	  to	  be	  harmed,	  the	  numbers	  count,	  as	  Regan	  explains:	  when	  we	  are	  faced	  between	  choosing	  between	  options,	  one	  of	  which	  will	  harm	  A,	  the	  other	  which	  will	  harm	  B,	  C,	  and	  D,	  and	  the	  third	  of	  which	  will	  harm	  them	  all	  …	  Precisely	  because	  each	  is	  to	  count	  for	  one,	  no	  more	  than	  one	  we	  cannot	  count	  choosing	  to	  override	  the	  rights	  of	  B,	  C,	  and	  D	  as	  neither	  better	  nor	  worse	  than	  choosing	  to	  override	  A’s	  alone.	  Three	  are	  more	  than	  one,	  and	  when	  the	  four	  individuals	  have	  an	  equal	  prima	  facie	  right	  not	  to	  be	  harmed,	  when	  the	  prima	  facie	  right	  not	  to	  be	  harmed	  is	  comparable	  …	  then	  showing	  equal	  respect	  for	  the	  equal	  rights	  of	  the	  individuals	  involved	  requires	  that	  we	  override	  the	  right	  of	  A	  (the	  few)	  rather	  than	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  many	  (B,C,D).	  To	  choose	  to	  override	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  many	  in	  this	  case	  would	  be	  to	  override	  and	  equal	  right	  three	  times	  …	  when	  we	  could	  choose	  to	  override	  such	  a	  right	  only	  once,	  and	  that	  cannot	  be	  consistent	  with	  showing	  equal	  respect	  for	  the	  equal	  rights	  of	  all	  the	  individuals	  involved.91	  	  The	  Miniride	  Principle	  provides	  a	  trouble-­‐shooting	  guide	  for	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  harms	  faced	  by	  innocent	  right-­‐holders	  are	  comparable.	  The	  Worse-­‐Off	  Principle	  is	  intended	  to	  deal	  with	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  harms	  to	  innocent	  right-­‐holders	  are	  not	  comparable:	  Special	  considerations	  aside,	  when	  we	  must	  decide	  to	  override	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  many	  or	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  few	  who	  are	  innocent,	  and	  when	  the	  harm	  faced	  by	  the	  few	  would	  make	  them	  worse-­‐off	  than	  any	  of	  the	  many	  would	  be	  if	  any	  other	  option	  were	  chosen,	  then	  we	  ought	  to	  override	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  many.	  	  	  	  	  Suppose	  now	  that	  we	  must	  choose	  whether	  to	  override	  the	  right	  of	  A	  not	  to	  be	  harmed	  or	  the	  rights	  of	  B,	  C,	  and	  D	  not	  to	  be	  harmed.	  However,	  the	  harm	  faced	  by	  A	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  harm	  faced	  by	  B,	  C,	  and	  D.	  In	  this	  case,	  according	  to	  The	  Miniride	  Principle,	  the	  numbers	  do	  not	  count.	  For	  example,	  if	  we	  must	  choose	  between	  subjecting	  A	  to	  a	  short	  headache	  or	  subjecting	  B	  to	  having	  her	  leg	  broken,	  then	  we	  must	  choose	  to	  override	  A’s	  right	  not	  to	  be	  harmed.	  In	  fact,	  we	  could	  subject	  an	  infinite	  number	  of	  people	  to	  a	  headache,	  because	  B’s	  broken	  leg	  is	  a	  greater	  loss	  than	  a	  headache	  is	  for	  anyone	  else.	  Likewise,	  Regan	  says,	  in	  a	  situation	  of	  true	  emergency,	  when	  we	  have	  to	  chose	  between	  killing	  an	  animal,	  killing	  a	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human,	  or	  letting	  them	  all	  die,	  we	  are	  morally	  obligated	  to	  save	  the	  human.	  According	  to	  Regan,	  the	  harm	  of	  death	  is	  a	  function	  of	  the	  opportunities	  on	  which	  it	  forecloses.	  Since,	  humans	  are	  more	  cognitively	  sophisticated	  than	  animals,	  humans	  are	  made	  worse	  off	  by	  death.	  	  	  2.5	  Practical	  Implications	  of	  Regan’s	  View	  	   On	  the	  rights	  view,	  we	  ought	  not	  to	  support	  institutions	  that	  violate	  the	  rights	  of	  others.	  On	  the	  individual	  level,	  this	  means	  that	  have	  an	  obligation	  to	  lead	  a	  vegetarian	  (when	  Regan	  wrote,	  vegetarian	  meant	  vegan)	  way	  of	  life,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  others	  are	  doing	  so.	  The	  rights	  view	  not	  only	  prescribes	  that	  individuals	  cease	  to	  consume	  animal	  products,	  it	  calls	  for	  the	  total	  dissolution	  of	  the	  animal	  industry,	  including	  factory	  farms	  and	  small	  farms,	  hunting	  and	  trapping	  either	  for	  commercial	  reasons	  or	  pleasure,	  and	  using	  animals	  for	  toxicity	  testing	  and	  medical	  experimentation.	  All	  of	  these	  activities	  override	  the	  rights	  of	  animals	  to	  respectful	  treatment.	  All	  of	  these	  practices	  erroneously	  assume	  that	  the	  value	  of	  rights-­‐holding	  animals	  is	  reducible	  to	  their	  utility	  relative	  to	  human	  interests.	  Moreover,	  the	  rights	  view	  does	  not	  grant	  privileged	  moral	  status	  to	  endangered	  species.	  It	  maintains	  that	  animals	  ought	  to	  be	  protected	  in	  virtue	  of	  being	  animals	  who	  have	  inherent	  value	  and	  not	  in	  virtue	  of	  belonging	  to	  an	  endangered	  species	  group.	  Lastly,	  Regan	  notes	  that	  legal	  property	  status	  must	  be	  called	  into	  question,	  because	  viewing	  them	  as	  property	  “implies	  that	  we	  cannot	  make	  sense	  of	  viewing	  them	  as	  legal	  persons.”92	  Regan	  does	  not	  go	  into	  great	  detail	  about	  the	  legal	  property	  status	  of	  animals,	  but	  he	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  inconsistent,	  on	  his	  view,	  to	  view	  other	  animals	  as	  such.	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  3.1	  Francione’s	  Abolitionist	  Theory	  of	  Animal	  Rights	  	   While	  Francione	  agrees	  with	  Regan’s	  conclusion	  that	  other	  animals	  have	  rights	  and	  that	  our	  acknowledgment	  of	  their	  status	  as	  rights-­‐bearers	  requires	  that	  we	  abolish,	  not	  merely	  regulate,	  the	  institution	  of	  animal	  exploitation,	  his	  view	  differs	  from	  Regan’s	  in	  at	  least	  four	  fundamental	  respects.93	  First,	  Francione	  rejects	  that	  the	  class	  of	  protected	  animals	  ought	  to	  be	  restricted	  to	  those	  sentient	  being	  who	  satisfy	  the	  subject-­‐of-­‐a-­‐life	  criterion.	  Francione	  links	  moral	  status	  directly	  to	  sentience.	  Second,	  Francione	  rejects	  Regan’s	  argument	  that	  it	  is	  an	  empirical	  fact	  that	  death	  is	  a	  greater	  harm	  to	  humans	  than	  it	  is	  to	  other	  animals.	  Third,	  Francione’s	  view	  focuses	  on	  the	  legal	  property	  status	  of	  animals.	  Fourth,	  Francione	  derives	  the	  basic	  right	  not	  to	  be	  used	  as	  someone	  else’s	  property	  directly	  from	  The	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration,	  and	  thus	  is	  much	  simpler	  than	  Regan’s	  argument.	  	  	   The	  structure	  of	  Francione’s	  argument	  is	  relatively	  simple.	  He	  takes	  as	  his	  starting	  point	  our	  moral	  intuition	  that	  we	  ought	  not	  to	  cause	  other	  animals	  to	  suffer	  unnecessarily,	  emergency	  cases	  notwithstanding.	  This	  intuition	  is	  the	  content	  of	  The	  Humane	  Treatment	  Principle.	  He	  then	  points	  out	  that	  our	  actions	  run	  radically	  afoul	  from	  our	  moral	  conviction	  that	  we	  ought	  not	  to	  cause	  animals	  to	  suffer	  unnecessarily,	  as	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  first	  chapter.	  Francione	  attributes	  our	  moral	  inconsistency	  to	  the	  legal	  property	  status	  of	  animals.	  More	  specifically,	  he	  argues	  that	  the	  legal	  property	  status	  of	  other	  animals	  precludes	  our	  ability	  to	  accurately	  apply	  The	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration	  to	  other	  animal’s	  interests	  in	  not	  suffering.	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   Francione	  stresses	  that	  we	  have	  two	  and	  only	  two	  options	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  moral	  status	  of	  other	  animals.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  we	  can	  do	  nothing,	  and	  maintain	  the	  status	  quo	  by	  continuing	  to	  ignore	  other	  animal’s	  interests	  in	  not	  suffering,	  and	  treating	  them	  exclusively	  as	  economic	  commodities.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  can	  protect	  other	  animal’s	  interests	  in	  not	  suffering	  by	  according	  them	  one	  right:	  the	  basic	  right	  not	  to	  be	  treated	  exclusively	  as	  the	  means	  to	  the	  ends	  of	  others.	  I	  will	  begin	  by	  discussing	  The	  Humane	  Treatment	  Principle.	  I	  will	  then	  discuss	  the	  problem	  with	  the	  legal	  status	  of	  other	  animals	  as	  property.	  I	  will	  then	  discuss	  basic	  rights	  and	  the	  grounds	  for	  extending	  them	  to	  other	  animals.	  And	  finally,	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  view.	  	  	  3.2	  The	  Humane	  Treatment	  Principle:	  A	  Moral	  Rule	  and	  a	  Legal	  Rule	  	  	   According	  to	  Francione,	  The	  Humane	  Treatment	  Principle	  encompasses	  two	  widely	  accepted	  intuitions:	  first,	  we	  can	  prefer	  humans	  to	  other	  animals	  in	  situations	  of	  “necessity.”	  That	  is,	  most	  of	  us	  believe	  that	  in	  an	  emergency	  situation	  in	  which	  one	  is	  forced	  to	  choose	  to	  save	  the	  life	  of	  a	  human	  or	  another	  animal,	  it	  is	  preferable	  to	  save	  the	  human.	  For	  instance,	  suppose	  a	  building	  is	  on	  fire.	  Inside	  the	  building,	  a	  human	  and	  dog,	  neither	  or	  whom	  you	  know,	  are	  trapped	  inside.	  You	  have	  three	  choices.	  You	  can	  save	  the	  human,	  save	  the	  dog,	  or	  let	  them	  both	  die.	  The	  Humane	  Treatment	  principle	  preserves	  our	  intuition	  that	  it	  is	  usually	  preferable	  to	  save	  the	  human.	  	  	   The	  Humane	  Treatment	  Principle	  also	  captures	  our	  moral	  intuition	  that	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  inflict	  unnecessary	  suffering	  onto	  animals.	  This	  is	  because	  we	  recognize	  that	  sentient	  beings	  have	  subjective	  lives	  that	  matter	  to	  them,	  as	  Francione	  explains:	  Like	  us,	  sentient	  nonhumans	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  not	  experiencing	  pain	  and	  suffering;	  that	  is,	  they	  are	  the	  sorts	  of	  beings	  who	  prefer,	  or	  desire,	  or	  want	  not	  to	  suffer	  pain.	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Animals	  may	  have	  other	  interests	  as	  well,	  but	  as	  long	  as	  they	  are	  sentient,	  we	  know	  that	  at	  the	  very	  least	  they	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  avoiding	  pain	  and	  suffering.	  We	  regard	  such	  an	  interest	  as	  morally	  significant	  and	  we	  accept	  that	  we	  ought	  not	  to	  inflict	  any	  unnecessary	  suffering	  on	  animals.94	  	  	  	   Francione	  notes	  that	  the	  humane	  treatment	  principle	  has	  been	  an	  uncontroversial	  part	  of	  our	  culture	  since	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  In	  addition	  to	  being	  a	  moral	  rule,	  the	  humane	  treatment	  principle	  is	  a	  legal	  rule:	  Animals	  welfare	  laws	  purport	  to	  prohibit	  us	  from	  inflicting	  unnecessary	  suffering	  onto	  animals.	  To	  determine	  whether	  a	  particular	  action	  is	  necessary,	  we	  balance	  the	  interests	  of	  humans	  and	  other	  animals:	  If	  the	  balance	  tips	  in	  favor	  of	  humans—if	  human	  interests	  in	  inflicting	  harm	  on	  an	  animal	  are	  stronger	  than	  the	  animal’s	  interests	  in	  not	  being	  made	  to	  suffer—we	  consider	  that	  the	  use	  or	  treatment	  is	  morally	  justified	  because	  it	  is	  necessary.	  	  If	  the	  balance	  tips	  in	  favor	  of	  animals,	  then	  the	  infliction	  of	  harm	  is	  not	  morally	  justified	  because	  it	  is	  considered	  unnecessary.	  This	  balancing	  …	  is	  not	  a	  precise	  operation,	  and	  we	  may	  very	  well	  disagree	  in	  our	  assessment	  of	  the	  relative	  weight	  of	  competing	  human	  and	  animals	  interests	  in	  particular	  cases,	  as	  well	  as	  about	  what	  constitutes	  necessary	  suffering.	  But	  whatever	  differences	  we	  may	  otherwise	  have,	  we	  must	  agree	  that	  if	  the	  prohibition	  against	  unnecessary	  suffering	  is	  to	  have	  any	  meaning	  at	  all,	  it	  is	  morally	  and	  legally	  wrong	  to	  inflect	  suffering	  on	  animals	  merely	  for	  our	  amusement	  or	  pleasure.	  We	  must	  agree	  that	  there	  are	  some	  meaningful	  limits	  on	  our	  use	  and	  treatment	  of	  animals.95	  	  	  	   Although	  The	  Humane	  Treatment	  Principle	  is,	  on	  the	  surface,	  a	  widely	  accepted	  moral	  and	  legal	  rule,	  we	  routinely	  and	  systematically	  cause	  unnecessary	  suffering	  to	  other	  animals.	  Although	  most	  of	  us	  are	  outraged	  when	  we	  learn	  of	  the	  neglect	  or	  abuse	  of	  some	  animals,	  such	  as	  dogs	  and	  cats,	  our	  own	  actions	  are	  not	  any	  morally	  different.	  For	  instance,	  eating	  an	  animal	  is	  not	  morally	  different	  than	  kicking	  or	  beating	  an	  animal	  insofar	  as	  both	  actions	  cause	  unnecessary	  suffering.	  Animal	  products	  such	  as	  meat	  and	  dairy	  cannot	  be	  obtained	  without	  causing	  animals	  to	  suffer.96	  While	  there	  might	  be	  a	  difference	  in	  culpability	  between	  the	  dog	  abuser	  who	  knows	  what	  he	  does	  is	  wrong	  and	  the	  “dairy”	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consumer	  who	  does	  not	  know	  dairy	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  human	  health,	  there	  is	  no	  moral	  difference	  between	  beating	  a	  dog	  and	  drinking	  a	  glass	  of	  milk.97	  Since	  we	  have	  no	  need	  to	  eat	  or	  use	  the	  products	  of	  other	  animals,	  the	  suffering	  we	  cause	  them	  in	  the	  process	  of	  obtaining	  their	  goods	  or	  services	  is	  entirely	  unnecessary.	  Indeed,	  according	  to	  Francione	  all	  of	  our	  uses	  of	  animals	  facilitate	  nonessential	  humans	  desires—pleasure,	  amusement	  or	  convenience—and	  therefore	  violate	  The	  Humane	  Treatment	  Principle.98	  Francione	  stresses	  that	  we	  wrongly	  treat	  most	  of	  our	  dealings	  with	  other	  animals	  as	  situations	  of	  emergency,	  like	  the	  burning	  building	  scenario.	  We	  treat	  our	  dealings	  with	  other	  animal	  as	  though	  we	  have	  no	  other	  choice	  except	  to	  choose	  between	  their	  interests	  and	  ours,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  true	  conflict	  of	  interests.	  	  	  3.3	  The	  Problem:	  Animals	  as	  Legal	  Property	  	  	   On	  Francione’s	  view,	  the	  profound	  gulf	  between	  our	  beliefs	  and	  actions	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  status	  of	  other	  animals	  as	  legal	  property.	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  the	  legal	  property	  status	  of	  other	  animals	  impedes	  our	  ability	  to	  accurately	  apply	  The	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration	  to	  other	  animals.	  Animal	  welfare	  laws	  fail	  because	  other	  animals	  are	  regarded	  as	  things	  we	  own,	  “as	  economic	  commodities	  that	  possess	  no	  value	  apart	  from	  that	  which	  is	  accorded	  to	  them	  by	  their	  owners—whether	  individuals,	  corporations,	  or	  governments.”99	  Since	  our	  respect	  for	  animal	  interests	  is	  contingent	  upon	  respect	  for	  property	  rights,	  we	  wrongly	  emphasize	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  human	  owner	  over	  those	  of	  animals.	  Animal	  welfare	  laws,	  which	  appeal	  to	  our	  intuitions	  regarding	  the	  interests	  of	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other	  animals	  rather	  than	  the	  interests	  of	  animal-­‐owners,	  are	  therefore	  ineffective	  and	  admit	  of	  legal	  loopholes.	  I	  will	  present	  four	  of	  the	  reasons	  Francione	  thinks	  that	  welfare	  laws	  cannot	  meaningfully	  protect	  animals.	  	  	   First,	  anticruelty	  laws	  build	  in	  exemptions	  for	  specific	  uses	  of	  animals.	  For	  instance,	  “California	  provides	  that	  its	  anticruelty	  law	  is	  not	  applicable	  to	  activities	  permitted	  under	  the	  game	  laws,	  laws	  for	  the	  destruction	  of	  certain	  birds,	  the	  killing	  of	  venomous	  reptile	  or	  other	  dangerous	  animals,	  the	  killing	  of	  animals	  for	  food,	  or	  the	  use	  of	  animals	  in	  experiments	  conducted	  under	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  faculty	  of	  a	  regularly	  incorporated	  medical	  college	  or	  university.”100	  Second,	  even	  if	  the	  courts	  do	  not	  explicitly	  exclude	  some	  uses	  of	  other	  animals	  from	  scrutiny,	  they	  implicitly	  do	  so	  by	  interpreting	  statutes	  to	  permit	  	  “the	  infliction	  of	  even	  extreme	  suffering,	  so	  long	  as	  it	  is	  incidental	  to	  an	  accepted	  use	  of	  animals.”101	  For	  instance,	  Francione	  points	  out	  that	  in	  cases	  dealing	  with	  the	  treatment	  of	  animals	  used	  for	  food,	  courts	  have	  held	  that	  pain	  and	  suffering	  inflicted	  on	  animals	  is	  necessary	  “[w]henever	  the	  purpose	  for	  which	  the	  act	  is	  done	  is	  to	  make	  the	  animal	  more	  serviceable	  for	  the	  use	  of	  man.”102	  Anticruelty	  laws	  distort	  the	  meaning	  of	  cruelty,	  as	  it	  is	  normally	  understood,	  to	  allow	  for	  excruciatingly	  painful	  but	  profitable	  treatments	  of	  animals.103	  	  	  	   Third,	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	  secure	  a	  conviction.	  Anticruelty	  laws	  are	  criminal	  laws,	  and	  most	  criminal	  laws	  stipulate	  that	  the	  state	  must	  prove	  that	  a	  defendant	  engaged	  in	  an	  unlawful	  act	  mens	  rea	  (with	  a	  culpable	  state	  of	  mind).	  The	  state	  must	  prove	  beyond	  a	  reasonable	  doubt	  not	  just	  that	  the	  defendant	  imposed	  pain	  on	  an	  animal,	  but	  that	  he	  did	  so	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maliciously.	  The	  problem,	  Francione	  points	  out,	  is	  that	  if	  the	  defendant	  inflicts	  pain	  onto	  an	  animal	  as	  part	  of	  an	  accepted	  institutional	  practice,	  it	  is	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  prove	  that	  he	  acted	  with	  the	  requisite	  malicious	  state	  of	  mind.104	  For	  example,	  having	  been	  convicted	  of	  violating	  a	  state’s	  anticruelty	  statute	  for	  beating	  a	  dog,	  a	  man	  appealed,	  arguing	  that	  he	  had	  not	  intended	  to	  harm	  the	  puppy,	  but	  merely	  to	  discipline	  the	  puppy.	  The	  court	  maintained	  that	  the	  laws	  were	  “not	  intended	  to	  place	  unreasonable	  restrictions	  on	  the	  infliction	  of	  pain	  as	  may	  be	  necessary	  for	  the	  training	  or	  discipline	  of	  an	  animal.”105	  	  	   Fourth,	  animal	  welfare	  laws	  do	  not	  work	  because	  there	  is	  an	  erroneous	  presumption	  that	  property	  owners	  always	  take	  care	  of	  their	  property.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  we	  assume	  that	  animal	  owners	  always	  act	  in	  their	  own	  economic	  self-­‐interest	  and	  do	  not	  inflict	  more	  pain	  than	  is	  necessary	  to	  our	  efficient	  use	  of	  the	  animal	  as	  an	  economic	  resource.	  To	  do	  otherwise	  would	  be	  irrational:	  imposing	  pain	  onto	  animals	  would	  diminish	  their	  value	  and	  thereby	  diminish	  our	  own.	  In	  a	  system	  of	  private	  property,	  Francione	  says,	  it	  is	  generally	  assumed	  that	  “property	  owners	  are	  the	  best	  judges	  of	  the	  value	  of	  their	  property	  and	  allow	  them	  to	  use	  that	  property	  as	  they	  see	  fit.	  We	  assume	  that	  animal	  owner	  will	  not	  as	  a	  general	  matter	  ‘waste’	  their	  animal	  property,	  just	  as	  we	  assume	  that	  most	  people	  will	  not	  light	  cigars	  with	  flaming	  $100	  bills.”106	  Francione	  emphasizes	  that	  this	  assumption	  is	  naïve,	  because	  there	  are	  strong	  economic	  forces	  that	  militate	  against	  better	  treatment.	  Overriding	  the	  interests	  of	  other	  animals	  can	  and	  does	  generate	  profound	  economic	  rewards.	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   As	  one	  can	  see,	  on	  Francione’s	  view,	  the	  humane	  treatment	  principle,	  as	  it	  is	  applied	  through	  law,	  does	  not	  provide	  meaningful	  protections	  to	  other	  animals.	  This	  is	  because,	  Francione	  says:	  the	  law	  limits	  our	  use	  of	  animals	  only	  insofar	  as	  we	  must	  use	  animals	  for	  a	  “purpose.”	  We	  must	  use	  them	  incidental	  to	  our	  accepted	  forms	  of	  institutionalized	  exploitation—for	  food,	  hunting,	  recreation,	  entertainment,	  clothing,	  or	  experiments—the	  primary	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  use	  animals	  as	  commodities	  to	  generate	  economic	  profit.	  The	  only	  time	  that	  our	  infliction	  of	  suffering	  on	  animals	  raises	  any	  sort	  of	  legal	  question	  is	  when	  we	  inflict	  that	  suffering	  outside	  the	  accepted	  institutions	  of	  animal	  use—when	  we	  inflict	  suffering	  in	  ways	  that	  do	  not	  generate	  property-­‐related	  benefits	  and	  where	  the	  only	  explanation	  for	  the	  behavior	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  torture	  “for	  the	  gratification	  of	  malignant	  or	  vindictive	  temper.”107	  	  	   On	  this	  view,	  so	  long	  as	  other	  animals	  are	  legal	  property,	  things	  to	  be	  owned,	  there	  can	  be	  no	  meaningful	  balancing	  of	  interests	  of	  humans	  and	  other	  animals.	  The	  legal	  property	  status	  of	  other	  animals	  impedes	  our	  ability	  to	  accurately	  apply	  The	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration	  to	  The	  Humane	  Treatment	  Principle,	  resulting	  in	  the	  infliction	  of	  unnecessary	  suffering	  to	  other	  animals.	  	  	   Francione’s	  conception	  of	  the	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration	  is	  not	  different	  from	  Singer’s	  or	  Regan’s—it	  is	  a	  formal	  principle	  that	  requires	  that	  like	  interests	  be	  treated	  alike.	  Indeed,	  Francione	  points	  out	  that	  The	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration	  is	  a	  necessary	  component	  of	  any	  valid	  moral	  theory.	  Moreover,	  Francione	  directs	  us	  to	  notice	  that	  The	  Humane	  Treatment	  Principle	  is	  a	  moral	  theory	  that	  requires	  us	  to	  balance	  the	  interests	  of	  humans	  and	  other	  animals.	  Therefore,	  it	  must	  include	  The	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  Francione	  attributes	  our	  failure	  to	  meaningfully	  apply	  The	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration	  to	  other	  animals	  to	  the	  legal	  status	  of	  other	  animals	  as	  property.	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   Francione	  notes	  that	  The	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration	  also	  failed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  human	  slavery,	  which	  allowed	  some	  humans	  to	  treat	  other	  humans	  as	  property.	  The	  structure	  of	  human	  slavery	  was	  identical,	  Francione	  explains:	  Because	  a	  human	  slave	  was	  regarded	  as	  property,	  the	  slave	  owner	  was	  able	  to	  disregard	  all	  of	  the	  slave’s	  interests	  if	  it	  was	  economically	  beneficial	  to	  do	  so,	  and	  the	  law	  generally	  deferred	  to	  the	  slave	  owner’s	  judgment	  as	  to	  the	  value	  of	  his	  slave	  property.	  As	  chattel	  property,	  slaves	  could	  be	  sold,	  willed,	  insured,	  mortgaged,	  and	  seized	  in	  payments	  of	  the	  owner’s	  debts.	  Slave	  owners	  could	  inflict	  severe	  punishments	  on	  slaves	  for	  virtually	  any	  reason.	  Those	  who	  intentionally	  or	  neglectfully	  injured	  another’s	  slave	  were	  liable	  to	  the	  owner	  in	  an	  action	  for	  damage	  to	  property.	  As	  a	  general	  matter	  slaves	  could	  not	  enter	  into	  contracts,	  own	  property,	  sue	  or	  be	  sued,	  or	  live	  as	  free	  persons	  with	  basic	  rights	  and	  duties.	  The	  law	  supposedly	  required	  that	  slaves	  be	  treated	  ‘humanely.’	  	  	  While	  laws	  have	  been	  passed	  that	  ostensibly	  provided	  slaves	  with	  some	  legal	  protections,	  these	  laws	  were	  ineffectual	  for	  the	  same	  reasons	  that	  the	  laws	  that	  purport	  to	  protect	  animals	  are	  ineffectual:	  they	  both	  admitted	  of	  many	  exceptions	  and	  they	  were	  unenforceable.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  Francione	  introduces	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  basic	  right	  and	  equal	  inherent	  value	  to	  reconceptualize	  our	  relationships	  with	  other	  animals.	  He	  discusses	  these	  concepts	  in	  the	  context	  of	  human	  rights	  before	  arguing	  that	  they	  ought	  to	  be	  extended	  to	  other	  animals.	  	  	  3.4	  The	  Basic	  Right	  not	  to	  be	  Treated	  as	  a	  Thing	  and	  Equal	  Inherent	  Value	  	   According	  to	  Francione,	  if	  The	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration	  is	  to	  have	  any	  meaningful	  application	  to	  humans,	  then	  we	  must	  recognize	  that	  all	  sentient	  beings	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  not	  suffering	  at	  all	  as	  the	  result	  of	  their	  use	  as	  resources	  of	  others.108	  We	  can	  express	  this	  idea	  in	  two	  different	  but	  related	  ways,	  Francione	  says.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  humans	  have	  a	  basic	  right	  not	  to	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  means	  to	  the	  ends	  of	  others.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  humans	  have	  equal	  inherent	  value	  that	  prevents	  them	  from	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being	  valued	  strictly	  as	  resources.	  Both	  of	  these	  ideas	  express	  that	  we	  should	  not	  treat	  humans	  as	  mere	  resources;	  humans	  should	  be	  afforded	  basic	  protections	  against	  not	  suffering	  unnecessarily	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  others.109	  Francione	  points	  out	  that	  this	  view	  of	  basic	  rights	  and	  equal	  inherent	  value	  does	  not	  entail	  any	  metaphysical	  commitments;	  it	  only	  requires	  logic:	  if	  the	  interests	  of	  humans	  have	  moral	  significance,	  then	  they	  cannot	  be	  mere	  resources.	  The	  interest	  of	  the	  individual	  who	  is	  a	  resource	  cannot	  be	  equal	  to	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  owner.	  I	  will	  now	  discuss	  basic	  rights,	  and	  then	  I	  will	  discuss	  equal	  inherent	  value.	  	  	   A	  right	  on	  this	  view	  is	  a	  means	  of	  protecting	  an	  interest.	  A	  right	  protects	  interests	  from	  being	  abrogated	  because	  doing	  so	  would	  have	  beneficial	  consequences	  for	  someone	  else.	  While	  there	  is	  disagreement	  about	  exactly	  which	  rights	  humans	  possess,	  it	  is	  now	  nearly	  universally	  accepted	  that	  all	  humans	  hold	  a	  basic	  right	  not	  to	  be	  treated	  exclusively	  as	  a	  means	  to	  the	  ends	  of	  others.	  A	  basic	  right	  is	  a	  fundamental	  right	  because	  it	  is	  a	  necessary	  prerequisite	  for	  enjoying	  all	  other	  rights.	  For	  instance,	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  is	  largely	  meaningless	  if	  one	  does	  not	  also	  have	  a	  right	  not	  to	  be	  killed.110	  Francione	  stresses	  that	  in	  order	  to	  effectively	  protect	  the	  interests	  of	  humans	  in	  not	  being	  treated	  as	  mere	  means	  to	  others	  ends,	  it	  is	  imperative	  that	  we	  use	  a	  right	  to	  do	  so.	  If	  one’s	  interests	  could	  be	  traded	  off	  when	  doing	  so	  would	  conduce	  to	  the	  aggregate	  good,	  “then,	  by	  definition,	  we	  will	  no	  longer	  respect	  the	  interest	  of	  those	  humans	  in	  being	  treated	  as	  ends	  in	  themselves,	  and	  those	  humans	  will	  be	  at	  risk	  of	  being	  treated	  as	  mere	  commodities.”111	  Francione	  also	  stresses	  that	  the	  basic	  right	  not	  to	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  thing	  is	  limited.	  It	  offers	  basic	  protection	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but	  it	  does	  not	  guarantee	  any	  other	  rights.	  One	  could	  hold	  a	  basic	  right	  but	  nevertheless	  not	  be	  guaranteed	  protection	  from	  all	  unfair	  treatment.	  A	  basic	  right	  does	  prohibit,	  buying	  or	  selling	  humans,	  using	  them	  as	  unconsenting	  subjects	  in	  biomedical	  experiments,	  making	  shoes	  out	  of	  them,	  or	  hunting	  them	  for	  sport.112	  	   To	  say	  an	  individual	  has	  equal	  inherent	  value	  is	  another	  way	  of	  expressing	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  protect	  the	  interests	  of	  humans	  in	  not	  being	  treated	  exclusively	  as	  the	  resource	  of	  another.	  Francione	  points	  out	  that	  the	  factual	  basis	  for	  equal	  inherent	  value	  is	  that	  all	  sentient	  humans	  value	  themselves	  even	  if	  no	  one	  else	  does.	  Even	  mentally	  disabled	  people	  and	  infants	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  not	  suffering	  even	  if	  no	  one	  else	  cares.113	  Francione	  notes	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  equal	  inherent	  value	  is	  “integral	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  morality.”	  We	  must	  have	  a	  notion	  of	  equal	  inherent	  value	  underpinning	  our	  interactions	  with	  one	  another;	  otherwise	  even	  our	  most	  basic	  interests	  could	  be	  traded-­‐away	  at	  the	  will	  of	  others	  or	  whenever	  doing	  so	  might	  conduce	  to	  the	  greater	  good.114	  Equal	  inherent	  value	  is	  the	  minimal	  requirement	  for	  membership	  in	  the	  moral	  community.	  Francione,	  helpfully,	  analogizes	  the	  moral	  community	  to	  a	  theater:	  Once	  you	  are	  admitted	  into	  the	  theater,	  you	  are	  guaranteed	  a	  space	  somewhere	  to	  watch	  the	  performance,	  but	  not	  necessarily	  the	  best	  seat	  or	  a	  particularly	  good	  seat,	  or	  even	  any	  seat	  at	  all.	  Maybe	  we	  will	  make	  you	  stand.	  But	  to	  be	  in	  the	  theater	  is	  to	  have	  some	  space	  in	  which	  to	  watch	  the	  performance;	  otherwise	  admission	  is	  meaningless.	  As	  a	  logical	  matter,	  admission	  to	  the	  theater	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  seeing	  the	  performance	  means	  that	  you	  will	  have	  some	  access—however	  imperfect	  relative	  to	  that	  of	  those	  sitting	  in	  the	  front	  row.115	  	  	  This	  example	  underscores	  the	  idea	  that	  equal	  rights	  and	  equal	  inherent	  value	  do	  not	  imply	  that	  all	  individuals	  are	  due	  equal	  treatment.	  This	  is	  as	  it	  should	  be,	  for	  as	  we	  seen,	  the	  varying	  capacities	  and	  characteristics	  among	  individuals	  give	  rise	  to	  different	  prescriptions	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for	  treatment.	  Moreover,	  one	  might	  think	  that	  it	  ought	  to	  be	  permissible	  to	  pay	  a	  brain	  surgeon	  more	  than	  a	  barista,	  even	  though	  they	  have	  equal	  inherent	  value.	  In	  summary,	  if	  we	  take	  seriously	  the	  human	  interest	  in	  not	  suffering	  as	  a	  result	  of	  being	  used	  as	  a	  mere	  resource,	  then	  we	  must	  heed	  The	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration,	  and	  inherent	  value	  by	  affording	  all	  humans	  a	  basic	  right	  not	  to	  be	  the	  property	  of	  another.	  The	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration,	  as	  on	  Singer’s	  view,	  is	  a	  formal	  principle	  that	  captures	  that	  all	  sentient	  beings	  have	  moral	  status,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  specify	  what	  treatment	  they	  are	  due.	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  unlike	  Singer	  and	  Regan,	  Francione	  derives	  the	  basic	  rights	  not	  to	  be	  the	  property	  of	  someone	  else	  directly	  from	  The	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration.	  According	  to	  Francione,	  what	  it	  means	  to	  have	  moral	  status	  is	  to	  have	  a	  basic	  right	  not	  to	  be	  property.	  	  	  The	  Solution:	  Basic	  Rights	  for	  All	  Sentient	  Beings	  	   As	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  legal	  property	  status	  of	  other	  animals	  precludes	  granting	  equal	  consideration	  to	  their	  interests	  in	  not	  suffering.	  We	  treat	  other	  animals	  in	  the	  same	  way	  we	  treated	  slaves.	  The	  “hybrid	  system”	  that	  prescribed	  us	  to	  balance	  the	  interests	  of	  slave	  owners	  against	  the	  interests	  of	  slaves	  could	  not	  treat	  the	  interests	  of	  slaves	  as	  morally	  significant.	  Likewise,	  we	  cannot	  expect	  a	  hybrid	  system	  to	  treat	  the	  interest	  of	  other	  animals	  as	  morally	  significant.116	  The	  moral	  universe,	  Francione	  says,	  is	  comprised	  of	  two	  kinds	  of	  beings:	  persons	  and	  things.117	  We	  cannot	  have	  a	  three-­‐tiered	  system,	  as	  we	  tried	  in	  the	  case	  of	  slavery,	  that	  recognizes	  a	  class	  of	  inanimate	  property,	  free	  persons	  and	  quasi-­‐persons:	  “We	  eventually	  recognized	  that	  if	  slaves	  were	  going	  to	  have	  morally	  significant	  interests,	  they	  could	  not	  be	  slaves	  anymore	  …	  they	  are	  either	  person,	  beings	  to	  whom	  The	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Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration	  applies	  and	  to	  whom	  we	  have	  direct	  moral	  obligations,	  or	  things,	  beings	  to	  whom	  The	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration	  does	  not	  apply	  and	  to	  whom	  we	  have	  no	  direct	  moral	  obligations.”118	  	  	   If	  we	  want	  to	  give	  content	  to	  our	  moral	  and	  legal	  prohibition	  against	  the	  infliction	  of	  unnecessary	  suffering	  to	  other	  animals,	  we	  have	  to	  heed	  The	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration	  by	  treating	  like	  interests	  alike.	  This	  means	  that	  we	  must	  extend	  the	  same	  protections	  that	  we	  accord	  to	  the	  human	  interest	  in	  not	  suffering	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  other	  animals	  in	  not	  suffering.	  That	  is,	  we	  must,	  at	  minimum,	  extend	  them	  the	  basic	  right	  not	  to	  be	  the	  property	  of	  others.	  There	  is	  no	  sound	  reason	  to	  accord	  a	  basic	  right	  to	  all	  humans,	  irrespective	  of	  their	  age,	  intelligence	  or	  any	  other	  characteristic,	  yet	  deny	  this	  right	  to	  all	  other	  animals.	  We	  must	  shift	  other	  animals	  out	  from	  the	  class	  of	  things	  into	  the	  class	  of	  persons,	  conceived	  as	  beings	  who	  have	  moral	  status.	  	  	   The	  question	  about	  the	  moral	  status	  of	  other	  animals,	  Francione	  notes,	  is	  concerned	  with	  how	  we	  ought	  to	  treat	  other	  animals	  under	  typical	  circumstances	  and	  in	  situations	  of	  emergency,	  when	  there	  is	  a	  genuine	  conflict	  of	  interests.	  Francione	  ask	  us	  to	  notice	  that	  we	  inappropriately	  treat	  the	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  our	  dealings	  with	  other	  animals	  as	  though	  they	  are	  emergency	  scenarios.	  We	  create	  false	  conflicts	  when	  we	  consider	  whether	  we	  need	  a	  leather	  jacket	  or	  to	  eat	  dairy	  or	  meat	  during	  a	  meal:	  “We	  bring	  billions	  of	  sentient	  animals	  into	  the	  world	  for	  the	  sole	  purpose	  of	  killing	  them.	  We	  then	  seek	  to	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  our	  moral	  obligation	  to	  them.”	  Drawing	  an	  analogy	  from	  the	  burning-­‐building	  emergency	  case,	  Francione	  says	  that	  we	  need	  to	  stop	  dragging	  animals	  into	  burning	  houses	  and	  then	  asking	  whether	  we	  ought	  to	  save	  the	  human	  or	  the	  dog.	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On	  this	  view,	  what	  we	  ought	  to	  do	  is	  accurately	  apply	  The	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Consideration	  to	  other	  animals.	  This	  involves	  ceasing	  to	  fabricate	  conflicts	  of	  interests.	  In	  the	  next	  section	  I	  discuss	  the	  practical	  implication	  of	  this	  view.	  	  	  3.6	  Practical	  Implications:	  The	  Total	  Abolition	  of	  Animal	  Exploitation	  	  	   According	  to	  Francione,	  the	  abolitionist	  theory	  yields	  the	  following	  six	  principles,	  or	  practical	  implications.	  	  
1. Our	  recognition	  of	  the	  one	  basic	  right	  means	  that	  we	  must	  abolish,	  and	  not	  merely	  regulate,	  institutionalized	  animal	  exploitation—because	  it	  assumes	  that	  animals	  are	  the	  property	  of	  humans.	  We	  recognize	  that	  we	  will	  not	  abolish	  overnight	  the	  property	  status	  of	  nonhumans,	  but	  we	  will	  support	  only	  those	  campaigns	  and	  positions	  that	  explicitly	  promote	  the	  abolitionist	  agenda.	  We	  will	  not	  support	  positions	  that	  call	  for	  supposedly	  ‘improved’	  regulation	  of	  animal	  exploitation.	  2. The	  abolitionist	  approach	  sees	  abolition	  as	  the	  goal	  of	  animal	  ethics	  and	  sees	  creative,	  nonviolent	  vegan	  advocacy—and	  not	  welfare	  reform—as	  the	  means	  to	  that	  end.	  The	  abolitionist	  approach	  regards	  veganism	  as	  the	  moral	  baseline	  and	  maintains	  that	  we	  cannot	  draw	  a	  morally	  coherent	  distinction	  between	  flesh	  and	  other	  animal	  products,	  such	  as	  dairy	  or	  eggs,	  or	  between	  animal	  foods	  and	  the	  use	  of	  animals	  for	  clothing	  or	  other	  products.	  3. The	  abolitionist	  approach	  links	  the	  moral	  status	  of	  nonhumans	  with	  sentience	  alone	  and	  not	  with	  any	  other	  cognitive	  characteristic.	  Sentience	  is	  subjective	  awareness;	  there	  is	  someone	  who	  perceives	  and	  experiences	  the	  world.	  A	  sentient	  being	  has	  interests;	  that	  is,	  preferences,	  wants,	  or	  desires.	  If	  a	  being	  is	  sentient,	  then	  that	  is	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  for	  the	  being	  to	  have	  the	  right	  not	  to	  be	  used	  as	  a	  means	  to	  human	  ends,	  which,	  correlatively,	  imposes	  on	  humans	  the	  moral	  obligation	  not	  to	  use	  that	  being	  as	  a	  resource.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  “humanely”	  using	  that	  animal.	  Although	  less	  suffering	  is	  better	  than	  more	  suffering,	  no	  use	  can	  be	  morally	  justified.	  	  4. Just	  as	  we	  reject	  racism,	  sexism,	  ageism,	  and	  heterosexism,	  we	  reject	  speciesism.	  The	  species	  of	  a	  sentient	  being	  is	  no	  more	  reason	  to	  deny	  the	  protection	  of	  this	  basic	  right	  than	  race,	  sex,	  age,	  or	  sexual	  orientation	  is	  a	  reason	  to	  deny	  membership	  in	  the	  human	  moral	  community	  to	  other	  humans.	  5. We	  recognize	  the	  principle	  of	  nonviolence	  as	  the	  guiding	  principle	  of	  the	  animal	  rights	  movement.	  Violence	  is	  the	  problem;	  it	  is	  not	  any	  part	  of	  the	  solution.119	  	   The	  implications	  of	  this	  view	  are	  radical	  insofar	  as	  it	  calls	  for	  a	  drastic	  restructuring	  of	  society.	  But,	  as	  Francione	  notes,	  this	  view	  is	  conservative	  in	  that	  it	  follows	  from	  a	  moral	  principle	  we	  already	  accept—it	  is	  wrong	  to	  inflict	  unnecessary	  suffering	  on	  animals.	  If	  we	  accept	  that	  other	  animals	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  not	  suffering	  that	  ought	  to	  be	  protected	  by	  a	  basic	  moral	  and	  legal	  right,	  then	  we	  must	  abolish,	  and	  not	  merely	  regulate	  the	  use	  of	  other	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  119	  see	  Francione’s	  webpage:	  http://www.abolitionistapproach.com/about/the-­‐six-­‐principles-­‐of-­‐the-­‐abolitionist-­‐approach-­‐to-­‐animal-­‐rights/#.VTV5VRdJvB8	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animals	  as	  resources,	  and	  we	  must	  not	  use	  them	  in	  situations	  in	  which	  we	  would	  never	  use	  a	  human.	  We	  ought	  to	  shift	  away	  from	  the	  welfare	  paradigm,	  which	  is	  concerned	  with	  how	  we	  treat	  other	  animals,	  to	  a	  rights	  paradigm,	  which	  rejects	  the	  use	  of	  other	  animals	  as	  resources.	  What	  this	  means	  practically	  is	  that	  we	  have	  to	  extend	  legal	  personhood	  to	  animals.	  We	  can	  no	  longer	  use	  them	  for	  food,	  entertainment,	  sport,	  clothing,	  experiments	  or	  product	  testing.120	   	  	   I	  will	  discuss	  two	  implications	  of	  this	  view	  that	  tend	  to	  cast	  doubt	  on	  the	  plausibility	  of	  this	  position.	  I	  will	  first	  discuss	  the	  implication	  that	  we	  can	  never	  use	  other	  animals	  in	  biomedical	  experiments,	  then	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  implication	  that	  animal	  rights	  advocates	  ought	  not	  to	  pursue	  any	  welfare	  reforms	  on	  behalf	  of	  other	  animals.	  I	  will	  close	  with	  a	  brief	  discussion	  of	  cases	  in	  which	  there	  is	  a	  genuine	  conflict	  of	  interests	  between	  humans	  and	  other	  animals.	  	  	   One	  might	  think	  that	  using	  other	  animals	  for	  biomedical	  experiments	  in	  order	  to	  cure	  human	  diseases	  might	  constitute	  a	  case	  of	  genuine	  emergency	  akin	  to	  the	  burning-­‐house	  scenario.	  But	  Francione	  points	  out	  that	  the	  “supposed	  conflict	  between	  humans	  animals	  in	  this	  context	  is	  no	  more	  real	  than	  a	  conflict	  between	  humans	  suffering	  from	  a	  disease	  and	  other	  humans	  we	  might	  use	  in	  experiments	  in	  order	  to	  find	  a	  cure	  for	  that	  disease.”121	  We	  do	  not	  think	  it	  is	  morally	  permissible	  to	  use	  unconsenting	  humans	  in	  medical	  experiments,	  even	  though	  doing	  so	  would	  yield	  better	  results	  than	  the	  results	  that	  would	  be	  yielded	  from	  another	  species	  of	  animal.	  Our	  willingness	  to	  use	  other	  animals	  for	  biomedical	  experiments	  when	  we	  would	  never	  subject	  humans	  to	  those	  experiments	  betrays	  speciesism.	  The	  supposed	  conflict	  between	  humans	  and	  other	  animals	  with	  regard	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120	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to	  biomedical	  experimentation	  is	  yet	  another	  fabricated	  conflict.	  Moreover,	  as	  Francione	  and	  many	  others	  have	  pointed	  out,	  it	  is	  not	  at	  all	  clear	  that	  biomedical	  experimentation	  on	  other	  animals	  positively	  impacts	  human	  health	  or	  improves	  “anything	  other	  than	  the	  bottom	  lines	  of	  corporations	  and	  grant-­‐hungry	  universities.”122	  	   	  In	  Rain	  Without	  Thunder:	  The	  Ideology	  of	  the	  Animal	  Rights	  Movement,	  Francione	  argues	  that	  the	  abolitionist	  position	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  welfare	  reform.	  The	  term	  “animal	  rights”	  is	  used	  as	  a	  generic	  umbrella	  term	  to	  capture	  any	  view	  that	  pertains	  to	  the	  welfare	  of	  animals.	  To	  get	  an	  idea	  of	  the	  capaciousness	  of	  the	  term,	  consider	  that	  it	  includes	  individuals	  who	  advocate	  for	  the	  total	  abolition	  of	  animal	  exploitation	  and	  individuals	  who	  are	  directly	  engaged	  in	  animal	  exploitation	  but	  who	  nevertheless	  purport	  to	  be	  concerned	  with	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  their	  animals.	  Francione	  distinguishes	  between	  welfarists	  and	  rightists.123	  Welfarists	  pursue	  welfare	  reforms,	  such	  as	  increased	  cage	  sizes	  for	  chickens.	  Some	  welfarists	  believe	  that	  welfare	  measures	  will	  eventually	  result	  in	  the	  abolition	  of	  animal	  exploitation.	  By	  contrast,	  rightists	  pursue	  only	  measures	  that	  represent	  some	  practice	  that	  is	  partially	  constitutive	  of	  the	  institution	  of	  animal	  exploitation.	  For	  instance,	  increasing	  the	  size	  of	  the	  cage	  of	  animals	  used	  in	  drug	  addiction	  experiments	  would	  represent	  an	  impermissible	  welfare	  reform,	  but	  ending	  drug	  testing	  on	  animals	  would	  represent	  an	  acceptable	  incremental	  step	  toward	  abolition.	  	  	   Francione	  maintains	  that	  welfare	  reforms	  are	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  abolitionist	  view.	  I	  will	  briefly	  discuss	  three	  of	  these	  reasons.	  Welfare	  reforms	  are	  fundamentally	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  rights	  position	  because	  they	  involve	  sacrificing	  the	  interests	  of	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animals	  today	  for	  the	  interest	  of	  future	  animals.124	  Welfare	  reforms	  take	  a	  long	  time	  to	  come	  into	  fruition.	  Therefore,	  when	  we	  advocate	  for	  reform	  and	  not	  abolition,	  we	  trade-­‐off	  the	  interests	  of	  animals	  now	  for	  future	  animals.	  Second,	  rightists	  oppose	  welfare	  reforms	  because	  they	  reinforce	  the	  property	  paradigm,	  rather	  than	  undermining	  it.125	  Indeed,	  Francione	  argues,	  welfare	  reforms	  may	  increase	  demand	  for	  animal	  products	  by	  implying	  that	  there	  is	  some	  ethical	  way	  to	  obtain	  them.126	  Third,	  Francione	  emphasizes	  that	  there	  are	  strong	  economic	  reasons	  that	  welfare	  reforms	  have	  not	  and	  cannot	  make	  a	  meaningful	  difference.127	  Moreover,	  supposed	  improvements	  in	  animal	  welfare	  are	  unstable,	  because	  they	  can	  easily	  be	  overturned	  by	  the	  next	  wave	  of	  politicians.	  Furthermore,	  Francione	  argues,	  animal	  exploiters	  would	  make	  welfare	  “improvements”	  anyhow,	  either	  because	  they	  would	  be	  economically	  beneficial,	  or	  because	  the	  industry	  would	  respond	  to	  decreasing	  demand	  for	  animal	  products	  by	  improving	  standards.128	  	  	   Francione	  also	  maintains	  that	  animal	  advocacy	  must	  be	  pursued	  on	  the	  grass	  roots	  level	  and	  take	  the	  form	  of	  educational	  initiatives.	  One	  reason	  this	  is	  the	  case	  is	  that	  big	  nonprofit	  organizations	  must	  seek	  insider	  status	  with	  lawmakers.129	  This	  necessarily	  involves	  compromising	  an	  unequivocal	  anti-­‐speciesist	  message,	  because	  big	  non-­‐profit	  organizations	  must	  appear	  to	  be	  moderate	  to	  lawmakers.	  One	  result	  of	  this	  compromise	  is	  that	  animal	  organizations	  effectively	  end	  up	  partnered	  with	  animal	  exploiters,	  often	  suggesting	  welfare	  improvements	  that	  would	  be	  economically	  beneficial	  to	  companies,	  and	  further	  reinforcing	  the	  problematic	  property	  paradigm.	  Institutional	  exploiters	  are	  then	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  124	  Francione,	  Gary	  L.	  Rain	  Without	  Thunder:	  The	  ideology	  of	  the	  Animal	  Rights	  Movement.	  pp.	  203-­‐206	  125	  Francione,	  Gary	  L.	  The	  Animal	  Rights	  Debate:	  Abolition	  or	  Regulation?	  pp.	  29-­‐40	  126	  ibid	  pp.	  85	  127	  ibid	  pp.	  27-­‐29.	  128	  ibid	  pp.	  45-­‐47	  
129	  ibid	  pp.	  162-­‐173	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able	  to	  cite	  their	  willingness	  to	  work	  with	  these	  groups	  as	  evidence	  that	  their	  practices	  are	  morally	  justifiable.	  Unlike	  big	  non-­‐profit	  organizations,	  smaller	  grassroots	  groups	  can	  maintain	  an	  unequivocal	  vegan	  message.	  Moreover,	  smaller	  grassroots	  groups	  can	  disseminate	  an	  unequivocal	  vegan	  message.	  They	  can	  do	  this	  because	  they	  do	  not	  have	  to	  appease	  their	  donor	  base	  by	  pursuing	  superficial	  welfare	  reforms	  to	  prove	  that	  they	  are	  making	  positive	  changes.	  Therefore,	  small	  grassroots	  groups	  are	  the	  appropriate	  vehicles	  for	  effective,	  creative	  and	  non-­‐violent	  advocacy.	  	  	  3.7	  Conclusion	  	   I	  have	  opted	  to	  give	  comprehensive	  accounts	  of	  these	  three	  theories	  because	  they	  have	  enormous	  sway	  over	  social	  thought	  and	  actions.	  The	  intuitive	  appeal	  of	  Singer’s	  view	  and	  of	  welfare	  reforms	  is	  so	  great	  that	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  identify	  exactly	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  it,	  and	  to	  offer	  an	  alternative	  account.	  As	  Francione	  points	  out,	  the	  welfarist	  view	  has	  dominated	  mainstream	  thinking	  for	  a	  long	  time	  and	  we	  have	  had	  anti-­‐cruelty	  laws	  for	  over	  100	  years,	  yet	  the	  animal	  exploitation	  industry	  is	  thriving.	  While	  Regan’s	  rights	  theory	  represents	  an	  improvement	  in	  our	  thinking,	  insofar	  as	  it	  issues	  rights	  to	  many	  sentient	  beings,	  it	  nevertheless	  fails	  in	  important	  respects.	  He	  does	  not	  extend	  rights	  to	  all	  sentient	  beings	  and	  he	  erroneously	  appeals	  to	  the	  traditional	  moral	  hierarchy,	  in	  which	  humans	  are	  on	  top.	  In	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  discuss	  four	  reasons	  that	  Francione’s	  rights	  theory	  is	  stronger	  than	  Regan’s.	  Because	  it	  is	  the	  strongest	  account,	  we	  ought	  to	  devote	  resources	  to	  clarifying	  and	  developing	  it.	  	  	   First,	  Francione’s	  view	  is	  preferable	  to	  Regan’s	  because	  Francione	  does	  not	  restrict	  the	  class	  of	  protected	  animals	  to	  beings	  who	  satisfy	  the	  subject-­‐of-­‐a-­‐life	  criterion.	  As	  we	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have	  seen,	  whatever	  differences	  there	  may	  be	  among	  sentient	  beings,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  they	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  not	  suffering.	  	  Although	  it	  is	  easier	  to	  identify	  the	  constellation	  of	  qualities	  that	  Regan	  describes	  as	  present	  in	  normally	  developed	  mammals	  of	  a	  particular	  age,	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  chickens	  and	  other	  birds	  are	  intelligent,	  sentient	  being	  with	  an	  experiential	  life.	  And	  although	  most	  of	  us	  do	  not	  even	  think	  of	  fish	  as	  conscious	  of	  pain,	  researchers	  have	  concluded	  that	  fish	  “have	  subjective	  experiences	  and	  so	  are	  liable	  to	  suffer.”130	  	  	  	  Regan	  does	  not	  deny	  that	  beings	  who	  are	  not	  subjects-­‐of-­‐a-­‐life	  have	  inherent	  value.	  Rather,	  he	  says	  that,	  if	  they	  do,	  they	  have	  it	  on	  different	  grounds	  than	  individuals	  who	  are	  subjects-­‐of-­‐a-­‐life.	  Francione’s	  view,	  however,	  is	  preferable	  because	  it	  accounts	  for	  the	  moral	  status	  of	  all	  animals,	  and	  it	  does	  so	  without	  presupposing	  any	  metaphysical	  commitments.	  Whereas	  Regan’s	  view	  requires	  us	  to	  accept	  that	  rights	  are	  a	  feature	  of	  objective	  reality,	  which	  moral	  patients	  and	  agents	  possess	  in	  virtue	  of	  being	  subjects-­‐of-­‐a-­‐life,	  Francione’s	  view	  only	  requires	  logic.	  Rights	  are	  simply	  a	  tool	  for	  protecting	  interests.	  	  	   The	  second	  reason	  Francione’s	  theory	  is	  preferable	  to	  Regan’s	  is	  that	  Regan	  wrongly	  privileges	  subjects-­‐of-­‐a-­‐life	  over	  other	  animals,	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  human’s	  higher	  level	  of	  cognitive	  sophistication.	  This	  is	  evident	  in	  his	  prescription	  for	  adjudicating	  emergency	  scenarios,	  in	  which	  one	  must	  choose	  whether	  to	  save	  the	  life	  of	  a	  human	  or	  another	  animal,	  such	  as	  dog.	  Recall	  that,	  in	  situations	  of	  genuine	  emergency,	  we	  are	  morally	  obligated	  to	  save	  the	  life	  of	  a	  human,	  even	  over	  millions	  of	  dogs.	  Regan	  thinks	  that	  death	  is	  a	  greater	  harm	  to	  the	  human,	  because	  death	  forecloses	  on	  more	  opportunities	  for	  humans	  than	  it	  does	  for	  dogs.	  This	  is	  because,	  on	  Regan’s	  view,	  dogs	  are	  not	  as	  cognitively	  sophisticated	  as	  humans.	  But	  privileging	  cognitive	  sophistication	  is	  arbitrary.	  Francione	  points	  out	  that	  there	  is	  no	  reason,	  for	  instance,	  to	  think	  that	  lives	  of	  individuals	  who	  can	  do	  math	  are	  superior	  to	  the	  lives	  of	  individuals	  who	  can	  fly.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  we	  would	  not	  be	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  or	  the	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  p.	  xxxiii.	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Chapter	  3:	  What	  Should	  We	  Do?	  
	  1.1	  Introduction	  	  	   Having	  established	  what	  speciesism	  is,	  and	  having	  identified	  strong	  grounds	  for	  our	  obligations	  to	  other	  animals,	  we	  are	  now	  in	  a	  position	  to	  consider	  what	  we	  should	  do	  about	  speciesism.	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  discuss	  what	  minimal	  obligations	  we	  have	  to	  other	  animals	  and	  to	  discuss	  how	  we	  might	  begin	  to	  undermine	  speciesism,	  given	  its	  ideological	  nature.	  	  	  1.2	  Minimal	  Moral	  Requirement:	  Veganism	  	   Regardless	  of	  whether	  one	  agrees	  with	  Francione	  that	  we	  ought	  not	  to	  endorse	  welfare	  reforms,	  respecting	  other	  animals’	  basic	  right	  not	  be	  used	  exclusively	  as	  a	  means	  to	  someone	  else’s	  ends	  requires	  that	  we	  stop	  eating	  them	  and	  using	  them	  for	  reasons	  of	  pleasure,	  amusement	  and	  convenience.	  It	  requires,	  at	  minimum,	  that	  we	  be	  vegans.	  More	  specifically,	  we	  should	  abstain	  from	  eating	  or	  wearing	  animals,	  using	  them	  as	  subjects	  in	  medical	  experiments	  or	  for	  product	  testing,	  or	  holding	  them	  captive	  in	  zoos,	  or	  breeding	  them	  as	  “pets.”	   	  	   I	  will	  now	  address	  two	  possible	  objections	  to	  the	  view	  that	  veganism	  is	  morally	  required.	  One	  concern	  that	  often	  arises	  from	  the	  argument	  that	  veganism	  is	  morally	  imperative	  is	  a	  concern	  about	  further	  disadvantaging	  disadvantaged	  individuals.	  Let	  us	  call	  this	  the	  privilege	  objection,	  which	  goes	  something	  like	  this:	  veganism	  cannot	  be	  morally	  required	  because	  not	  all	  people	  have	  the	  opportunity,	  time	  or	  money	  to	  be	  vegans.	  If	  veganism	  is	  morally	  required,	  then	  only	  privileged	  people	  can	  do	  what	  is	  morally	  right.	  Veganism	  cannot	  be	  a	  moral	  requirement	  because	  it	  entails	  wrongly	  morally	  condemning	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individuals	  who	  are	  disadvantaged.	  I	  have	  two	  responses	  to	  the	  privilege	  concern:	  the	  first	  is	  factual	  and	  the	  second	  is	  conceptual.	  First,	  various	  studies	  have	  suggested	  that	  animal	  rights	  supporters	  come	  from	  various	  socioeconomic	  backgrounds.132	  In	  fact,	  a	  vegan	  diet	  can	  actually	  be	  much	  cheaper	  than	  a	  standard	  American	  diet.	  But,	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  argument	  let	  us	  assume	  that	  it	  is	  more	  expensive	  to	  be	  vegan	  and	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  vegans	  are	  white	  and	  wealthy.	  	   My	  second,	  and	  most	  important	  response	  to	  the	  privilege	  concern	  is	  that	  this	  concern	  can	  be	  allayed	  by	  appeal	  to	  the	  distinction	  between	  moral	  permissibility	  and	  moral	  culpability.	  Moral	  permissibility	  refers	  to	  the	  value	  of	  a	  specific	  action	  and	  moral	  culpability	  refers	  to	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  an	  individual	  is	  responsible	  for	  that	  action.	  For	  instance	  we	  tend	  to	  think	  that	  we	  are	  all	  morally	  obligated	  to	  refrain	  from	  murdering	  others.	  That,	  we	  tend	  to	  think	  murder	  is	  a	  morally	  impermissible	  act.	  However,	  we	  recognize	  that	  there	  are	  cases	  in	  which	  we	  should	  not	  hold	  an	  individual	  morally	  culpable	  for	  committing	  murder.	  For	  instance,	  in	  cases	  of	  genuine	  self-­‐defense,	  we	  tend	  to	  think	  that	  murder	  is	  morally	  excusable.	  	  	   Likewise,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  veganism,	  if	  a	  person	  genuinely	  cannot	  access	  vegan	  food	  or	  information	  about	  veganism,	  then	  she	  should	  certainly	  not	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  consuming	  animal	  products.	  For	  instance,	  consider	  Mary,	  a	  single	  mother,	  who	  is	  dependent	  upon	  public	  transportation	  and	  state	  assistance.	  Not	  only	  are	  the	  grocery	  stores	  she	  has	  access	  to	  inadequate,	  she	  works	  60	  hours	  a	  week	  and	  does	  not	  have	  the	  time	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  132	  Jerolmack,	  Colin.	  (2003).	  Tracing	  the	  Profile	  of	  Animal	  Right	  Supporters:	  A	  Preliminary	  Investigation.	  
Society	  and	  Animals	  11:3.	  	  also	  see	  Kendal,	  Holli	  A.,	  Labao,	  Linda.	  M,	  Sharp,	  Jeff	  S.	  (2006).	  Public	  Concern	  with	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contemplate	  the	  morality	  of	  her	  food	  choices.	  We	  should	  think	  of	  Mary	  as	  being	  in	  a	  state	  of	  socioeconomic	  emergency.	  If	  Mary	  knows	  that	  consuming	  animals	  is	  wrong	  but	  she	  does	  it	  because	  she	  does	  not	  have	  a	  viable	  alternative,	  then	  her	  actions	  are	  morally	  excusable.	  This	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  consuming	  animal	  products	  is	  morally	  permissible;	  it	  merely	  means	  that	  there	  are	  cases	  in	  which	  it	  is	  morally	  excusable	  to	  do	  so.	  If	  Mary’s	  situation	  were	  to	  change,	  then	  Mary’s	  level	  of	  culpability	  could	  also	  change.	  By	  contrast,	  consider	  Bob.	  Bob	  has	  access	  to	  all	  the	  resources	  necessary	  to	  obtain	  vegan	  food	  and	  information.	  Let	  us	  also	  suppose	  that	  he	  is	  not	  suffering	  from	  false	  consciousness	  with	  respect	  to	  speciesism.	  Bob	  knows	  consuming	  animals	  is	  wrong,	  and	  he	  has	  a	  genuine	  choice	  in	  the	  matter,	  but	  he	  eats	  animal	  products	  anyway.	  In	  this	  case,	  we	  would	  be	  justified	  in	  holding	  Bob	  morally	  culpable	  for	  his	  actions.	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  absolutely	  crucial	  to	  recognize	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  opportunity,	  time	  and	  money	  that	  motivates	  the	  privilege	  problem	  stems	  from	  social	  and	  economic	  inequality,	  and	  it	  highlights	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  speciesism	  is	  entrenched	  in	  our	  society;	  it	  does	  not	  betray	  a	  conceptual	  problem	  with	  veganism	  or	  the	  idea	  that	  other	  animals	  have	  basic	  rights.	  	  	   The	  next	  objection	  I	  want	  to	  consider	  is	  perhaps	  less	  of	  an	  objection	  to	  the	  notion	  that	  veganism	  is	  morally	  required,	  and	  more	  of	  a	  query	  about	  whether	  veganism	  requires	  the	  abolition	  of	  every	  form	  of	  animal	  use.	  That	  is,	  are	  there	  any	  uses	  of	  animals	  that	  do	  not	  constitute	  rights	  violations?	  Consider	  the	  following	  formulation	  of	  an	  oft-­‐evoked	  counterexample	  to	  the	  notion	  that	  all	  uses	  are	  morally	  impermissible.	  Suppose	  other	  animals	  are	  no	  longer	  legal	  property.	  I	  have	  adopted	  a	  hen	  from	  a	  factory	  farm	  that	  has	  been	  closed.	  I	  intend	  to	  care	  for	  her	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  her	  life.	  Like	  most	  chickens	  bred	  in	  factory	  farms,	  she	  has	  been	  genetically	  engineered	  to	  produce	  a	  lot	  of	  eggs.	  The	  possibility	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that	  I	  might	  be	  able	  to	  eat	  her	  eggs	  did	  not	  factor	  into	  my	  decision	  to	  adopt	  her.	  There	  are	  eggs	  simply	  laying	  in	  my	  yard.	  Would	  eating	  them	  constitute	  a	  rights	  violation?	  	  	   It	  is	  not	  clear	  to	  me	  that	  this	  would	  constitute	  a	  rights	  violation.	  However,	  I	  think	  there	  are	  good	  reasons	  we	  should	  not	  eat	  eggs	  from	  rescued	  hens.	  First,	  I	  think	  it	  is	  problematic	  to	  think	  of	  eggs	  as	  appropriate	  sources	  of	  food.	  Just	  as	  we	  would	  not	  consider	  eating	  an	  amputated	  human	  arm	  that	  is	  just	  lying	  in	  the	  trash,	  we	  should	  not	  consider	  eating	  the	  products	  of	  the	  reproductive	  systems	  of	  hens.	  Second,	  the	  question	  about	  whether	  it	  is	  morally	  permissible	  to	  consume	  eggs	  from	  rescued	  hens	  ought	  to	  be	  considered	  from	  within	  the	  context	  of	  our	  speciesism-­‐entrenched	  society.	  Within	  this	  context,	  eating	  eggs	  risks	  perpetuating	  the	  pernicious	  speciesist	  paradigm,	  in	  which	  animals	  are	  viewed	  as	  commodities.	  Even	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  consuming	  eggs	  from	  rescued	  hens	  does	  not	  violate	  their	  rights,	  our	  consumption	  of	  eggs	  might	  constitute	  an	  affirmation	  of	  the	  permissibility	  of	  animal	  use.	  I	  will	  briefly	  expand	  upon	  the	  idea	  that	  animals	  are	  not	  
things	  to	  eat	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  	   For	  now,	  I	  will	  leave	  open	  the	  question	  about	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  class	  of	  animal	  uses	  that	  do	  not	  violate	  rights.	  It	  would	  be	  incomprehensible,	  I	  think,	  to	  maintain	  that	  every	  use	  of	  other	  animals	  is	  morally	  wrong.	  For	  example,	  merely	  resting	  one’s	  arm	  on	  one’s	  beloved	  rescued	  dog	  while	  watching	  television	  can	  be	  construed	  as	  “using”	  the	  dog.	  It	  would	  be	  strange	  to	  think	  that	  this	  action	  violates	  the	  dog’s	  rights.	  There	  is	  clearly	  a	  distinction	  between	  using	  other	  animals	  as	  a	  means	  and	  using	  them	  exclusively	  as	  means.	  But	  wherever	  the	  line	  is	  drawn	  between	  using	  other	  animals	  as	  a	  means	  and	  exclusively	  as	  means,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  our	  uses	  will	  fall	  on	  the	  wrong	  side	  of	  that	  line.	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   Before	  I	  close	  this	  section,	  I	  want	  to	  make	  a	  note	  about	  the	  process	  of	  becoming	  vegan.	  Veganism	  itself	  is	  not	  difficult	  or	  complicated.	  Animal	  products	  are	  nonessential,	  so	  theoretically,	  there	  is	  nothing	  biologically	  difficult	  about	  ceasing	  to	  use	  them.	  However,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  we	  live	  in	  a	  world	  that	  is	  entrenched	  in	  speciesism.	  We	  have	  become	  dependent	  on	  animals	  products	  and	  we	  lack	  cultural	  precedent	  for	  living	  without	  them.	  For	  some	  people,	  it	  will	  be	  possible	  to	  become	  vegan	  immediately.	  For	  instance,	  an	  individual	  whose	  worldview	  is	  such	  that	  it	  can	  easily	  absorb	  anti-­‐speciesist	  ideology,	  and	  who	  has	  a	  sufficient	  degree	  of	  control	  over	  her	  life,	  may	  be	  able	  to	  make	  the	  change	  with	  little	  ado.	  	  	   Other	  people’s	  lives	  may	  be	  more	  complicated	  and	  becoming	  vegan	  might	  require	  more	  time	  or	  energy.	  For	  instance,	  suppose	  one	  has	  a	  demanding	  job	  and	  a	  family	  who	  would	  resist	  such	  a	  change.	  It	  does	  not	  seem	  right	  to	  hold	  that	  person	  morally	  accountable	  for	  not	  becoming	  vegan	  immediately.	  There	  ought	  to	  be	  a	  culpability	  grace	  period,	  so	  to	  speak.	  If	  one	  cannot	  immediately	  become	  vegan	  but	  recognizes	  the	  imperativeness	  of	  doing	  so,	  then	  what	  he	  ought	  to	  do	  is	  declare	  a	  moral	  state	  of	  emergency	  with	  a	  definitive	  date	  by	  which	  he	  will	  make	  the	  transition.	  For	  instance,	  one	  might	  commit	  (if	  one	  can)	  to	  taking	  time	  off,	  or	  to	  making	  other	  provisions	  to	  make	  the	  transition.	  What	  exactly	  this	  process	  should	  look	  like	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  constraints	  in	  an	  individual’s	  life.	  The	  point	  here	  is	  to	  highlight	  that	  while	  we	  should	  be	  unequivocal	  about	  the	  rights	  of	  animals,	  we	  should	  also	  support	  people	  in	  becoming	  vegan	  rather	  than	  being	  too	  preoccupied	  with	  determining	  the	  exact	  moment	  at	  which	  an	  individual	  is	  morally	  accountable	  for	  her	  actions.	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1.3	  Reconceptualizing	  our	  Relationships	  With	  Other	  Animals	  	   The	  question	  about	  whether	  we	  ought	  to	  eat	  eggs,	  or	  any	  animal	  products,	  when	  doing	  so	  does	  not	  cause	  suffering	  and	  it	  does	  not	  constitute	  a	  rights	  violation,	  highlights	  a	  possible	  shortcoming	  of	  all	  the	  theories	  I	  have	  discussed.	  As	  Cora	  Diamond	  discusses	  in	  “Eating	  Meat	  and	  Eating	  People,”	  theories	  that	  appeal	  to	  suffering	  or	  capacities	  to	  ground	  rights	  or	  protections	  fail	  to	  explain	  why	  animals	  are	  not	  things	  to	  eat.	  They	  do	  not	  address	  our	  attitudes	  towards	  other	  animals.	  These	  theories	  do	  not	  explain,	  for	  instance,	  whether	  we	  ought	  to	  refrain	  from	  eating	  a	  cow	  who	  has	  been	  struck	  by	  lightening.	  Or	  whether	  it	  is	  permissible	  to	  buy	  a	  leather	  jacket	  from	  a	  thrift	  store.	  Appealing	  to	  interests	  or	  rights	  does	  not	  offer	  insight	  into	  the	  permissibility	  of	  these	  actions.	  Nor	  do	  we	  gain	  insight	  by	  appealing	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  do	  not	  eat	  deceased	  humans.	  In	  fact,	  Diamond	  says,	  appealing	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  do	  not	  eat	  our	  dead	  or	  use	  humans	  as	  food	  sources	  is	  not	  only	  unhelpful;	  it	  is	  self-­‐destructive.	  This	  kind	  of	  argument,	  she	  says,	  does	  not	  defend	  animals;	  it	  attacks	  the	  significance	  of	  human	  life.133	  According	  to	  Diamond,	  we	  need	  to	  understand	  what	  considerations	  are	  involved	  in	  our	  not	  eating	  our	  dead	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  why	  it	  is	  wrong	  for	  us	  to	  view	  animals	  as	  food	  sources.134	  	   Diamond	  suggests	  that	  one	  way	  to	  go	  about	  showing	  someone	  why	  he	  ought	  not	  to	  eat	  animals	  is	  by	  casting	  other	  animals	  as	  “fellow	  creatures,”	  not	  in	  a	  biological	  sense	  but	  as	  “fellows	  in	  mortality,”	  or	  independent	  beings	  who	  are	  subject	  to	  life’s	  contingencies,	  or	  “thy	  poor	  earth	  bound	  companion.”135	  Diamond	  offers	  the	  following	  example	  to	  illuminate	  the	  significance	  of	  how	  we	  conceptualize	  other	  beings.	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Compare	  the	  case	  Orwell	  describes,	  from	  his	  experience,	  in	  the	  Spanish	  Civil	  War,	  of	  being	  unable	  to	  shoot	  a	  half-­‐dressed	  man	  who	  was	  running	  along	  the	  top	  of	  a	  trench	  parapet,	  holding	  up	  his	  trousers	  with	  both	  hands	  as	  he	  ran.	  ‘I	  had	  come	  here	  to	  shoot	  “Fascists,”	  but	  a	  man	  who	  is	  holding	  up	  his	  trousers	  is	  not	  a	  “Fascist,”	  but	  is	  visibly	  a	  fellow	  creature,	  similar	  to	  yourself,	  and	  you	  do	  not	  feel	  like	  shooting	  him.’	  The	  notion	  of	  enemy	  (‘Fascist’)	  and	  fellow	  creature	  are	  there	  in	  a	  kind	  of	  tension,	  and	  even	  a	  man	  who	  could	  shoot	  at	  a	  man	  running	  holding	  up	  his	  trousers	  might	  recognize	  perfectly	  well	  why	  Orwell	  could	  not.136	  	  	  	  	  	  	  We	  categorize	  other	  animals	  in	  ways	  that	  impact	  how	  we	  view	  them:	  some	  are	  pets,	  some	  are	  vermin,	  others	  are	  food.	  If	  these	  categories	  are	  socially	  constructed,	  then	  they	  are	  mutable,	  and	  we	  might	  be	  able	  to	  reconstruct	  the	  way	  we	  view	  other	  animals.	  Diamond’s	  view	  suggests	  that	  we	  might	  be	  able	  to	  undermine	  speciesism	  by	  presenting	  people	  with	  alternative	  ways,	  or	  counter-­‐ideologies,	  to	  conceptualize	  animals	  that	  might	  appeal	  to	  their	  affective	  systems.	  Perhaps	  we	  might	  be	  able	  to	  prompt	  people	  to	  see	  other	  animals	  in	  the	  way	  Orwell	  saw	  the	  so	  called	  ‘Fascist’	  man	  running	  while	  struggling	  to	  hold	  up	  his	  trousers.	  We	  might	  do	  this	  through	  literature,	  film,	  or	  by	  spending	  time	  with	  “food”	  animals.	  Before	  I	  leave	  this	  section,	  I	  want	  to	  note	  two	  things.	  First,	  I	  think	  that	  because	  abolitionist	  theory	  includes	  all	  sentient	  beings	  in	  the	  moral	  community,	  it	  can	  absorb	  a	  conception	  of	  other	  animals	  as	  “fellow	  creatures.”	  Second,	  I	  want	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  there	  is	  an	  implicit	  question	  lurking	  in	  this	  thesis	  about	  how	  much	  a	  given	  concept	  or	  theory	  ought	  to	  be	  able	  to	  do.	  How	  much	  should	  it	  be	  able	  explain?	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  this	  thesis,	  I	  am	  going	  to	  set	  this	  question	  aside,	  but	  I	  think	  that	  Sally	  Haslanger	  is	  right	  in	  noting	  that	  the	  strength	  of	  a	  concept	  or	  theory	  ought	  to	  be	  measured	  by	  what	  we	  want	  it	  to	  do	  for	  us.	  If	  we	  want	  to	  explain	  why	  we	  should	  stop	  exploiting	  animals,	  then	  Francione’s	  theory	  is	  successful.	  If	  we	  want	  to	  explain	  why	  we	  should	  refrain	  from	  eating	  “roadkill”	  it	  falls	  short.	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Undermining	  Speciesism	  	   Francione	  maintains	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  combat	  speciesism	  through	  creative	  nonviolent	  vegan	  education.	  But	  If	  I	  am	  right	  that	  speciesism	  is	  an	  ideology,	  then	  educational	  initiatives	  alone	  will	  be	  insufficient	  to	  undermine	  speciesism.	  However,	  vegan	  education	  is	  a	  necessary	  component	  if	  there	  is	  to	  be	  any	  hope	  of	  eventually	  dismantling	  speciesist	  ideology.	  In	  order	  to	  make	  any	  structural	  changes,	  or	  to	  create	  counter-­‐ideologies	  through	  books	  and	  film,	  we	  have	  to	  develop	  a	  critical	  mass	  of	  people	  who	  are	  committed	  to	  doing	  so.	  Given	  that	  not	  everyone	  holds	  speciesist	  beliefs	  in	  false	  consciousness,	  or	  that	  everyone	  who	  does	  hold	  beliefs	  in	  false	  consciousness	  will	  remain	  stuck	  in	  false	  consciousness,	  this	  should	  be	  possible.	  	  	   As	  a	  strategic	  matter,	  our	  vegan	  educational	  efforts	  ought	  to	  be	  aimed	  at	  individuals	  who	  already	  hold	  anti-­‐oppression	  worldviews.	  While	  there	  is	  no	  guarantee	  that,	  if	  they	  hold	  their	  speciesist	  beliefs	  in	  false	  consciousness,	  they	  will	  come	  to	  see	  speciesism	  as	  a	  form	  of	  oppression,	  it	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  think	  that	  people	  who	  already	  hold	  compatible	  worldviews	  would	  be	  more	  receptive	  to	  the	  message.	  Moreover,	  not	  everyone	  holds	  speciesist	  beliefs	  in	  false	  consciousness,	  so	  in	  some	  cases	  people	  simply	  need	  more	  information	  so	  that	  they	  can	  react	  appropriately	  by	  becoming	  vegan.	  	  	   Advocates	  for	  animal	  rights	  also	  ought	  to	  seek	  clarity	  on	  two	  issues	  in	  particular.	  First,	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  know	  that	  speciesist	  ideology	  is	  often	  accepted	  for	  affective	  (that,	  is	  noncognitive)	  reasons;	  we	  also	  should	  seek	  to	  understand	  what	  those	  reasons	  are.	  Second,	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  know	  that	  speciesism	  serves	  the	  social	  function	  of	  creating	  and	  stabilizing	  animal	  oppression;	  we	  should	  also	  seek	  to	  identify	  whose	  interests	  are	  served	  by	  the	  oppression	  of	  the	  other	  animals.	  We	  may	  be	  able	  to	  draw	  on	  insights	  from	  other	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